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ABSTRACT
Benefiting from innovatory techniques, two communication platforms (online so-
cial networking (OSN) platforms and smartphone platforms) have emerged and been
widely used in the last few years. However, cybercriminals have also utilized these
two emerging platforms to launch malicious activities such as sending spam, spread-
ing malware, hosting botnet command and control (C&C) channels, and performing
other illicit activities. All these malicious activities may cause significant economic
loss to our society and even threaten national security. Thus, great e↵orts are indeed
needed to mitigate malicious activities on these advanced communication platforms.
The goal of this research is to make a deep analysis of malicious activities on OSN
and smartphone platforms, and to develop e↵ective and e cient defense approaches
against those malicious activities. Firstly, this dissertation performs an empirical
analysis of the cyber criminal ecosystem on a large-scale online social networking
website space. Secondly, through reverse engineering OSN spammers’ tastes (their
preferred targets to spam), this dissertation provides guidelines for building more
e↵ective social honeypots on the online social networking platforms, and generates
new insights to defend against OSN spammers. Thirdly, this dissertation shows
a comprehensive empirical study on analyzing the market-level and network-level
behaviors of the Android malware ecosystem. Lastly, by grouping the common pro-
gram logic among malware families, this dissertation designs an e↵ective system to
automatically detect Android malware.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the recent years, with the innovation of Online Social Networking (OSN) plat-
forms (e.g., Twitter and Facebook) and Smartphone platforms (e.g., Android), many
people have changed their lifestyle, from posting their recent experiences, finding out
what friends are up to, and keeping track of the hottest trends, to viewing interesting
photos or videos, and playing games with friends.
However, cyber-criminals have also utilized OSN platforms and smartphone plat-
forms to launch malicious activities such as sending spam, spreading malware, hosting
botnet command and control (C&C) channels, and performing other illicit activities.
All these malicious activities have caused significant economic loss to our society,
and even threaten national security. Thus, great e↵orts are indeed needed to miti-
gate malicious activities on these advanced communication platforms. The goal of
this research is to make a deep analysis of malicious activities on these two types
of emerging communication platforms, and to further develop e↵ective and e cient
defense insights against those malicious activities.
In this chapter, we first introduce the malicious activities in these two types of
the platforms, and then outline the research challenges for the analysis and detection
of those malicious activities. Next, we show the common characteristics of these two
types of platforms that are essentially utilized by cyber-criminals to launch malicious
activities. We further provide an overview of our solution: a deep understanding of
spammers’ social networks, and a comprehensive measurement of spammers’ strate-
gies of selecting spamming targets, and two Android malware detection approaches
(one is built based on the understanding of Android malware ecosystem; the other
one is built by disassembling Android apps, and analyzing the programming pro-
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cedure shared by known malware.). Finally, we present the contributions of the
dissertation.
1.1 Malicious Activities in the OSN and Smartphone Platforms
Traditionally, cyber-criminals typically require great e↵orts to build their own
platforms to induce victims to visit their spam/malicious websites or further down-
load their malware. Generally, the e↵ectiveness of cyber-criminals to successfully
induce victims is highly restricted by two major factors: (1) the number of users
that the links to the cyber-criminals’ spam/malicious websites can be exposed to;
(2) click-through rate, which is the probability that the users would click links to
visit spam/malicious links (or further download malware). Cyber-criminals typically
spread their malicious links in popular forums to induce victims. Since most of the
forums are interested by particular groups of people, and most people only read re-
cent news typically shown in the top a few pages, the e↵ectiveness of this approach to
induce victims is highly limited by the number of users that can access the malicious
links.
However, the emergency of OSN and smartphone platforms eased the process
of cyber-criminals to induce victims. Cyber-criminals have already utilized such
communication platforms to launch multiple types of malicious activities. Table 1.1
shows several selective attacks that historically are launched in the OSN platforms.
As seen from this table, in the early stage of the OSN platforms, due to the week
security vetting process, cyber-criminals can easily spread spam [81] or phishing at-
tacks [56] by posting unsolicited messages on their faked accounts’ profile, or sending
unsolicited messages to other users. As a very stealthy channel, cyber-criminals have
also utilized OSN platforms to host C&C commands to coordinate with their con-
trolled bots. Later, cyber-criminals evolved to exploit the security vulnerabilities
2
Attack Type Year Attack Details
Spam 2009 Twitter spam invades trending topics [81]
Phishing 2009 A new phishing scam spreads through direct messages [56]
Hosting Botnet 2009 Twitter-based Botnet Command Channel [59]
Clickjacking 2010 Facebook clickjacking attack spreads through Facebook likes [120]
Cross-site Scripting 2010 Twitter onMouseOver security flaws [28]
Distributing Malware 2011 New Koobface malware spreads on Facebook [17]
Hacking Accounts 2010 Twitter phishing hack hits BBC, Guardian and cabinet minister [6]
Table 1.1: Selective attacks in the online social networking platforms.
of OSN platforms to launch more complex attacks (e.g., clickjacking attacks [120]
and cross-site scripting attacks [28]). In addition, once some famous OSN accounts
owning thousands of OSN friends (e.g., followers in Twitter or friends in Facebook)
are hacked, cyber criminals utilized these accounts to spread their malicious content
very e ciently, and made great cost for victims [6].
Similarly, cyber-criminals have also unleashed a great number of smartphone mal-
ware to achieve multiple malicious goals (e.g., hijacking phones [72], privacy leak-
ing [20] and money stealing [98, 119]). According to a survey in China, until March
2012, over 210 thousands smartphones have been injected malicious code that can
steal victims’ money by stealthily making phone calls or sending SMS messages to
premium-rate numbers. It makes victims to lose over 10 million dollars per year [98].
Meanwhile, the number of malicious smartphone apps also increases quickly during
these years. According to a Mobile Report, the number of malicious Android apps
received by F-Secure grew from 139 in the first quarter (Q1) of 201, to 3,063 and
over 10,000 during the same Q1 period of 2012 and 2013, respectively. F-Secure also
receives 153 new Android malware families in the first quarter (Q1) of 2013, which
increases to 252 in the third quarter (Q3) of 2013. Trend Micro identified about
5,000 malicious Android apps in the first quarter of 2012, a number that rose to
3
20,000 by the end of June. Google has realized the seriousness of the malware threat
and implemented the Google Bouncer for its GooglePlay marketplace. But, Google-
Play remains inaccessible in countries like China, where users have no choice but to
rely on dubious third-party marketplaces. Furthermore, clever malware could still
fingerprint and evade the analysis of Bouncer [125]. Trend Micro also reports that
it found 17 malicious apps in GooglePlay (Google’s o cial Android marketplace),
and those apps were downloaded more than 700,000 times before Google removed
them. In addition, di↵erent from spreading desktop malware, malware authors can
utilize Android markets to spread Android malware more e ciently. According to a
recent report in 2013, during a security check of over 90,000 Android apps from 24
Chinese third-party Android markets, 860 types of Android malware were discovered
and had been downloaded over 8.5 million times [99]. One type of the Android mal-
ware, named Skullkey, was inserted to over 6,000 Android apps and spread widely in
those third-party markets. This malware could even bypass the detection of existing
commercial anti-virus tools and achieve multiple malicious goals (e.g.,steal sensitive
information and send SMS to premium-rate numbers).
According to the previous discussions, we can clearly see that we need to take
great e↵orts to design e↵ective approaches to defend against those malicious ac-
tivities launched in such emerging communication platforms. Thus, the desire of
understanding and further detecting such new types of malicious activities forms the
key motivation of this dissertation.
1.2 Common Charactersitics between OSN and Smartphone Platforms
The reason why the emergency of the OSN and smartphone platforms facilities
cyber-criminals to launch attacks is mainly due to the following four major common
characteristics:
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• User-based. Both of these two types of platforms rely on users’ contribution
(e.g., Tweets in Twitter, Walls in Facebook, and Android apps in GooglePlay).
Restricted by limited policies, users have a great freedom to submit any infor-
mation they like to share. Also, in the current design of these two types of
platforms’ architecture, the content submit by the users can be pushed to (or
recommended to) other users. Thus, utilizing such platforms, cyber-criminals
can stealthily submit their malicious content, and expose them to potential
victims more e ciently.
• Global Centralized. Both of these two types of platforms have been widely
used by the people from all of the world. By Jan. 1st of 2014, Twitter has
over 645 million active registered users and over 58 million tweets per day.
By Jan. 14th of 2014, smartphones have taken over 90% of global market
shares (Android takes up around 51.7%). By July 2013, over 1 million Android
apps are available in GooglePlay and over 50 billion times of apps have been
downloaded by users. Such a global centralized architecture essentially can be
utilized by cyber-criminals to expose their malicious content to more potential
victims at a very fast speed.
• Interactive. Unlike traditional chatting rooms and forums, users can interact
with their friends (e.g., sharing interesting news, personal photos, and playing
games) more frequently and easily in these emerging communication platforms.
In the real-world, people tend to trust the information sent from their friends,
or trust the items selected by a large number of people. With the same habi-
tat, users are typically less aware of potential security risks in the messages
(e.g., Tweets and Walls) post/sent from their OSN friends (or famous OSN
users), and also more likely to download those hot apps that have been down-
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loaded a lot. Thus, once cyber-criminals successfully compromise such trust
to post malicious content (e.g., compromise famous OSN accounts, or fraudu-
lently increase the downloading numbers of smartphone apps), these malicious
content can be spread at a very fast speed. In fact, many benign users’ OSN
accounts are compromised due to their less awareness of the security risks in
the messages sent from their friends or their favorite stars.
• Week Security Vetting Process. In the early stage of these two types of plat-
forms, organizers typically pay more attentions to encouraging users to con-
tribute more content to the system, than the quality (potential security risks)
of those content. Once these platforms become larger and more popular, the
great amount of information post by users makes it extremely changeling for
the organizers to vet potential security risks or attacks in every piece of the
information within a short time period.
1.3 Research Challenges of Detecting Malicious Activities
The first challenge of detecting malicious activities in these two types of platforms
is that we lack basic insights of the strategies that are utilized by cyber-criminals
to launch malicious activities. More specifically, in terms of the OSN platform,
cyber-criminals typically require to register a corpus of fake (spam) accounts to
spread malicious activities. Although existing studies have been made to detect
sybil nodes. These studies rely on the assumption that it is di cult for sybil nodes
to mix with benign nodes. However, is this assumption held in the real-world OSN
platforms? If not, how do spam accounts mix into the real-world OSN platforms?
How are spam accounts correlated with each other? How do spam accounts find
their spamming targets? How do malware authors utilize app markets to spread
smartphone malware? How do malware authors build networking infrastructure to
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communicate with their malware? The deep understanding of these questions are
essentially very important to facilitate to design e↵ective approaches to detect those
malicious activities.
The second challenge is that how to design e↵ective and e cient approaches to
detect (or to guide the sample of more likely) malicious activities, given the limited
time/resource. Given the fact that there are millions of OSN accounts and billions
of OSN messages sent per day, it is extremely di cult to analyze every account and
every message within a short time of period. Thus, a guided inference to those more
likely spam accounts is highly desirable. Also, due to the socialization property of
the OSN platform, to design e↵ective defensive approach, we may also need to bor-
row knowledge from other areas (e.g., graph theory and nature language processing
theory). Similarly, in the smartphone platform, not every smartphone app market
(especially those third-party markets) has su cient resource/time/expertise to make
a deep security analysis of the all apps that are uploaded to the markets. Even for
the o cial smartphone app market (e.g., GooglePlay), it will be very challenging (or
even impossible) to vet every app within a short time period. Thus, an e↵ective and
lightweight approach to sample those more likely malicious apps is also desirable.
In addition, given the special programming design of smartphone platforms, we also
need to deeply analyze the programming procedure in known smartphone malware
to design an e↵ective approach to automatically detect smartphone malware.
1.4 Research Goal and Solution Overview
In this section, we present the research goal and the overview of our solutions. As
illustrated in Table 1.2, this dissertation aims at providing in-depth analysis of the
malicious activities, and further providing defense insights against those malicious
activities in the OSN and Smartphone platforms.
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OSN Platform Smartphone Platform
Malicious Activities Malicious OSN Accounts Malicious Android Apps
In-depth Analysis Spammers’ Social Network Market-level and Networking-level Behaviors
Defensive Insights Social Honeypot Malware Programming Procedure
Table 1.2: Research overview of the dissertation.
More specifically, to understand the characteristics of the social relationships
among malicious OSN accounts, we aim at describing a detailed analysis of OSN
spammers’ social network (i.e., cyber criminal ecosystem) on Twitter. After un-
derstanding the characteristics of OSN spammers’ spamming targets, we plan to
further provide detection approaches including guidelines of building e↵ective so-
cial honeypots to attract spammers and two inference-based algorithms to sample
spam accounts. Similarly, we aim at providing a deeper understanding how Android
malware authors spread malicious Android apps by analyzing the Android malware
ecosystem, and further designing an automatic approach to detect malicious Android
apps.
Based on our research goal, Figure 1.1 illustrates a general framework of our
solution, including three major phases: collecting data, making in-depth analysis,
and generating defensive insights.
In the phase of collecting data, we first build an e↵ective crawler to collect a
large-scale of real-world dataset. In this dissertation, we choose Twitter and An-
droid markets as our case studies. Due to the challenging of obtain a perfect ground
truth for such large-scale datasets, we require to adopt a practical and relatively
accurate policy to identify malicious activities from our collected datasets (i.e., mali-
cious/spam Twitter accounts in Twitter, and malicious Android apps in the Android
markets).
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In the phase of making in-depth analysis, we mainly analyze the following three
aspects of the malicious activities in Twitter: Spammer Behaviors (the social behav-
iors of individual spam account), Malicious Account Community (the relationships
among multiple malicious Twitter accounts), and Strategies of Spreading Twitter
spam (the strategies used by spammers to find spam targets). From a similar re-
search viewpoint, we mainly analyze the following three aspects of the malicious
activities in the Android platform: Malware Author Behavior (the market behavior
of individual malware author), Malicious App Community (the relationships among
multiple malicious Android apps), and Infrastructure of Spreading Malicious Apps
(the market and networking infrastructure used by malware authors to spread mali-
cious apps).
In the phase of generating defensive insights against Twitter spammers, our solu-
tion obtains indications from analyzing Tweet Content (content of the tweets), Insert
URL (URLs that are inserted in the tweet), Spammer Behavior (social behavior of
spam account ), Community Relationships (the relationships among multiple spam
accounts), Social Honeypot (fake Twitter accounts that are used to capture spam
accounts’ contact). Similarly, in the phase of generating defensive insights against
Android malware, our solution obtains indications from analyzing Programming Pro-
cedure (Android framework APIs and control-flow logics that are commonly used in
Android malware), Remote Server (the remote servers that are used to communicate
with Android malware), Author Behavior (Android malware authors market be-
havior), and Community Relationships (the relationships among multiple malicious
Android apps).
We integrate our solution into four technical chapters: Twitter Spammer Ecosys-
tem (an in-depth analysis of the ecosystem of Twitter spammers), Reversing En-
gineering Twitter Spammers (a comprehensive measurement of the strategies used
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Figure 1.1: The illustration of the framework of our solution.
by Twitter spammers to select spamming targets), Android Malware Ecosystem (an
in-depth analysis of the ecosystem of Android malware), and DroidMiner (an auto-
matic Android malware detection system). We next present an overview of each of
the four technical chapters with more details.
In Chapter 4, this dissertation empirically analyzes the cyber criminal ecosys-
tem on Twitter, including malicious account community composed of malicious ac-
counts, and malicious supporter community composed of other accounts who have
close friendships (following relationships) with malicious accounts. Specifically, this
dissertation analyzes inner social relationships in the malicious account community to
examine how malicious accounts socially connect with each other. Then, it analyzes
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outer social relationships between malicious accounts and their malicious supporters
to reveal the characteristics of those accounts who have close friendships with mali-
cious accounts. Through these analyses, this dissertation aims at understanding how
malicious accounts survive and mix into the whole Twitter space, and presenting
new defense insights to e↵ectively catch more malicious accounts on Twitter.
In Chapter 5, through reverse engineering spammers’ tastes (their preferred tar-
gets to spam), this dissertation provides guidelines for designing e↵ective social hon-
eypots, and design lightweight and guided strategies to actively sample more likely
social spam accounts. To achieve this goal, this dissertation use Twitter as a case
study due to its great popularity and publicity. Specifically, to reveal which behaviors
tend to incur spammers’ contact, we implement 96 “benchmark” Twitter social hon-
eypots with 24 diverse fine-grained social behavior patterns to trap spam accounts.
After launching our social honeypots for five months, we successfully garner around
600 spam accounts. Using these data, we analyze spammers’ tastes (how spammers
find their targets), through comparing the e↵ectiveness of social honeypots with
di↵erent behavior patterns. Based on these analyses, we design and implement 10
more e↵ective (“advanced”) honeypots to trap Twitter spammers. Within the same
time period, using those advanced honeypots can trap spammers around 26 times
faster than using “traditional” honeypots. To further understand spammers’ tastes,
we also design an algorithm to extract semantic topic terms, which may highly at-
tract spammers’ attentions. In addition, with the concern of limited time/resource,
through reverse engineering spammers’ strategies of selecting targets, we gain the
insights to design two guided approaches to prioritize the active sampling of more
likely spam accounts from Twittersphere, which is an e↵ective complement to exist-
ing passive social honeypots.
In Chapter 6, this dissertation empirically performs the first comprehensive mea-
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surement study on analyzing the market-level and network-level behaviors of the
Android malware ecosystem. Through the analysis, we provide more deep analy-
sis on how Android malware is spread, and generate new defense insights against
Android malware. In the phase of analyzing the market-level behaviors, we mainly
investigate: (1) whether the location of the market is an e↵ective indication to the
quality of Android apps; (2) whether the downloading number has a strong corre-
lation with the quality of Android apps; (3) whether the public Android anti-virus
blacklist is e↵ective to stop malware authors from submitting their malicious apps
to the markets; (4) whether malicious accounts have specific temporal behavioral
patterns to submit malware samples. In the phase of analyzing the network-level
behaviors, we investigate: (1) which IP address spaces are mainly used by Android
malware; (2) which special networks tend to be used to host remote servers; (3)
whether existing IP/domain blacklists are e↵ective to be used to find Android mal-
ware; (4) the characteristics of malware communities. Spurred by our analysis, we
design an Android malware inference algorithm, to infer more malicious Android
apps by starting from a small seed set of known malicious ones.
In Chapter 7, this dissertation presents DroidMiner for discovering and auto-
matically extracting malware modalities. While our e↵orts are primarily focused on
identifying and then characterizing malware behavior, aspects of our methodology
are also directly applicable to automated characterization of a broad class of Android
application behaviors, including the detection of shared security vulnerabilities. We
evaluate DroidMiner using 2,466 malicious apps, identified from a corpus of over
67,000 third-party market Android apps, plus an additional set of over 10,000 o cial
market Android apps. Specifically, this dissertation measure the utility of Droid-
Miner modalities with respect to three specific use cases: (i) malware detection, (ii)
malware family classification, and (iii) malware behavioral characterization. Our
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results validate that DroidMiner modalities are useful for classification and capable
of isolating a wide range of suspicious behavioral traits embedded within Android
applications. Furthermore, the composite of these traits enables a unique means by
which Android malware can be identified with a high degree of accuracy.
1.5 Contributions
In this thesis, we make the following main contributions:
• In order to analyze the cyber criminal ecosystem on Twitter, this disserta-
tion finds a few observations about inner- and outer-social relationships among
Twitter spammers. We have two main findings: (i) Malicious accounts tend to
be socially connected, forming a small-world network; (ii) Compared with ma-
licious leaves, malicious hubs are more inclined to follow malicious accounts.
We also find that malicious accounts in some particular malicious campaign
tend to have strong semantic and timing coordinations. To analyze how Twit-
ter spammers mix into Twitter space, we propose a new algorithm to extract
malicious supporters who have close friendships with malicious accounts. We
also investigate the characteristics of three representative categories of mali-
cious supporters. We design a new algorithm to selectively sample and infer
more malicious accounts based on a known seed set by analyzing their social
relationships and semantic coordinations with other accounts.
• To provide guidelines for designing e↵ective social honeypots, and design a
lightweight algorithm to actively sample more likely social spam accounts, this
dissertation contributes a set of new defense insights. We present a deep anal-
ysis of spammers’ tastes: spammers tend to contact with accounts that tweet
messages and follow accounts related to specific topics. We present our guide-
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lines of deploying more e↵ective honeypots, and two lightweight, guided ap-
proaches to prioritize the sampling of more likely Twitter spam accounts.
• Through analyzing the market-level and network-level behaviors of the An-
droid malware ecosystem, this dissertation provides a series of security obser-
vations among Android malware, and design defense approaches against them.
Through analyzing the market-level behaviors, this dissertation find that: (1)
Neither the location of the market nor the popularity of the apps has a strong
correlation with the quality of the apps; (2) The public Android anti-virus
blacklist is too slow at identifying new Android malware; (3) The same mal-
ware authors tend to submit multiple malicious apps, and within a short time
period. Through analyzing the network-level behaviors, this dissertation find
that: (1) There is a strong provider locality property in the Android mal-
ware’s remote servers hosting infrastructure; Android malware authors tend to
use cloud vendors to host remote servers to communicate with their malware
samples; (2) Existing IP/domain blacklists are not e↵ective to be used to find
Android malware; (3) A few malware communities (sharing common authors
or remote servers) contribute to a large portion of Android malware. We design
a novel algorithm to infer more malicious apps by exploiting their community
relationships, which requires neither the disassembling of Android apps nor the
deep domain knowledge of the Android system.
• We design and implementation a novel system for automated extraction of An-
droid app modalities, and use machine learning strategies to classify a given app
under the modality pattern. We made an in-depth evaluation of DroidMiner
with respect to its run-time performance and e cacy in malware detection,
family classification, and behavioral characterization.
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2. BACKGROUND AND TERMINOLOGY
2.1 Background and Terminology of Twitter
Twitter is one of the most famous online social networking websites that allows
users to register accounts and use them to personal messages. In one message, at
most 140 characters is allowed. Through this platform, people can easily follow up
the newest update from other users they are interested. A great number of people
and organizations have utilized this platform to successfully promote themselves or
their business to the public. To guarantee a better service, Twitter also releases a
series of Twitter Rules [108] to restrict some cyber-criminals’ malicious operations
on Twitter. Once an account is judged to have violated Twitter Rules by Twitter,
Twitter will suspend this account. As one of the most representative Twitter Rules,
“a Twitter account can be considered to be spamming, and thus be suspended by
Twitter, if it has a small number of followers compared to the amount of accounts
that it follows.”
We next introduce basic terminologies of Twitter:
• Tweet. Once a Twitter user register a Twitter account and use it to post
a message, this message is named as “tweet”, and the user is said to have
”tweeted”. Users typically have a great freedom to post whatever they want
to, or even post links to other websites. And, each URL will be automatically
recognized by Twitter. In addition, due to the limitation of the number of
characters in one Tweet, users prefer to post short URL instead of real URL.
• Follow. One user can choose other users they are interested in to follow. Once
a user follows other users, the user will automatically and instantly receive
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other users’ updates, without the requirement of visiting other users’ accounts’
homepages. Updates for all the users one account follow will appear in reverse
chronological order with the most recent update on top of the page.
• @mention (@reply). @metion allows one user to send a Tweet to another
specific target user. No matter whether the target user followed the sender or
not, the target user can read the @mention messages, which contains a string
composed of the symbol of “@” and the target user’s username. Before 2012,
@metions will be directly shown on the users’ public time. Since then, users
will receive senders’ @mentions in the users’ Notifications, which is a tab in
the users’ homepage showing users’ social interactions with others.
• Direct Message. A direct message is a private message from one Twitter user
to another, which can only be seen in receivers’ message inbox. Thus, direct
messages can only be seen by the receivers, after they login into their Twitter
accounts and check their message inboxes.
• # (Hashtag). Once a Tweet contains a symbol of “#” with another keyword,
it implies that this tweet represents a topic. This tweet will be also indexed by
Twitter and searched out by using the keyword as the search query.
2.2 Background and Terminology of Android
Android apps are composed of several components and have a complex and event-
driven programming paradigm involving multiple entry points. Android defines a
component-based framework for developing mobile apps. Android apps comprise
four types of components: Activities, Services, Broadcast Receivers, and Content
Providers. Each component in an app works as a unit performing certain tasks:
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• Activities support basic functionalities such as interacting with end-users through
graphical user interfaces (GUIs); each GUI (screen) is controlled by one Activ-
ity.
• Services are designed to provide interfaces in the background for communicat-
ing with other components and applications. Thus, unlike activities, services do
not represent any GUI and cannot be activated/stopped by users. They will
run as background processes forever until they are stopped by some certain
application components.
• Broadcast Receivers are designed to achieve the mechanism of incident response
in Android. A receiver will continuously listen to system-wide broadcast mes-
sages. When it receives relevant messages, it will automatically trigger corre-
sponding registered events/operations.
• Content Providers act as database management systems, from where other
components/apps could query or store an app’s data without the requirement
of knowing how the data is stored.
Android application authors implement Android components in an app as Java
classes by inheriting corresponding super classes defined in the Android SDK (e.g.,
Activity, Service, BroadcastReceiver or ContentProvider). Android components
are identified by other components through registration in the applications’ man-
ifest file (“AndroidManifest.XML”). This enables these components to interact with
each other by using specific intents and framework API calls defined in the An-
droid Framework. For example, an activity could activate a service by invoking the
startService() Framework API call. In addition, unlike traditional software, the
lifetimes of Android components are controlled by a series of lifecycle API functions
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defined by the Android platform (e.g., onStart() and onDestroy() used in a ser-
vice will start and stop the service, respectively). Moreover, the (data and control)
sub-flows in an app are typically loosely connected. All these di↵erences make An-
droid program analysis uniquely challenging and di↵erent from traditional malware
analysis.
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3. RELATED WORK
In the previous two chapters, we first identified the research scope of this disserta-
tion, and the challenges for malicious activity detection on the OSN and smartphone
platforms. Then, we introduced the basic background and terminologies of these two
platform. In this chapter, we will answer the following questions: why are exist-
ing techniques not su cient for malicious activity detection on these two platforms?
How are they related to or di↵erent from our solution?
3.1 Related Work on Understanding and Detecting Malicious Activities on the
OSN Platforms
3.1.1 Analysis of OSN Characteristics
Due to the great popularity of the OSNs, some work has studied OSN charac-
teristics. Mislove et al. present a large-scale measurement study and analysis of the
structure of multiple OSNs including Flickr, YouTube, LiveJournal, and Orkut [76].
Kwak et al. have shown a comprehensive and quantitative study on Twitter accounts’
behavior [63]. Wang et al. use Twitter to study the unbiased sampling algorithm
for directed social graphs [117]. Cha et al. utilize di↵erent metrics to measure the
user influence on Twitter [19]. Galuba et al. focus on characterizing and modeling
the information cascades formed by individual URL mentions in the Twitter follower
graph [42]. Castillo et al. design automatic methods for assessing the credibility of
a given set of tweets [18]. Metaxas et al. analyze political community behavior and
the spread of political opinions on Twitter [75], and Ratkiewicz et al. analyze the
spread of Astroturf memes on Twitter [92].
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3.1.2 Detection of OSN Malicious Accounts
Since spam and attacks are so rampant in the OSNs, many researchers have stud-
ied detecting OSN malicious accounts. A framework to detect tag spam in tagging
systems is proposed in [61]. This work prevents the attackers who desire to increase
the visibility of an object from fooling the search mechanism. Benevenuto et al.
[11, 12] utilize machine learning techniques to identify video spammers on YouTube.
Meanwhile, most Twitter malicious account detection work can be classified into two
categories. The first category of work, such as [65, 10, 116, 102], utilizes machine
learning techniques to classify legitimate accounts and malicious accounts accord-
ing to their collected training data and their selections of classification features like
“following-follower ratio”. The second category of work, e.g., [51], detects and an-
alyzes malicious accounts by examining whether URLs or domains posted in the
tweets are labeled as malicious by public URL blacklists or domain blacklists.
3.1.3 Utilization of Honeypots
A honeypot is a decoy (e.g., a computer, data, or a network site) mainly set up
to attract attackers. Traditionally, the honeypot techniques have been widely used
for capturing malware and related malicious activities. Server-side honeypots are
mainly implemented by emulating vulnerable services or software to trap attacks,
aiming at collecting malware and malicious requests [135], understanding network
and web attacks [58], building network intrusion detection systems [62], or preventing
the spread of spam email [34]. Client-side honeypots are mainly used to detect
compromised (web) servers [87, 52, 118, 77]. In [4], Antonatos et al. proposed an
approach to detect instant messaging (IM) threats using IM honeypots.
In the context of OSN, social honeypots are defined as OSN accounts that appear
to belong to real users, but are actually fake accounts used for attracting spammers.
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Due to its simplicity and low false positives, social honeypots are a great way to
collect spammers for further study, e.g., understanding their characteristics and then
further building e↵ective machine-learning features to detect them. Many existing
studies [102, 65] use this social honeypot technique. However, an important missing
component in this line of research is that, we still know little about the interactions
between users’ behaviors and spammers’ actions, e.g., why this social honeypot can
attract few (many) spammers. Essentially, we need a systematic analysis on how to
build more e↵ective social honeypots, which is an important goal of this work. Thus,
this paper bridges the gap in existing research using social honeypots.
3.1.4 Measurement of Spam Campaigns and Networks.
Yardi et al. analyzed Twitter spam accounts’ social behaviors and network struc-
tures by investigating a specific spam campaign [134]. In [43], Gao et al. conducted
a study on detecting and characterizing social spam campaigns on Facebook, based
on the observation that spam accounts in the same spam campaign, tend to send
similar spam messages simultaneously. In [105], Thomas et al. analyzed tools, tech-
niques, and support infrastructure utilized by spam accounts through retrospecting
suspended accounts.
While most existing approaches [11, 65, 10, 102, 132] focus on detecting Twitter
criminal accounts individually, we still understand far less about the properties of
those criminal accounts’ social relationships on Twitter. Yet, it is these very rela-
tionships that may be utilized by criminal accounts to increase their influence or to
avoid detection and suspension. Specifically, since Twitter users can automatically
obtain their following accounts’ updates, criminal accounts’ social relationships can
aid them in increasing the visibility of their malicious content – thus in obtaining
more victims. In addition, by gaining more followers, Twitter criminal accounts
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can evade existing detection approaches such as “Twitter Rules” and break through
Twitter’s “Follow Limit Policy”1, while maintaining their high visibility. Particu-
larly, according to Twitter Rules [108], “a Twitter account can be considered to be
spamming, and thus be suspended by Twitter, if it has a small number of followers
compared to the amount of accounts that it follows.”
However, we lack basic insights into the characteristics of criminal accounts’ social
relationships. How do criminal accounts socially connect with each other on Twit-
ter? What is the topological structure of social relationships among those criminal
accounts? Due to the fact that legitimate accounts normally do not like to follow
criminal accounts, what are the main characteristics of criminal accounts’ followers?
Can we exploit these miscreants’ tactics to build e↵ective defense strategies against
cyber criminals? The desire of addressing these questions empirically – and thus
obtaining insights for defending against Twitter criminal accounts – forms the core
motivation of this dissertation.
In addition, among many existing research and engineering e↵orts in fighting
against spam/spammers, social honeypot techniques are quite promising, and have
been widely deployed in existing studies to collect spammers [65, 66, 102]. A social
honeypot is essentially a specially created fake account with the intent to capture
spammers’ social interactions. However, current social honeypots are designed to
be either too static (few behaviors performed by honeypots) or too uniform (few
variations among honeypots’ behaviors). As a result, those honeypots are not used in
an optimal or e↵ective way to trap as many spammers as they can. The fundamental
reason is that we still lack the basic insights of the strategies utilized by spammers
to select spam targets. Thus, a good understanding of spammers’ tastes is pressing
1According to this policy, once an account has followed 2,000 users, the number of additional
accounts it can follow is limited to its follower number [113].
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and we seriously need systematic guidelines for building more e↵ective (attractive)
social honeypots.
Compared with previous work on analyzing and detecting OSN malicious activ-
ities, our work focuses more on analyzing cyber criminal ecosystem – investigating
inner social relationships in the malicious account community and outer relationships
between malicious accounts and their supporters. Our proposed sampling strategies
can provide a guided approach to prioritize the sampling of more likely spam ac-
counts (instead of blind/random crawling) in the huge Twittersphere, thus providing
a good first-layer filter for existing detection approaches. In addition, we perform a
deep social honeypot measurement study to understand spammers’ tastes, thus help
to design new guidelines for building better social honeypots and guided strategies
to prioritize the sampling of more likely spam accounts. Thus, our work is a new
supplement to existing work.
3.2 Related Work on Understanding and Detecting Malicious Activities on the
Smartphone Platform
3.2.1 Android Malware Detection
The growing threat of malicious mobile applications, particularly on the smart-
phone platform, has attracted considerable research attention. We group proposed
detection approaches for mobile malware into the following three subcategories, based
on the inputs that each algorithm consumes.
3.2.1.1 System Call Monitoring
Systems such as [16, 85, 94, 95] detect malware by monitoring and analysis of
system calls. A fundamental shortcoming of such approaches is the semantic gap
between the system calls and specific behaviors (e.g., it is exceedingly di cult to
know whether an app sends an SMS to a premium number by analyzing a sequence
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of Android kernel-level system calls). DroidScope [131] is designed to reconstruct
both OS-level and Java-level semantics. Their dynamic analysis approach is limited
by path exploration challenges, but is a useful complement to DroidMiner’s static-
based approach.
3.2.1.2 Android Permission Monitoring
Enck et al. studied the security of Android apps by analyzing the permissions
registered in the top o cial Market apps [36]. Stowaway [40] and COPES [9] are
designed to find those apps that request more permissions than they need. PScout [7]
analyzes the usage trend of permissions in Android apps. Kirin [37] detected ma-
licious Android apps by finding permissions declared in Android apps that break
“pre-defined” security rules. More recent work also detected malicious Android apps
by designing several classifiers, whose features were built primarily on the application
categories and permissions [84]. A concern with these approaches is false positives
stemming from the coarse-grained nature of permissions and the highly common
nature of benign apps to over-claim their set of required permissions.
3.2.1.3 Framework API Monitoring
Bose et al. detected malware on Symbian OS through analyzing the temporal
pattern of the usage of APIs in the DLL files [13]. TaintDroid [35] tracks the data
flow and the usage of framework API calls to detect those apps that may leak users’
privacy information. However, it is not designed to detect other kinds of malicious
behaviors such as stealthily sending SMS. RiskRanker [143] detects malicious apps
based on the knowledge of known Android system vulnerabilities, which could be
utilized by malicious apps, and several heuristics, e.g., malware intends to charge
the victims while blocking notifications to the victims. DroidRanger [142] detects
malicious Android apps by statically matching against “pre-defined” signatures (per-
24
missions and Android Framework API calls) of well-known malware families. It also
includes a heuristic-based approach to detect malicious applications from unknown
families that requires semi-manual analysis of suspicious system calls. In [129], the
frequencies of API calls were used as detection features, and more recently in [1],
the names and parameters of APIs and packages were used as detection features.
Both studies di↵er fundamentally from DroidMiner in that our modalities capture
the connections of multiple sensitive API functions, not just the frequency or names
of APIs. In addition, DroidMiner introduces the use of  -analysis for sensitive node
identification and associative rule mining in identifying malicious modalities. Pe-
gasus [21] is designed to detect Android malware through abstraction of Android
apps into permission event graphs, and checking whether such graphs contain pre-
defined malicious intents. However, such manual selection of heuristics (or detection
patterns) is not systematic and not robust to the evolution of malware.
3.2.2 Android Security Extensions
Existing studies have also developed several security extensions to improve the
security mechanism of current Android platform including defending against confused
deputy attacks and collusion attacks [32, 15], achieving fine-grained access control
policies [80, 79, 29, 130, 78, 37], protecting privacy leak [53], and securing smartphone
OSes [85, 64, 3, 97]. These complementary studies are developed to increase the
security assurance from the phone-side, which focuses more on the quality of the
smartphone systems.
3.2.3 Analysis of Attackers
A series of studies have also been conducted to understand attackers’ (or spam-
mers’) behaviors in di↵erent attack scenarios. Ramachandran et al studied the
network-level behavior of spammers such as IP address ranges that send the most
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spam and common spamming modes [90]. Leontiadis et al measured and analyzed
search-redirection attacks in the illicit online prescription drug trade [67]. Christin
et al analyzed an online confidence scam (One Click Fraud) [24]. One recent An-
droid malware measurement studies is made on analyzing the working mechanism of
malware (e.g., the activation of the malware) [141].
3.2.4 Analysis of Mobile Tra c
A few existing studies have been conducted on analyzing mobile tra c to un-
cover general mobile network characteristics [39, 44, 38]. Falaki et al found that
the browsing contributes over half of the tra c [39]. Erman et al examined cellular
video tra c and find that only 40% of the videos are fully downloaded [38]. Through
analyzing malicious tra c in cellular carriers, Lever et al claimed that only a vanish-
ingly small number of mobile devices appear to be infected, and Apple’s App Store
and operating system do not make devices in the ecosystem more secure [68].
While most existing research e↵orts are spent on detecting Android malware [13,
35, 142, 129, 143, 21, 139] or designing new security extensions to defend against
specific types of attacks [32, 15], we still lack some basic insights on the whole
ecosystem of spreading Android malware. It is known that malware authors typically
need to submit Android malware to the markets to attract victims’ downloads, and
build remote servers to communicate with the malware to achieve malicious goals
(e.g., C&C control and compromising victims’ privacy). However, the characteristics
of the market-level behaviors and network-level behaviors of the Android
malware ecosystem are still not well understood. Are there any special characteristics
of those market accounts that submit malware? Are there any special networks
mainly utilized by Android malware authors to host their remote servers? Are there
any large communities among Android malware? The desire of addressing these
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questions empirically, and obtaining insights for defending against Android malware,
forms the core motivation of this work.
In addition, existing static analysis approaches for detecting Android malware
rely on either matching against manually-selected heuristics and programming pat-
terns [142, 21] or designing detection models that use coarse-grained features such as
permissions registered in the apps [84]. We design a new system, named DroidMiner,
to salably detect and characterize Android malware through robust and automated
learning of fine-grained programming logic and patterns in known malware. While
DroidMiner also relies on analyzing Framework API calls, it di↵ers from existing
approaches in the following ways: (1) it uses a learning-based approach to automat-
ically generate behavior models, which are composed of individual modalities and
could be used to detect malware instance from unseen families; (2) rather than sim-
ply examining whether or not the target app is malicious, it also reports specific app
behavior traits (modalities); (3) instead of focusing on analyzing isolated usage of (or
even the number of) Framework APIs, our detection model considers the API usage
sequence, enabling DroidMiner to capture the semantic relationships across multiple
APIs.
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4. ANALYZING SPAMMERS’ SOCIAL NETWORKS*
We have introduced the malicious activities that are launched on social network
platforms, and briefly explained why the analysis of OSN spammers characteristics
is important to design e↵ective detection approaches. In this chapter, we provide our
deep analysis of the spammers’ social networks to reveal how malicious OSN accounts
are socially connected in the OSN, and further provide an e↵ective inference-based
algorithm to sample more likely Twitter spammers [133].⇤
We analyze the cyber criminal ecosystem on Twitter, containing criminal
account community composed of criminal (spam) accounts, and criminal supporter
community composed of those accounts outside the criminal account community who
have close friendships (following relationships) with criminal accounts, defined in our
work as criminal supporters (See Figure 4.1). Specifically, we analyze inner social
relationships in the criminal account community to reveal insights on how criminal
accounts socially connect with each other. Meanwhile, we analyze outer social
relationships between criminal accounts and their criminal supporters to reveal the
characteristics of those accounts who have close friendships with criminal accounts.
We also aim at finding possible reasons why criminal supporters outside the criminal
community become criminal accounts’ followers. Essentially, these supporters aid
criminal accounts in avoiding detection by increasing criminal accounts’ followers,
and in preying on more victims due to the “social-intercourse” nature of Twitter
(Twitter users may visit their friends’ friends’ profiles). Through these analyses, we
aim at understanding how criminal accounts mix into the whole Twitters space, and
⇤Reprinted with permission from “Analyzing Spammers’ Social Networks For Fun and Profit – A
Case Study of Cyber Criminal Ecosystem on Twitter” by Chao Yang, Robert Harkreader, Jialong
Zhang, Seungwon Shin, and Guofei Gu, 2012. Proceedings of the 21st International World Wide
Web Conference, Copyright[2012] by IW3C2.
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presenting new defense insights to e↵ectively catch Twitter criminal accounts.
Figure 4.1: Structure of the cyber criminal ecosystem.
We conduct our empirical analysis based on a sample dataset containing around
half million Twitter accounts with around 14 million tweets and 6 million URLs.
After building a sample criminal account community composed of 2,060 identified
spammer accounts in that dataset, we analyze its inner relationships by building and
analyzing the social relationship graph. To analyze outer relationships, we propose
a Malicious Relevance Score Propagation Algorithm (Mr.SPA) to extract criminal
supporters. We then observe typical characteristics of three categories of support-
ers and provide possible reasons why these supporters have close friendships with
criminal accounts.
We design a Criminal account Inference Algorithm (CIA), to infer unknown spam
Twitter accounts by starting from a seed set of known criminal ones and exploiting
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the properties of their social relationships and semantic coordinations with other
criminal accounts.
We make the following major contributions:
• We present the first in-depth case study of analyzing social relationships among
malicious accounts. We have two main findings: (i) Malicious accounts tend
to be socially connected, forming a small-world network; (ii) Compared with
malicious leaves, malicious hubs are more inclined to follow malicious accounts.
• We also find that malicious accounts in some particular malicious campaign
tend to have strong semantic and timing coordinations.
• We propose a new algorithm Mr.SPA and have extracted 5,924 malicious sup-
porters who have close friendships with malicious accounts. We also investigate
the characteristics of three representative categories of malicious supporters.
• We find that around 64% of supporters tend to build a lot of social friendships.
We also find around 48% of supporters will follow back the accounts within 48
hours, who initially follow them. However, less than 2% of normal accounts
would do this. This implies that malicious accounts could fully utilize these
accounts to mix into Twitter.
• We design a new algorithm CIA to selectively sample and infer more malicious
accounts based on a known seed set by analyzing their social relationships
and semantic coordinations with other accounts. Using CIA, this dissertation
can infer over 20 times more malicious accounts than that of using a random
selection strategy.
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4.1 Research Goal and Dataset
4.1.1 Research Goal
Our research goal is to provide the first empirical analysis on how criminal ac-
counts mix and survive in the whole Twitter space. Specifically, we target on those
criminal accounts as defined by Twitter Rules [108], who mainly post malicious URLs
linking to malicious content with an intention to compromise users’ computers or
privacy. Through analyzing inner social relationships in the criminal community
composed of criminal accounts (in Section 4.2), we aim at answering the following
questions: What is the structure of criminal accounts’ network? What are possible
factors and inherent reasons leading to that structure? Are there any di↵erent so-
cial roles for di↵erent types of criminal accounts? Through analyzing outer social
relationships (in Section 4.3), we aim at answering the following questions: what are
typical characteristics of the accounts outside the criminal community that tend to
follow criminal accounts? What are possible reasons that these accounts have close
friendships with criminal accounts? Then, through exploiting criminal accounts’ so-
cial relationships, we design an inference algorithm to catch more criminal accounts
(in Section 4.4).
4.1.2 Dataset
To analyze criminal accounts, we crawl a large dataset of Twitter account profiles
and identify Twitter spam accounts from the dataset. More specifically, we develop
a Twitter crawler that taps into Twitter’s Streaming API [107]. We first collect 20
seed Twitter accounts from the public timeline [111]. For each of these 20 accounts,
we also crawl their followers and followings. We then repeat this process by collecting
another 20 seed Twitter accounts from the timeline. For each account, we collect
its 40 most recent Tweets and the URLs in the tweets. Due to the large amount of
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redirection URLs used in Twitter, we also follow the URL redirection chain to obtain
the final destination URL. This resulted in the collection of nearly 500,000 Twitter
accounts which posted over 14 million tweets containing almost 6 million URLs (see
Table 4.1).
Item Accounts Followings Followers Tweets URLs
Number 485,721 791,648,649 855,772,191 14,401,157 5,805,351
Table 4.1: Twitter accounts crawling information.
Next, we use a relatively strict strategy to collect Twitter spammers. More
specifically, we focus on those Twitter spammers, who post URLs linking to mali-
cious content with an intention to compromise other users’ computers or privacy, as
mentioned in The Twitter Rules. We target at this type of spam accounts due to
their excessively hazard and prevalence on Twitter. Thus, unlike other related work
(e.g., [65]), we do not necessarily consider advertisers in Twitter as spammers, unless
they post malicious content. To label Twitter spam accounts, we first utilize two
methods to detect malicious or phishing URLs in the tweets: Google Safe Brows-
ing [49] and URL honeypot. GSB is a widely used and trustable blacklist to identify
malicious URLs, which is fast but may miss labeling malicious links. Thus, we also
build a high-interaction client-side URL honeypot based on Capture-HPC [52], which
will emulate a real person to click the URL in the browser in a virtual machine. The
honeypot detects a link as malicious, if the visit of the linked website will modify
sensitive data (e.g., process, files and registries) in the virtual machine. We define a
Tweet that contains at least one malicious or phishing URL as a Spam Tweet. In this
way, we collect 3,051 accounts by using GSB and 9,634 accounts by using honeypot,
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who at least post one Spam Tweet. For each account, we define its spam ratio as
the ratio of the number of its spam tweets that we detect to the total number of its
tweets that we collect. In this way, we extract 2,933 Twitter accounts with spam ra-
tios higher than 10%. In order to further decrease false positives, our group members
spend several days on manually verifying those 2,933 accounts by viewing whether
their tweets are useful and meaningful. Finally, we obtain 2,060 identified spam
accounts. Based on this dataset, we build and analyze a sample criminal account
community, which is composed of those 2,060 identified spam accounts.
4.2 Inner Social Relationships
In this section, we empirically analyze inner social relationships in our sample
criminal account community by visualizing its relationship graph and revealing its
relationship characteristics.
4.2.1 Visualizing Relationship Graph
If we view each criminal account as a node v and each follow relationship as
a directed edge e, we can view inner social relationships in the criminal account
community on Twitter as a directed graph, named as the criminal relationship graph
G = (V,E). In our dataset, the criminal relationship graph consists of 2,060 nodes
and 9,868 directed edges (see Figure 4.2(a)). By further breaking down the graph,
we can obtain 8 weakly connected components containing at least three nodes and
521 isolated nodes. (Since we can partially crawl the whole Twitters space and
utilize a relatively strict way of identifying criminal accounts, the number of isolated
accounts may be somewhat overestimated.) The giant connected component contains
954 nodes (see Figure 4.2(b)).
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(a) Relationship graph (b) Connected component
Figure 4.2: Criminal relationship graph. Each “dot” represents a criminal account
and each “line” connects a pair of following and follower criminal account. The more
relationships an account has, the more central it is positioned in the graph.
4.2.2 Revealing Relationship Characteristics
After visualizing our sample criminal relationship graph, we analyze this graph
by utilizing graph theoretical knowledge and obtain the following two main findings.
Finding 1: Criminal accounts tend to be socially connected, forming a small-
world network. From Figure 4.2(a), we can observe that criminal accounts tend to
socially connect with each other. To quantitatively validate this finding, we measure
three graph metrics: graph density, reciprocity, and average shortest path length.
Graph density is the proportion of the number of edges in a graph to the maximal
number of edges, which can be computed as |E||V |·(|V | 1) . This metric measures how
closely a graph is to being a complete graph. A higher value implies that the graph is
denser. After calculating the graph density for both our sample criminal relationship
and a public entire Twitter snapshot[63] containing 41.7 million users and 1.47 billion
edges, we find that the graph density of our sample criminal relationship graph, which
is 2.33⇥10 3, is much higher than that of the Twitter snapshot, which is 8.45⇥10 7.
This shows that the criminals have closer relationship than regular Twitter users.
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Reciprocity is represented by the number of bi-directional links1 to the number
of outlinks. We find that criminal accounts have higher reciprocity in the criminal
relationship graph, but lower reciprocity in our Twitter snapshot graph (contain-
ing around 500K nodes). Specifically, around 5% of criminal accounts’ values of
reciprocity in the criminal graph are lower than 0.2, while around 45% of normal
accounts and 75% of criminal accounts in our crawled graph have such values (See
Figure 4.3(a)). Also, around 20% of criminal accounts’ values of reciprocity in the
criminal graph are nearly 1.0, i.e., other criminal accounts followed by these 20%
of criminal accounts also follow them back. This observation implies that criminal
accounts have stronger social relationships in the criminal account community.
Average Shortest Path Length is defined as the average number of steps along the
shortest paths for all possible pairs of graph nodes. It can be used to measure the
e ciency of information flow on a graph. Compared with the average path length
of a sample data set with 3,000 legitimate Twitter accounts [63], which is 4.12,
the average shortest path length of the criminal relationship graph is even smaller,
which is 2.60. This implies that the criminal account community is also a small-
world network. As an important property, a small-world network contains a giant
connected component, which can be verified in Figure 4.2(b).
From the above analysis, we can find that criminal accounts have strong social
connections with each other. Then, the next question we try to answer is: what are
the main factors (criminal accounts’ actions) leading to that structure?
Finding 2: Compared with criminal leaves, criminal hubs are more inclined to
follow criminal accounts. To validate this finding, we examine whether criminal hubs’
followings are more likely to be criminal accounts. For better description, we term
a criminal account’s following account as a “criminal-following”, if this following
1There is a bi-directional link between two nodes, if they reciprocally link to each other.
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Figure 4.3: The comparison of the criminal accounts and normal accounts.
account is also a criminal. Then, we design a metric, named Criminal Following
Ratio (CFR), which is the ratio of the number of an account’s criminal-followings to
its total following number. A higher CFR of an account implies that this account
is more inclined to follow criminal accounts. From Figure 4.4(a), we can find that
criminal hubs’ CFRs are much higher than that of criminal leaves. Specifically,
around 80% criminal hubs’ CFRs are higher than 0.1, while only 20% of criminal
leaves’ CFRs are higher than 0.1. Also, almost no criminal hubs’ CFRs are lower
than 0.05, while around 60% of criminal leaves’ CFRs are lower than 0.05. This
observation validates that criminal hubs tend to follow more criminal accounts than
leaves do. Similar to Finding 1, we next provide and validate possible explanations
to Finding 2.
We make the following possible explanation for this finding: Criminal hubs tend
to obtain followers more e↵ectively by following other criminal accounts. Although
criminal accounts could obtain followers by randomly following any account and
expecting it to follow back, this method is still not very e↵ective, due to the low
chance of successfully alluring legitimate accounts to follow back. However, through
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following criminal accounts, hubs can automatically acquire those criminal accounts’
followers’ information (Username or Account ID). Then, there is a bigger chance
for criminal hubs to successfully allure other criminal accounts’ followers to become
their own followers, since these followers are already proved to be more susceptible
to follow criminal accounts, which many legitimate accounts may not choose to do.
In this way, criminal hubs can obtain followers more e↵ectively.
To validate this explanation, we examine whether criminal hubs’ followers are
highly shared with their criminal-followings. Specifically, we design a metric, named
Shared Follower Ratio (SFR), which is the percentage of an account’s followers, who
is also a follower of at least one of this account’s criminal-followings. A high SFR
of an account implies that most of this account’s followers are also its criminal-
followings’ followers, i.e., this account tends to share common followers with its
criminal-followings. We find that criminal hubs’ SFRs are higher than criminal
leaves’. Around 80% of criminal hubs’ SFRs are higher than 0.4, while around 5%
of criminal leaves have such values (see Figure 4.4(b)). This observation reflects
that compared with criminal leaves, criminal hubs’ followers share more follower
information with their criminal-followings. This indirectly implies that criminal hubs
could obtain followers by knowing their criminal-followings’ followers’ information,
once these hubs follow other criminal accounts.
From these two findings, we can roughly draw a picture on how criminal accounts
obtain followers on Twitter. Similar to the Bee Community, in the criminal account
community, criminal leaves, like bee workers, mainly focus on collecting pollen (ran-
domly following other accounts to expect them to follow back); criminal hubs in
the interior, like bee queens, mainly focus on supporting bee workers and acquiring
pollen from them (following leaves and acquiring their followers’ information).
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Figure 4.4: The comparison between criminal hubs and criminal leaves.
4.3 Outer Social Relationships
If malicious accounts mainly build social relationships within themselves, mali-
cious accounts can be detected by using existing sybil attack detection approaches
such as Sybil Guard [136] and Sybil Infer [31]. However, many Twitter malicious
accounts have already utilize several tricks to obtain followers outside the malicious
account community and mix well into the whole Twittersphere [88]. Thus, those
accounts, outside the malicious community who have close “follow relationships”
with malicious accounts, defined as malicious supporters, essentially help malicious
accounts avoid detection and spread malicious content [121].
However, we have little knowledge about the characteristics of those malicious
supporters. Thus, in this section, we conduct the first analysis of outer social re-
lationships between malicious accounts and their supporters including extracting
malicious supporters and characterizing them. By doing this, we can reveal typi-
cal characteristics of malicious supporters and understand more on how malicious
accounts can mix into the Twitter space.
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4.3.1 Extracting Malicious Supporters
We first design a Malicious Relevance Score Propagation Algorithm (Mr.SPA)
to extract malicious supports. Specifically, Mr.SPA will assign a malicious relevance
score (MR score) to each Twitter account, measuring how closely this account follows
malicious accounts. A higher MR score implies a closer “follow relationship” to
malicious accounts. Then, we measure the MR score based on three heuristics: (1)
the more malicious accounts that an account has followed, the higher score this
account should inherit; (2) the further an account is away from a malicious account,
the lower score the account should inherit; (3) the closer the support relationship
between an account and a malicious account is, the higher score the account should
inherit.
To formalize the above intuitions, we build a malicious relevance graph G =
(V,E) to model the support relationship. In this graph, we consider each Twitter
account i in our dataset outside the malicious community as a node Vi. There
is a directed edge eij from the node Vi to the node Vj, if the account i follows
the account j. The weight Wij of the edge eij is determined by the closeness of
the relationship between i and j. We next introduce our malicious relevance score
propagation algorithm including: initializing MR score and propagating MR score.
MR Score Initialization: Before propagating MR score, we first assign an
initial score M0i to each node Vi. If we denote C = {Ci|Ci is a malicious account},
then each malicious account Ci 2 C is assigned a non-zero score mi2. For other
accounts, the score is initialized to zero.
MR Score Propagation: To propagate a MR scoreMi to each node Vi after the
initialization phase, we make the following three score-assigning policies according
2In our preliminary experiment, we set mi = 1.
39
to the above three heuristics:
• Policy 1: MR Score Aggregation. An account’s score should sum up all the
scores inherited from the accounts it follows. As Figure 4.5(a) illustrates, when
A follows both malicious accounts C1 and C2, the score of A is the sum of the
malicious scores of C1 and C2.
• Policy 2: MR Score Dampening. The amount of MR score that an account
inherits from other accounts should be multiplied by a dampening factor of
↵ according to their social distances, where 0 < ↵ < 1. As Figure 4.5(b)
illustrates, when A1 is one hop away from a malicious account C, we assign it
a dampening factor of ↵, where 0 < ↵ < 1. When A2 is two-hop away, A2 will
get a dampening factor of ↵ · ↵ = ↵2.
• Policy 3: MR Score Splitting. The amount of MR score that an account inherits
from the accounts it follows should be multiplied by a relationship-closeness
factor Wij, which is the weight of the edge in our malicious relevance graph.
Specifically, we use the number of followers of an account to reflect the closeness
of the relationship between this account and its followers. (The intuition is
that if an account has more followers, the closeness of the relationship between
this account and each of its followers will become weaker.) As Figure 4.5(c)
illustrates, if A1 and A2 have followed the same malicious account C, the
relationship-closeness factor of each account to C is 0.5. Thus, according to this
policy, the score of a node Vi can be computed as Mi = Wij ·Mj, if (i, j) 2 E.
Before presenting our mathematical model of propagating MR score, we first
introduce some notations. Let n be the number of nodes in the malicious relevance
graph. We use the indication function Iij = {0, 1} to indicate whether (i, j) 2 E (i.e.,
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Figure 4.5: The policies of assigning MR scores.
if (i, j) 2 E, Iij = 1; otherwise, Iij = 0). If we use numIndegree(j) to denote the
number of the indegree of the node j, then from MR Score Splitting policy, we can
obtain that Wij =
1
numIndegree(j) . We use I to denote the column-vector normalized
adjacency matrix of nodes (i.e., Iij = Iij · Wij, if numIndegree(j) 6= 0; Iij = 1n , if
numIndegree(j) = 0). Let
 !
M0 be initial MR Score vector for all nodes and let
 !
Mt
be malicious score column vector for all nodes at the step t.
According to those three policies and our notations, at each step, for each node
Vi, its simple MR score Mi can be computed using Eq.(4.1).
Mi = ↵ ·
nX
j=1
Iij ·Wij ·Mj (4.1)
In addition, with the consideration of each node’s historical score record, at each
step t(t > 0), we add an initial score bias (1   ↵) ·M0i to its simple MR Score. (In
our experiment, we set ↵ = 0.85, since it is widely used in the random-walk model.)
Thus, we can compute the MR Score column-vector
 !
Mt for all nodes at the step
t(t > 0) by Eq.(4.2).
 !
Mt = ↵ ·     !I ·Mt 1 + (1  ↵) · !M0 (t > 0) (4.2)
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When the score vector converges after several propagation steps, we can obtain
final MR scores for all nodes. Once all MR scores have been calculated, a threshold
is needed to determine which accounts have su ciently close friend relationships
to their malicious counterparts. To find an acceptable threshold, we first use x-
means algorithm [83] to cluster accounts based on their MR scores. In this way,
accounts with similar scores will be grouped together indicating they have similar
follow relationships with malicious accounts. Then, we observe that most accounts
have relatively small scores and are grouped into one single cluster. That is mainly
because most accounts do not have very close follow relationships with malicious
accounts. With this observation, we choose the highest score of the account in that
cluster as the threshold. Then, we output 5,924 malicious supporters, whose MR
scores are higher than the threshold.
4.3.2 Characterizing Malicious Supporters
After extracting malicious supporters, according to our empirical studies, we
observe three representative categories of supporters (social butterflies, social pro-
moters, and dummies) according to our defined thresholds. (Since we aim at showing
preliminary and basic insights of malicious supporters’ characteristics, the thresholds
that are used to characterize them can be tunable according to how strictly to reflect
their behavioral characteristics.)
Social Butterflies are those accounts that have extraordinarily large numbers
of followers and followings. Like social butterflies in our real life, these accounts
build a lot of social relationships with other accounts without discriminating those
accounts’ qualities. To qualitatively define social butterflies, we use 2,000 following
as a threshold in terms of Twitter’s Following Limit Policy [113], which can be an
e cient number to distinguish whether the account is socialized. In this way, we can
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find 3,818 social butterflies.
We present our hypothesis that the reason why social butterflies intend to have
close friendships with maliciouss is mainly because most of them usually follow back
the users who follow them without careful examinations. Especially, some public
software and services[115] can help users automatically follow back other users who
have followed them. In this way, these social butterflies would unintentionally follow
back malicious accounts upon requests.
To validate this hypothesis, we first sign up 30 accounts without any tweets and
any personal information. Then we use 10 accounts to follow 500 accounts (each
account follows 50 accounts) that are randomly selected from those 3,818 butter-
flies. Meanwhile, we use another 10 accounts to follow another randomly selected
500 normal accounts without any tweets, and the other 10 accounts to follow another
randomly selected 500 identified malicious accounts. To minimize the influence gen-
erated by our experiment, we close our signed-up accounts after 48 hours. During this
timespan, we find 47.8% of those butterflies follow back to our signed-up accounts,
while only 1.8% of those normal accounts and 0.6% of those malicious accounts follow
back. The fast speed in which these social butterfly accounts followed our accounts
back validates our hypothesis that these accounts may automatically follow back any
accounts that follow them. Such a low value for those malicious accounts validates
that our identified malicious accounts are not social butterflies. And they usually
will not follow back other accounts, since this behavior will not increase their follower
numbers and influence. This experiment also shows that even though those Twitter
accounts with many followers are usually popular and trustable, we cannot totally
trust their friends’ quality.
Social Promoters are those Twitter accounts that have large following-follower
ratios (the ratio of an account’s following number to its follower number), larger
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following numbers and relatively high URL ratios. The owners of these accounts
usually use Twitter to promote themselves or their business. We extract those social
promoters whose URL ratios (the ratio of the number of URLs to the number of
tweets) are higher than 0.1, and following numbers and following-follower ratios are
both at the top 10-percentile of all accounts in our dataset. In this way, we obtain
508 social promoters.
We make our hypothesis that the reason why social promoters intend to have
close friendships with malicious accounts is probably because most of them usually
promote themselves or their business by actively following other accounts without
considerations of those accounts’ quality. Thus, promoters may become malicious
supporters by unintentionally following malicious accounts.
For this type of supporters, we use a heuristic method to validate our hypothesis.
Since the goals of these promoters are promoting themselves or their business, they
usually repeat posting URLs with the same domain names, which link to the web-
pages containing their promotion information. Thus, the purity of domain names
in promoters’ posted URLs are higher, leading a lower domain name entropy. With
this intuition, to calculate domain name entropy for each social promoter, we ex-
tract each promoter’s posted domain names in the final URLs, which are obtained
through following URL redirection chains, since many URLs on Twitter are short-
ening URLs. Then, we can compute its domain name entropy by using  
NP
i=1
pi ln pi,
where N denotes the number of distinct domain names and pi denotes the ratio of
the occurrences of the i-th distinct domain name to the total number of domain
names.
From Figure 4.6, we can find around 40% social promoters’ domain name en-
tropy are zero, which implies that all their URLs have the same domain names.
Also, social promoters’ domain name entropy are lower than that of other accounts.
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Figure 4.6: The entropy of the domain names.
Specifically, around 80% social promoters’ domain name entropy are lower than 1.0,
whereas around 45% of all accounts in our dataset have such values. The observation
heuristically validates our hypothesis that supporters tend to use Twitter to promote
themselves by actively following other accounts, leading to close relationships with
malicious accounts. One case study for a social promoter can be seen in Figure
4.7(a). The owner of this promoter mainly utilizes Twitter to promote an online
book selling website.
(a) Social Promoter (b) Dummy
Figure 4.7: Case studies for malicious supporters.
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Dummies are those Twitter accounts who post few tweets but have many fol-
lowers. Since in Twitter, legitimate users intend to follow those accounts that share
more useful information, it is relatively weird that these dummies with close relation-
ships with malicious accounts also have high follower numbers while sharing little
information. In particular, we extract intriguing dummy accounts who post fewer
than 5 tweets3 and whose follower numbers are at the top 10-percentile4. In this way,
we obtain 81 dummies.
We make our hypothesis that the reason why dummies intend to have close friend-
ship with malicious accounts is mainly because most of them are controlled or uti-
lized by cyber criminals. To validate this, we analyze these dummy accounts several
months after the data collection. Then, we find that one account has been suspended
by Twitter, and 6 accounts do not exist any more (closed), and 36 accounts begin
posting malware URLs labeled by Google Safe Browsing, and 8 accounts begin post-
ing (verified) phishing URLs. A case study of one dummy account, who posted no
tweets at the time when we crawled its profile, starts to post malicious tweets later
(see Figure 4.7(b)). The owner of this dummy account steals victims’ email addresses
by claiming to help people make money.
From the above experiment, we can find that unlike social butterflies and pro-
moters, “dummy” accounts are a special type of supporters. Since they initially do
not post any malicious URLs, they are not considered as malicious. However, those
dummy accounts extracted by Mr. SPA could evolve to malicious accounts. The
generation of this discrepancy is mainly because our work provides a static view of
the ecosystem. Thus, we do not argue whether dummies are supporters or malicious
accounts. This observation also implies that Mr.SPA could be applied as an early
3None of these tweets contain URLs that are labeled as malicious by GSB or honey client.
4According to [8], less than 10% of the Twitter accounts’ follower numbers are higher than 100.
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monitoring algorithm to catch those highly suspicious accounts, which may evolve
to be malicious.
Through analyzing outer social relationships between malicious accounts and
their supporters, we can understand more on how malicious accounts can mix into the
whole Twitter space by achieving malicious supporters. Also, once we extract these
supporters, we can warn legitimate users not to make friends with these supporters
so as to avoid exposure to malicious accounts.
4.4 Inferring Malicious Accounts
Considering the huge number of Twitter accounts, it is impractical to make in-
depth checks on every account whether it is a malicious account at the same time.
A lightweight sampling or inference algorithm, to guide to more suspicious accounts
instead of scanning or analyzing all accounts given limited resources or time, is
indeed needed. As malicious accounts tend to be socially connected, a spontaneous
and practical strategy is to first check those accounts that are connected with known
malicious accounts by using Breadth First Search (BFS) algorithm. In this section,
we propose a maliCious account Inference Algorithm (CIA) to selectively sample and
infer more malicious accounts by exploiting malicious accounts’ social relationships
and semantic coordination.
4.4.1 Design of CIA
In brief, our malicious account inference algorithm (CIA) propagates malicious
scores from a seed set of known malicious accounts to their followers according to
the closeness of social relationships and the strength of semantic coordinations. If
an account accumulates su cient malicious score, it is more likely to be a malicious
account.
The intuition of CIA is based on the following two observations: (1) malicious
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accounts tend to be socially connected; (2) malicious accounts usually share similar
topic/keywords/URLs to attract victims, thus having strong semantic coordinations
among them. The first observation has been shown and discussed in Section 4.2.
The second observation has also been analyzed in existing work such as [51, 43],
which validates the existence of shared semantic topics among di↵erent malicious
campaigns.
In general, our CIA integrates the first observation by referring to Mr.SPA de-
signed in Section 4.3 to quantify the closeness of social relationships. To integrate
the second observation, we use semantic similarity (SS) score to measure the seman-
tic coordination for each pair of accounts. A higher SS score between two accounts
implies that they have stronger semantic coordinations.
With the above intuitions and notions, we then describe the design of CIA in
details. To infer malicious accounts in a set of U Twitter accounts, we first start
from a known seed set ofM malicious accounts. Then, similar toMr.SPA, we build a
malicious relevance graph by using these (M+U) accounts, denoted asG = (V,E). In
this graph, each account denotes a vertex in V and each follow relationship denotes a
directed edge in E. Then, unlike Mr.SPA, we assign a weight for each edge eij 2 E,
by using a semantic weight assignment function WS(i, j), to reflect the semantic
coordination between each pair of accounts. The basic intuition of designing this
function is based on that if an account has higher SS scores (stronger semantic
coordination) with its followings, it should inherit more malicious score from its
followings. With this intuition, for each account j, we calculate SS score between
itself and each of its follower account i, denoted as SSij. Then, the weight WS(i, j)
of the edge eij can be calculated as: WS(i, j) =
SSijP
ekj2E
SSkj
.
Then, similar to Mr.SPA, for each malicious account, we assign a non-zero mali-
cious score and propagate this score by using the semantic weight assignment function
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WS(i, j). In this way, we can see that an account’s malicious score can be proportion-
ally distributed to its followers according to the closeness of social relationships and
strength of semantic coordinations. When the score vector converges after several
propagation steps, we infer those accounts with high malicious scores as malicious
accounts.
4.4.2 Evaluation of CIA
We evaluate our malicious account inference algorithm (CIA) based on two dif-
ferent datasets – Dataset I and Dataset II. Dataset I refers to the one we use for
the previous analyses. Dataset II contains another new crawled 30K accounts by
starting from 10 newly identified malicious accounts and using breath-first search
(BFS) strategy.
To evaluate the e↵ectiveness of our CIA, similar to [138] that uses the number
of hits in top list, we use the number of correctly inferred malicious accounts and
malicious a↵ected accounts, denoted as CA and MA, respectively. (Even though
these malicious a↵ected accounts may not be real malicious accounts, they still pol-
lute Twitter with malicious URLs and create a risk for innocent users.) Thus, a
higher number of CA and MA indicates that the algorithm is more e↵ective to infer
malicious accounts.
Note that as a lightweight inference and ranking algorithm aiming at magnifying
suspicious accounts from a small seed set, we do not position CIA as a full detection
algorithm. Thus, we adopt similar metrics to “Hit Count” used in [138] to measure
CIA’s e↵ectiveness rather than using false positive and false negative rate. However,
CIA could definitely be incorporated into an actual detection system by combining
with other detection features.
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4.4.2.1 Evaluation on Dataset I
We first design six experiments to evaluate the e↵ectiveness of our CIA based on
Dataset I:
• Di↵erent Selection Strategies. In this experiment, we start from the same
seed set of N identified malicious accounts, which are randomly selected from
2,060 identified malicious accounts. Then, starting from this seed set, we use
the following five strategies to select five di↵erent account sets with the same
selection size of k from the dataset5: random search (RAND), breath-first
search (BFS), depth-first search (DFS), random combination of breadth-first
and depth-first search (RBDFS)6, and CIA. From Figure 4.8(a), we can see
that CIA can outperform all the other selection strategies. Specifically, CIA
can infer 20.42 times as many CA and 10.66 times as many MA as that of
using random selection strategy. Also, CIA can infer 2.58 times as many CA
and around 2.00 times as many MA as that of using BFS, which can infer the
second most CA. Also, CIA can perform much better than the naive algorithm
that considering all accounts are possible malicious accounts. Specifically, CIA
can correctly predict around 0.0625 malicious accounts and over 0.25 malicious
a↵ected accounts by selecting 1 account. However, the naive algorithm can only
correctly predict 0.004 malicious accounts and 0.02 malicious a↵ected accounts
by selecting 1 account.
• Di↵erent Selection Sizes. In this experiment, we start from 100 identified
malicious account seeds and use CIA to infer malicious accounts by choosing
di↵erent selection sizes of accounts, i.e., we evaluate our CIA by changing the
5In this experiment, we choose N = 100 and k = 4, 000.
6Specifically, when RBDFS traverses to an account, it will have a probability of 50% to make a
breath-first or a depth-first search in the next step.
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values of k in the previous experiment. From Figure 4.8(b), we can see that
when we select more accounts, we can infer more CA andMA, and the increase
of CA and MA is sub-linear with the increase of the selection size.
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Figure 4.8: Using di↵erent selection strategies and setting di↵erent selection sizes of
accounts.
• Di↵erent Sizes of Seed Sets. In this experiment, we evaluate CIA by
starting from di↵erent sizes of malicious seeds, i.e., we set di↵erent values of
N . In this experiment, we also set k = 4, 000. From Figure 4.9(a), we can
see that when we increase the number of seeds, we can infer more malicious
accounts while selecting the same size of accounts. This is because when we use
more malicious seeds, we have more knowledge about the relationships among
the malicious account community.
• Di↵erent Types of Seeds. In this experiment, we evaluate CIA by using
di↵erent types of accounts as the seeds. Specifically, we start from the same
number (100) of randomly selected normal accounts (NOR) (posting no mali-
cious tweets), malicious a↵ected accounts (MA), malicious accounts (CA), and
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Figure 4.9: Striating from di↵erent sizes of seed sets and di↵erent types of seeds.
malicious hubs (CAHUB) and use CIA to select the same amount of 4,000
accounts. From Figure 4.9(b), we can find that starting from CAHUB and CA
can output much more CA and MA. Specifically, using CA we can infer 245
CA and 1,102MA, while using MA we can infer 6 CA and 248MA, and using
NOR we can infer 2 CA and 121 MA. This observation also validates that
malicious accounts have stronger social relationships and semantic coordina-
tions among themselves. Thus, it will be more e↵ective to use known malicious
accounts other than normal accounts as seeds to infer other malicious ones. We
can also find that using CAHUB can even infer more CA and MA than using
CA. That is also mainly because these malicious hubs have even more social
relationships with other malicious accounts than malicious leaves.
• Multiple Round Recursive Inference. In this experiment, we initially
start from a small set of randomly selected 50 identified malicious accounts
to recursively run CIA to infer malicious accounts. Specifically, during each
round, we will combine previous round’s seeds and identified malicious accounts
correctly inferred in the previous round as new seeds to run CIA again. From
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Figure 4.10, we can find that even when we start from a small number of
malicious accounts (50, which is around 2.4% of all CA in the dataset) within
running 3 rounds of CIA, we can infer around 9 times more malicious accounts
(500, which is around 22.3% of all CA). This observation shows that we can
use CIA to recursively infer more malicious accounts by adding newly correctly
inferred malicious accounts into the existing seed set.
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Figure 4.10: Evaluation of multiple round recursive inference.
• Performance. In this experiment, we examine the time used by CIA to infer
malicious accounts. Our CIA mainly contains three steps: Generating Social
Graph (Step 1), Calculating Coordination Weight (Step 2), and Propagating
Malicious score (Step 3). SInce the propagation of malicious score essentially
require the computation of a sparse matrix, we implement our propagation
algorithm based on SparseLib++ [86], which is an open library for e cient
sparse matrix computations. Specifically, we examine the time used for obtain-
ing malicious scores by starting from 100 randomly selected known malicious
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accounts. Table 4.2 shows the time used for each step to output the final
malicious score.
Step Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Total
Time 5.42 second 126.38 second 27.47 second 159.27 second
Table 4.2: The time (in second) used for each step in CIA to output malicious score.
From this table, we can see that the total time is less than 160 seconds, which
shows the e ciency of our CIA algorithm. The most time consuming step is
calculating coordination weight, which needs to calculate the semantic similar-
ity.
4.4.2.2 Evaluation on Dataset II
To decrease the e↵ect of possible sampling bias in our analyzed dataset and to
show the fact that the performance of CIA are reproducible, we also test CIA on
another newly crawled dataset. Also, to guarantee the correctness of identifying ma-
licious accounts, we first use Google Safe Browsing, a trustable blacklist, to collect
malicious a↵ected accounts. Then, we manually identify malicious accounts from
those malicious a↵ected accounts7. Then, we examine the e↵ectiveness of CIA on
newly crawled dataset by comparing di↵erent account selection strategies. Specifi-
cally, we start from only 10 identified malicious accounts and select 4,000 accounts
by using each strategy. From Figure 4.11, we can also find that CIA can generate the
best results. CIA can infer 13 more malicious accounts than that of using RAND.
Through the above experiments, we can find that our malicious account inference
algorithm (CIA) can be used to e↵ectively infer unknown malicious accounts. Also,
7We acknowledge that the numbers of CA and MA are the low bound of real numbers in the
dataset, because we can not detect all CA and MA by simply using GSB itself.
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Figure 4.11: Evaluation on Dataset II.
unlike most current work on detecting Twitter spammers based on machine learning
techniques, which require extracting many features from all the accounts in the
dataset, CIA mainly focuses on those accounts that have strong social relationships
with existing known malicious accounts. In addition, CIA can be utilized to work as
an early-stage monitoring and ranking algorithm to monitor those highly suspicious
accounts, which may evolve to be malicious accounts later.
4.5 Limitation
We acknowledge that our analyzed dataset may contain some bias. Also, the
number of our analyzed malicious accounts is a lower bound of the actual number in
the dataset, because we only target on one specific type of malicious accounts due
to their severity and prevalence on Twitter. However, it is extremely challenging to
obtain an ideal, unbiased dataset with perfect ground truth. Especially, to reduce
possible data sampling bias, we crawled two datasets at very di↵erent time to evaluate
the performance of our CIA. We also believe that even though the exact values of
some metrics used in our work may vary a little bit when using di↵erent sample
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datasets, our major conclusions and insights will likely still hold. Also, our analysis
is mainly based on a snapshot of Twitter space, which only provides a static view.
We also acknowledge that our validations on some possible explanations proposed
in this work may be not absolutely rigorous, due to the di culties in thoroughly
obtaining malicious ’ social actions or motivations. However, we believe that our
first-in-its-kind analysis of those phenomenon still provides great values and opens a
door to better understand the cyber criminal ecosystem on Twitter.
4.6 Summary
We have presented an empirical analysis of the cyber criminal ecosystem on Twit-
ter, including an in-depth analysis of the inner and outer social relationships among
malicious accounts. We observed that malicious accounts tend to be socially con-
nected, and malicious accounts in some particular malicious campaign tend to have
strong semantic and timing coordinations. We also observed three categories of ac-
counts that have closed social relationships with malicious accounts. Based on these
findings, we designed an inference algorithm to selectively sample more likely mali-
cious accounts based on a known seed set by analyzing their social relationships and
semantic coordinations with other accounts. We evaluated the algorithm’s inference
capabilities in a pre-crawled dataset by using di↵erent Selection Strategies, setting
di↵erent values of selection sizes and seed sizes, and using di↵erent types of seeds.
To prove that the performance of the inference algorithm is reproducible, we also
evaluated the algorithm by using a newly crawled dataset from a very small seed
of known malicious accounts by using di↵erent crawling strategies. Our experience
demonstrates that the algorithm can be e↵ectively used to sample more likely spam
accounts from a seed set of known malicious accounts. Our analysis of the cyber
criminal ecosystem on Twitter is also the first in-depth analysis of the social rela-
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tionships among malicious OSN accounts. We hope that our analysis can inspire
more studies in this research direction.
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5. REVERSE ENGINEERING TWITTER SPAMMERS
We have described our analysis of the social relationships among OSN spammers.
Through understanding the social relationships among OSN spammers, we find three
major categories of accounts that have close social relationships with spam accounts.
We also design two inference algorithms to infer unknown spam Twitter accounts
by starting from a seed set of known criminal ones and exploiting the properties of
their social relationships and semantic coordinations with other criminal accounts.
However, the spammers begin to evolve more evasive and to increase the success
chance of obtaining victims, by choosing specific accounts as spamming targets in-
stead of choosing random accounts. In this chapter, we present a novel defense
insights against those OSN spammers by reversing engineering the strategies used
by spammers to select their spam targets.
Restricted by OSNs’ anti-spam measures, many OSN spammers have evolved
to launch Targeted Social-Media Spamming (i.e., spammers selectively choose their
spamming targets by analyzing those targets’ behaviors [101]). Twitter users have
undergone the following experience: once they write some big brand names such
as “Ipad” or “Best Buy” in their tweets, they will receive a slew of tweets o↵ering
“free” products or gift cards related to the brands [69, 93]. Such observations indeed
imply an obvious interaction between users’ social behaviors and spammers’ actions
(as illustrated in Figure 5.1).
The benefit for spammers to use this strategy to find targets is straightforward.
Through selectively choosing targets to initialize unsolicited friend requests or send
unsolicited messages, spammers could significantly decrease the risks of being de-
tected under current OSNs’ policies. (According to our observation, a Twitter ac-
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of interactions between users’ social behaviors and spammers’
actions.
count, who constantly follows more than 50 accounts per day, will highly possibly
be suspend by Twitter within a week.) Furthermore, after knowing targets’ tastes
or social friend-circles, spammers could significantly increase their chances of suc-
cessfully spamming, either by actively pushing spam messages related to targets’
tastes (e.g., on Twitter) or pretending to be in the same social friend-circle (e.g., on
Facebook). In this way, social spammers could garner victims more e↵ectively by
launching customized actions based on their targets’ social behavior characteristics.
Thus, this is di↵erent from the scenario for traditional email spam or web spam, in
which attackers usually know nothing about their targets and can merely blindly
send spam.
However, we still know little about basic insights of the interactions between users’
behaviors and spammers’ actions, which could be used to catch spam accounts. Also,
such insights may further facilitate us to understand common questions such as “Why
do I get spam friends? [89]”, “Why do I receive spam messages? [96]” and “How
do spammers find their targets?”. The desire of addressing such questions, and thus
obtaining insights for defending against social spammers, forms one motivation of
this work.
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Furthermore, although many existing studies rely on social honeypots (or even
manual identification) to collect likely spam accounts (aiming at further analyzing
them to generate defense insights), such strategies are still not very e cient in terms
of collecting a large-scale of spam accounts from the huge Twittersphere. In partic-
ular, the technique of social honeypots is relatively passive and typically requires a
long time to attract many spam accounts. The strategy of manually labeling spam
accounts is tedious, time-consuming, and very di cult to scale. Thus, given lim-
ited resources/time, a light-weight strategy to selectively sample more likely spam
accounts from the huge Twittersphere is strongly desired.
Through reverse engineering spammers’ tastes (their preferred targets to spam),
this chapter provides guidelines for designing e↵ective social honeypots, and de-
signing lightweight and guided strategies to actively sample more likely social spam
accounts. To achieve this goal, we use Twitter as a case study due to its great popu-
larity and publicity. Specifically, to reveal which behaviors tend to incur spammers’
contact, we implement 96 “benchmark” Twitter social honeypots with 24 diverse
fine-grained social behavior patterns to trap spam accounts. After launching our
social honeypots for five months, we successfully garner around 600 spam accounts.
Using these data, we analyze spammers’ tastes (how spammers find their targets),
through comparing the e↵ectiveness of social honeypots with di↵erent behavior pat-
terns. Based on these analyses, we design and implement 10 more e↵ective (“ad-
vanced”) honeypots to trap Twitter spammers. Within the same time period, using
those advanced honeypots can trap spammers around 26 times faster than using
“traditional” honeypots. To further understand spammers’ tastes, we also design
an algorithm to extract semantic topic terms, which may highly attract spammers’
attentions.
We design two guided approaches to prioritize the active sampling of more likely
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spam accounts from Twittersphere. These two approaches are designed by the anal-
ysis results obtained through reverse engineering spammers’ strategies of selecting
targets. They are an e↵ective complement to existing passive social honeypots.
We make the following major contributions:
• We present a deep analysis of spammers’ tastes: spammers tend to contact with
accounts that tweet messages and follow accounts related to specific topics.
• We deploy “advanced” (more e↵ective) honeypots based on our provided guide-
lines, which can trap spammers around 26 times faster than using “traditional”
honeypots.
• We design two lightweight, guided approaches to prioritize the sampling of
more likely Twitter spam accounts in the huge Twittersphere. According to
our evaluation, our samplers can e ciently collect over 17,000 Twitter spam
accounts in a short time with a considerably high “Hit Rate” (correctly collect
0.6 spam account per sampled account).
In Section 5.1, we further clarify the problem that we are targeting. In Section
5.2, we detail the procedure of our collection and analysis of spammers’ interests. In
Section 5.3, we describe the motivation and algorithm design of our two lightweight
samplers to infer more likely Twitter spam accounts. In Section 5.4, we present our
evaluation results of those two samplers. We discuss our limitation in Section 5.5.
5.1 Problem Statement
We next introduce the research scope of this work. Our research goal is to un-
derstand the characteristics of one special type of Twitter spammers, who launch
targeted social-media spamming in Twitter, and further to gain new defense insights
against them by reverse engineering their spamming tastes. Particularly, we use a
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relatively strict/conservative view (similar to existing work [27] and Twitter rules
[108]) to consider an account to be a spam account, if it meets one of the following
criteria: (1) tend to post spam or malicious URLs in the tweets; (2) tend to post
scam words in the tweets; (3) repeatedly post duplicate tweets; (4) repeatedly send
“@mention” messages to other accounts with few useful content.
Figure 5.2: Illustration of the analysis flow.
To achieve our research goal, we first design 96 social honeypots with diverse
social behavior patterns to garner spammers (see Figure 5.2). Based on the func-
tions provided by Twitter, these social behavior patterns mainly vary in terms of
tweeting behaviors, following behaviors, and application usage. Particularly, the
content posted by users, the famous accounts followed by users and the applications
used by users may display users’ tastes, incurring spammers’ contact. Then, these
social honeypots could trap spammers by receiving spammers’ unsolicited messages
and obtaining spam followers. All of social honeypots’ behavior and their trapped
spammers’ actions (sending unsolicited messages or building unsolicited friendships)
will be saved in a local database.Next, after deeply analyzing spammers’ tastes by
62
comparing the e↵ectiveness of honeypots with di↵erent social behavior patterns, we
can provide guidelines to build e↵ective honeypots. Finally, through reverse engi-
neering spammers’ strategies of selecting targets, we design two lightweight, guided
strategies (Hashtag Sampler and Friend Sampler) to prioritize the sampling of more
likely Twitter spam accounts from the huge Twittersphere. More specially, Hash-
tag Sampler is designed to catch spammers that target on specific accounts if they
tweet specific hashtags. Friend Sampler is designed to catch spammers that target
on specific famous accounts’ followers.
5.2 Reverse Engineering Spammers
In this section, we describe our methodologies of extracting and analyzing social
spammers’ tastes. Specifically, we design and launch multiple social honeypots with
diverse fine-grained behavior patterns to garner spammers. Next, through analyzing
intrinsic properties of the interactions between users’ social behaviors and spammers’
actions, we could better understand the following questions: Who do spammers
spam? How do spammers find their victims? Through these analyses, we further
provide guidelines of building more attractive social honeypots.
5.2.1 Collecting Spammers’ Tastes
To analyze the interactions between users’ behaviors and spammers’ actions, we
need to endow social honeypots with diverse fine-grained social behavior patterns to
show diverse users’ tastes. As a Twitter account mainly has three categories of social
behaviors (posting tweets, following accounts and installing applications), we design
social honeypots based on the variations of these three categories: Tweet Behavior
(Tweet), Follow Behavior (Follow) and Application Usage (App) (see Table 5.1).
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Index Category Sub-Category Pattern
1-5 Tweet Frequency Once per day
6-10 Tweet Frequency Twice per day
11-15 Tweet Frequency Once per hour
16-20 Tweet Keywords Trending Topics
21-25 Tweet Keywords Arbitrary Hashtags
26-30 Tweet Keywords Current A↵airs
31-35 Tweet Keywords Bait Words
36-40 Tweet Keywords No Hashtags
41-45 Tweet Topic (Twice per day) Entertainment
46-50 Tweet Topic (Twice per day) Expertise
51-55 Tweet Topic (Twice per day) Sports
56-60 Tweet Topic (Twice per day) Economics
61-62 Tweet Topic (Once per hour) Entertainment
63-64 Tweet Topic (Once per hour) Expertise
65-66 Tweet Topic (Once per hour) Sports
67-68 Tweet Topic (Once per hour) Economics
69-70 Follow Two accounts per day Entertainment
71-72 Follow Two accounts per day Expertise
73-74 Follow Two accounts per day Sports
75-76 Follow Two accounts per day Economics
77-81 App NA Twitpic
82-86 App NA Instagr
87-91 App NA Twiends
92-96 Default NA NA
Table 5.1: Summary of 96 “benchmark” social honeypots with 24 fine-grained social
behavior patterns.
5.2.1.1 Tweet Behavior
The content tweeted by users (and tweet frequency) may directly expose users’
interests. Particularly, the keywords/topics posted by users may reveal their tastes,
which could be utilized by spammers to find targets. In fact, users’ real experience
has shown that di↵erent tweet keywords may behave very di↵erently in terms of in-
curring spammers [93]. Accordingly, we divide our social honeypots’ tweet behaviors
into three sub-categories: Tweet Frequency, Tweet Keywords and Tweet Topics.(To
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reduce possible e↵ects to other users, our social honeypots will not post any links
and “@ mentions”.)
Tweet Frequency refers to how often post one tweet. We divide tweeting frequency
into the following three patterns: 1 tweet per hour, 2 tweets per day, and 1 tweet
per day. For each pattern, we use 5 honeypot accounts to send tweets according to
the specific tweet frequency. Those tweets are randomly selected from the dataset
containing around half million Twitter accounts and 14 million tweets, which was
collected from Apr. 2010 to Aug. 2010 by using Twitter Stream APIs.
Tweet Keywords refer to special words or terms in the tweets, which may repre-
sent specific semantic topics. We divide tweet keywords into four patterns: popu-
lar trending topics, arbitrary hashtags, current a↵airs, bait words, and no hashtag
tweets:
• “Popular trending topics” refer to those hot Twitter trending topics [109],
which are widely used by Twitter users to express their opinions or experience
on specific topics or events. For each day, we collect top (the most widely
used) 10 trending topics. Then, we use 5 honeypot accounts to post these 10
trending topics. Each of them will post 2 trending topics.
• “Arbitrary hashtags” refer to those tweet terms with the tag of “#”. The
tweets containing the same hashtag will be grouped together by Twitter and
searched out by users from Twitter Search [112]. These hashtags are also ran-
domly selected from the pre-collected dataset. For each day, we use 5 honeypot
accounts to send 10 tweets with hashtags. Each of them sends 2 tweets, which
are randomly selected from our collected dataset.
• “Current a↵airs” refer to important social events happened each day. To ex-
tract those events, we implement a web crawler to crawl the top 10 headlines
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from CNN.com. Then, we use 5 honeypots to post those headlines (each posts
two headlines).
• “Bait words” refer to those keywords that are mainly used by spammers in
their scam webpages or messages to trap victims (e.g., “giftcard”). We use a
list of 200 bait words, mainly obtained through feeding queries such as “scam
word lists” to Google.com. Then, we also use 5 honeypots to send 2 messages
containing bait words per account per day.
• “No hashtags” refer to tweets without any hashtags. To make the comparison
with other social patterns, we also use 5 honeypots to post 10 tweets without
any hashtags on each day. Each of them will post 2 tweets, which are randomly
selected from the dataset.
Tweet Topics refer to specific semantic topics in the tweets. Since these tweets are
closely related with specific semantic topics, they will explicitly reveal users’ tastes.
Particularly, we focus on the following four topics: Entertainment, Expertise, Sports
and Economics. Entertainment contains those semantic topics related to TV media,
music, books and arts; Expertise contains topics related to IT technology, Science,
Fashion and Household; Sports contains topics related to golf, NBA, NCAA, NFL
and NHL; Economics contains topics related to business, finance and charity. To
use our honeypots to tweet those semantic topics, we first collect tweets related with
those topics by searching topic terms (e.g., “NBA”) on Twitter. Then, for each topic,
we use 5 honeypots to send one tweet per day. To compare, we also use 2 honeypots
to send 1 tweet per hour.
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5.2.1.2 Follow Behavior
Besides the content posted by users, users’ followings (especially those famous
people or companies’ o cial accounts) may also reveal their tastes. For example, if
an account follows “Lady Gaga”, the owner of the account may like music or live
concert. Thus, this kind of following tastes might be utilized by spammers.
To extract spammers’ such tastes, we use our honeypots to follow “verified ac-
counts”, whose tweets are related with four major topics mentioned above: Enter-
tainment, Expertise, Sports and Economics. Specifically, for each topic, we manu-
ally collect 400 verified accounts from Twitter. These verified accounts are typically
owned by famous people or organizations with high reputation, such as sports stars
and o cial business accounts. Thus, through following those verified accounts, our
honeypots explicitly show their interests to those topics. Particularly, for each topic,
we use 2 social honeypots to follow 2 verified accounts per day. (To reduce possible
e↵ects, each account will follow 30 verified accounts at most.)
5.2.1.3 Application Usage and Default
Users who install specific Twitter applications (e.g., multimedia sharing tools and
online games) may also reveal their specific tastes and thus become spammers’ tar-
gets. In our test, we choose three very popular Twitter social applications: Twitpic
[106], Instagr [54] and Twiends [110]. (Twitpic and Instagr are popular photo and
video sharing tools, and Twiends is an online Twitter friend-making tool.) For each
application, we use five honeypots to install and use it.
As a comparison, we also use five honeypots with default account registration
configuration, which neither post any tweets nor follow any accounts.
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5.2.1.4 Deployment of Honeypot
In summary, as seen in Table 5.1, we design 96 honeypots with 24 diverse fine-
grained behavior patterns to garner spammers. Since the aim of designing these social
honeypots is to understand which specific social behaviors tend to incur spammers
rather than to trap more spammers, we refer these 96 honeypots as “benchmark”
honeypots.
To implement those “benchmark” honeypots, we develop a realtime Twitter ap-
plication, named social honeypot app (SHP), which has three major operations:
write, follow, and read. As illustrated in Figure 5.3, write operation is utilized to
implement diverse tweet-behaviors by posting tweets on honeypots’ timelines; follow
operation is utilized to implement diverse follow-behaviors by following other ac-
counts; read operation is utilized to collect spam accounts and spam tweets trapped
by our social honeypots, through reading honeypots’ followers and “@mentions”.
Figure 5.3: The implementation of social honeypots.
More specifically, the application obtains each honeypot’s access token to auto-
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matically make the corresponding operations (write, follow and read) on the account
to perform its designed social behaviors according to the protocol of OAuth 2.0. All
the auxiliary data such as our collected tweet dataset, popular trending topics and
bait words are loaded into the app to implement corresponding operations. Finally,
the app will record each honeypot’s social behaviors, and its received “@mentions”
and followers into a local database everyday. In this way, we can collect the interac-
tions between honeypots’ behavior patterns and their trapped spammers’ actions.
Particularly, to make our honeypots to be more likely to be real accounts (i.e.,
to decrease the chance of being identified as honeypots by spammers), we register
our honeypot accounts by using real human names (e.g., Tracy Thompson) and valid
email addresses. Also, we will initialize the friendships among those honeypots. We
admit that smart shammers might still recognize our social honeypots by deeply
analyzing those honeypots’ behaviors, because these honeypots are designed with a
set of scheduled tasks. However, many normal accounts (e.g., some o cial company
accounts) are also customized to post particular messages/notifications in a scheduled
way. Thus, it is not that trivial for spammers to distinguish honeypots from normal
accounts. Also, this limitation is common for all this line of studies, which rely on
deploying automated honeypot accounts.
5.2.2 Analyzing Spammers’ Tastes
We next show the results of spammers collected by “benchmark” honeypots, and
analyze those spammers’ tastes.
5.2.2.1 Data Collection Result
We implemented those 96 “benchmark” honeypots and run them for five months.
We collected 1, 077 unique accounts that at least follow one of our social honeypots,
and 440 unique accounts that at least send one “@mention” to one honeypot. In
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total, there are 1, 512 unique accounts.
To extract spammers’ tastes, we need to identify spam accounts from those 1, 512
accounts. We first found out 303 accounts that have been suspended by Twitter due
to their violations to the Twitter Rule. Furthermore, following the definition of our
target spam accounts’ described in Section 5.1., we identified additional 278 spam
accounts by manually examining accounts timeline and checking those accounts’
posted URLs. In total, we obtain 578 spam accounts.
Note that the number of spam accounts trapped by our “benchmark” honeypots
seems a little smaller than other earlier social honeypot studies (e.g., [65]). We believe
this is due to the following reasons. First, those studies were conducted in early days
when Twitter has relatively loose policies to identify/mitigate spammers. However,
since 2009, Twitter has taken significant anti-spam e↵orts to actively filter/mitigate
a lot of spam accounts [23]. In addition, in this work, to guarantee the correctness
to analyze spammers’ interests, we use a relatively strict way to consider an account
to be spam. While there could be a few spam accounts missed in our data collection
with this relatively strict spammer identification strategy, we believe that our major
findings/conclusion in this research will still hold.
5.2.2.2 Analysis of Spammers’ Tastes
In this section, we provide our analyses of spammers’ tastes based on 578 trapped
spam accounts. To better measure the e↵ectiveness of social honeypots with di↵erent
behavior patterns, we define a metric named Capture Rate (CR), which is the average
number of spam accounts trapped by a honeypot per day. Thus, a higher value of
CR of honeypots with a specific pattern implies this pattern is more e↵ective to
trap spammers. As mentioned before, we try to answer several questions about the
social behavior interactions between users and spammers (e.g., “Who do spammers
70
spam?”). Then, our analysis and measurement results are presented in the question-
answer format.
Q1: Do spammers tend to find targets by randomly selecting accounts from Twit-
ter public timeline? Empirical Answer: No. One possible way for spammers to find
targets is to send requests to the public timeline, which will return the 20 most recent
tweets per request. However, according to our observation, it is not the case now. As
seen in Figure 5.4(a), we can find that even though we diversify tweeting frequencies
(once per hour – T1h, twice per day – T2d, and once per day – T1d), the performances
of these three patterns are similar (garnering similar numbers of spammers). Partic-
ularly, although T1h honeypots post more tweets than T2d and T1d, T1h’s CR, which
is 0.011, is even slightly smaller than that of T2d, which is 0.012 (see Figure 5.4(b)).
Thus, this observation shows that if an account posts more arbitrary tweets, it does
not necessarily increase the chance of attracting spammers’ more attentions, even
though this behavior will bring in a better chance for the account to be shown on
the Twitter public timeline.1 Nevertheless, we can see that these three types of hon-
eypots can trap more spammers than Default, because tweeting content essentially
may reveal honeypots’ tastes.
Q2: If an account posts more tweets related with specific semantic topics, does it
tend to attract more spammers’ attention? Empirical Answer: Yes. Another pos-
sible way to find targets for spammers is to analyze targets’ tweet content, which
may show targets’ interests on specific topics. Then, through actively pushing spam
related to those topics to those targets, attackers may achieve a higher chance of
success. As seen in Figure 5.5(a), posting messages related with specific topics (En-
tertainment – TEn, Sports – TSp, Economics – TEc, Expertise – TEx), will incur more
1To reduce the possible interference to Twittersphere, we did not test with extremely high tweeting
frequencies. Thus, we do not deny the possibility that our conclusion might be somehow di↵erent
if some accounts post tweets with an extremely high frequency.
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(a) # of Trapped Spammers (b) Capture Rate
Figure 5.4: Comparison of di↵erent tweet frequencies.
spammers’ contact than posting arbitrary messages even with the same tweeting
frequency (twice per day). More specifically, TEx2d’s CR (the highest for tweeting
topic twice per day) is around 3 times as that of T2d, and TEc2d’s CR (the lowest)
is around 1.5 times as that of T2d. In addition, when we increase the frequency
from twice per day to once per hour (e.g., from TEn2d to TEn1h), honeypots can trap
more spammers (See Figure 5.5(b)). And the average values of CR for these four
topics can be increased around 22.35 times (from 0.021 to 0.494). Thus, unlike the
observation under the pattern of tweet frequency, we can find that honeypots can
trap more spammers through tweeting more messages related with certain semantic
topics.
Q3: Do accounts that tweet more special terms (e.g., “Trending topics”) tend to
attract more spammers’ contact? Empirical Answer: Yes. As seen in Figure 5.6(a),
the values of CR for tweeting trending topics (Trend), arbitrary hashtags (Hashtag),
and bait words (Bait), are all higher than that of Nohash (arbitrary tweets without
hashtags) and Default. This observation indicates that posting special key terms
may also incur spammers’ contact. This because these key terms usually represent
semantic topic meanings, which could be utilized by spammers to find targets (similar
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(a) Tweet Topics (b) # of Trapped Spammers
Figure 5.5: The e↵ectiveness of tweet topics.
to tweeting topics). In addition, we can find that Trend is more e↵ective than
Hashtag. This might because trending topics are more timely and popular than
arbitrary hashtags.
(a) Tweet Keywords (b) Follow Behavior
Figure 5.6: The e↵ectiveness of tweet keywords and follow behavior.
Q4: Do users’ following behaviors tend to expose them to spammers? Empirical
Answer: Yes. As seen in Figure 5.6(b), similar to tweet topics, the values of CR
for following verified accounts related with the topics of Entertainment (FEn), Sports
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(FSp), Economics (FEc), Expertise (FEx), are all higher than that of T1d and Default.
This observation implies that the behavior of following those famous (“verified”)
accounts could be utilized by spammers to find their targets. As a case study, we
find one spam account, which mainly posts spam about TV media (the URLs in the
tweets have been identified as suspicious by the URL shortening service), shares 19
followings (most of them are related the topic of art or TV media) with one honeypot.
Q5: Do accounts with the usage of social apps tend to be contacted by more
spammers? Empirical Answer: No. According to our data, the capture rates of
honeypots with the usage of Instagram, Twitpic and Twiends, are 0.008, 0.008,
and 0.009, respectively. These values are lower than that of most of other social
patterns and similar to Default. Thus, using social apps do not help much in terms
of attracting spammers. This might either because spammers have not use this
strategy to find targets or the selections of applications used by our honeypots are
not representative.
According to the above analyses, we can find that many spammers indeed se-
lectively choose spamming targets, rather than random selections. By doing this,
spammers can increase the chance of success, while avoiding being suspended due to
excessive contacts with others.
5.2.2.3 Guidelines for Designing E↵ective Honeypots
According to the above analyses, we could summarize the following guidelines
for designing more e↵ective social honeypots to trap Twitter spammers: (1) post
tweets related with specific topics; (2) post tweets containing special key-
words such as Trending topics; (3) follow famous accounts related with
specific areas.
To evaluate the e↵ectiveness of those guidelines, we denote 96 “benchmark” hon-
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eypots as GE, and 51 honeypots of them2 that meet at least one guideline as GU. We
find that GU’s capture rate (0.083) is over two times as that of GE (0.040). This obser-
vation indicates that GU (that meet guidelines) is more e↵ective to attract spammers
than GE.
To further evaluate the e↵ectiveness of our guidelines, we deploy another 10
“advanced” honeypots (AD) with more guided social behaviors for a week right after
finishing the 5-month running of “benchmark” honeypots. Specifically, in each day,
each of them will behave the following social patterns3: (1) post one topic tweet
per hour related with each of those four topics; (2) post one tweet containing one
trending topic per hour; (3) post one tweet containing one arbitrary hashtag per
hour; (4) post one tweet containing one bait word per hour; (5) Follow 5 experts
related with each of four topics per day. Then, as seen in Figure 5.7, we compare
the performance of AD with GE and GU by collecting data in the same week. We
can find that AD is much more e↵ective than GE and GU in trapping more spammers.
Particularly, AD’s capture rate (2.17) is 25.5 times as that of GU (0.085), and 45.2
times as that of GE (0.048). Although this comparison result may contain some bias
due to a relatively short period time of data collection, such a huge di↵erence could
still validate the e↵ectiveness of our guidelines for designing better social honeypots.
5.2.2.4 Extracting Spammers’ Interested Topic Terms
To better understand spammers’ tastes, it is meaningful to extract those specific
key terms, which usually contain semantic meanings and tend to be used by spam-
mers to find targets. Even though this could be achieved by manually analyzing
those hashtags in the tweets, a more generic and automated approach to extract key
251 accounts are 16-25, 31-35, 41-76 as labeled in Table 5.1.
3To prevent spammers identifying our accounts as honeypots based on the temporal patterns, some
random delays are inserted before posting each tweet.
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(a) # of Spammers (b) per Honeypot
Figure 5.7: The e↵ectiveness of advanced honeypots.
terms (not limited to hashtags only) is still needed, because a large amount of tweets
do not contain hashtags. Thus, in this section, we design an approach to extract
those topic terms through analyzing the data collected by our honeypots.
Figure 5.8: One real case study of potential victims.
We first introduce the intuition of our algorithm. As shown in Figure 5.8, we find
that many spammers send illicit “@mentions” not only to our honeypots but also to
other accounts (e.g., “gladynotglady” in this example), which denoted as “potential
victims” in this work. We denote each pair of potential victims and honeypots in one
illicit “@mention” as a “victim relationship”. Thus, we believe that there should be
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some common social behavior patterns between our honeypots and those potential
victims in each victim relationship, which essentially incur spammers’ contacts. An
intuitive method is to extract the common terms used by both our honeypots and
those victims, which may represent spammers’ tastes. However, this approach will
extract many widely-used common words, which are not representative for spammers’
tastes. Even though we could use a big stop-word list to filter some common words,
it could not help much to achieve this goal, because many words tweeted by users
are not even spelled completely or in a standard form.
Thus, we first use the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)4 [127] algorithm to
extract topic terms, which are better to represent semantic topics, from the tweets
posted by our honeypots and potential victims. Then, we output those topic terms
that are highly/frequently shared by the pairs of victims and honeypots. In this way,
these topic terms may highly attract spammers’ contact.
Due to the page limitation, we next briefly introduce our algorithm to extract
topic terms based on LDA instead of presenting its details. For each honeypot
{SHPi|i = 1, 2, ..., I}, we extract its received “@mention” messages {Mim|m =
1, 2, ...,M} sent from spam accounts. If the message contains other potential victims
{PVj|j = 1, 2, ..., J}, we put {SHPi and {PVj|j = 1, 2, ..., J} into an account set
SMA, and record each victim relationship vr = (SHPi, PVj) into a victim relation-
ship set V R. Then, for each unique account SMAk 2 SMA, we extract its NTk top
ranked topic terms by using LDA. Next, for each relationship vr 2 V R, we extract
the shared topic terms among the honeypot and the potential victim, and save them
into a semantic topic term set ST . Then, we output the most frequent FT topic
terms shown in all victim relationships as spammers’ interesting topic terms, because
4LDA is a generative probabilistic topic modeling (clustering) algorithm, which could cluster terms
in the large volumes of unlabeled text into several semantic topics by identifying the latent topics
words in the text.
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these terms with strong semantic topic meanings are highly shared among our social
honeypots and their corresponding potential victims.
Specifically, our honeypots receive 449 “@mention” messages from spammers and
form 5,716 victim relationships with 275 unique potential victims. Then, we extract
1, 500 and 600 topic terms for each honeypot and potential victim, respectively. We
finally output the top 500 as semantic topic terms. (Due to the page limitation, we
skip to show those topic terms.) Furthermore, through extracting semantic topic
terms, we could examine whether there is tweet similarity between spammers and
their targets. Particularly, we extract semantic topic terms for 278 (manually) identi-
fied spam accounts by using LDA. Then, we extract all pairs of honeypots and spam
accounts, if the spam accounts either follow or “@mention” the honeypot. Then,
we find 81.69% of 360 pairs of two accounts share at least one semantic term. This
observation indicates a relatively strong semantic similarity between spammers and
their targets.
5.2.2.5 Ethical Considerations
The technology of deploying social honeypots on real OSNs may raise ethical
considerations: whether such social honeypots will generate big e↵ects to OSNs. In
terms of our work, both “benchmark” and “advanced” honeypots are designed to
neither send any messages to other users nor post any URLs/spam in the tweets.
Also, those accounts only follow a relatively small number (several hundreds) of
“verified” accounts. Thus, we believe our designed honeypots will generate very
limited e↵ects to other normal users. In addition, the technique of social honeypots
has been commonly used to capture spammers [102, 65] or to understand the security
vulnerability [14] on OSNs. Furthermore, as advocated in a recent study on the
ethics of security vulnerability [74], such studies served as social functions are neither
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unethical nor illegal.
5.3 Prioritizing the Sampling of Likely Spammers
In this section, we design two guided approaches to actively sample more likely
Twitter spam accounts from Twittersphere, based on the observation that many
spammers find their targets based on targets’ social behaviors.
5.3.1 Motivation
The collection of spam accounts is usually the first step to analyze spammers’ be-
haviors and to further generate defense insights. However, given the limited time/re-
source (especially for academic researchers), it is not trivial to collect a large-scale
of spam accounts in the huge Twittersphere. Existing studies mainly rely on the
following three strategies to collect (likely) spam accounts: implementing social
honeypots[65, 66, 102], collecting suspended accounts [105, 57], and manual iden-
tification [65, 116]. However, all these three strategies have certain limitations. The
honeypot approach is a passive one, requiring time (and luck) to wait for spammers’
contacts. Collecting suspended accounts requires to develop a robust crawler and
takes a considerable long time (typically several months) to crawl Twitter and to
wait for collected accounts to be suspended by Twitter. Manual identification could
achieves a high accuracy, which requires tedious human work and is not scalable.
Motivated by the limitations of existing strategies to collect (likely) spam ac-
counts, we design two lightweight, guided strategies (called samplers in this disserta-
tion) to prioritize the active sampling of more likely spam accounts in Twittersphere:
Hashtag Sampler and Friend Sampler. These two samplers are designed to be able to
e ciently collect/sample a considerable number of targeted social-media spammers
(spam accounts) in a short time period with a relatively high hit rate.
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5.3.2 Hashtag Sampler
5.3.2.1 Basic Intuition
Spammers tend to follow those accounts that post spammers’ interested keywords
(hashtags). According to this intuition, an account might be suspicious if it follows
many accounts that share some spammers’ interested hashtags in their tweets. At the
high level, Hashtag sampler is designed to preferentially sample likely spam accounts
through checking common followers of multiple accounts that share/post similar,
multiple hashtags as spammers do.
5.3.2.2 Detailed Strategy
As illustrated in Figure 5.9, Hashtag Sampler has three steps to sample likely
spam accounts from Twitter: (1) collecting spammers’ hashtags; (2) searching po-
tential spammers’ targets; (3) sampling suspicious hashtag followers.
Particularly, in Step 1, Hashtag Sampler collects keywords/hashtages that spam-
mers are potentially interested in (i.e., hashtags in spam accounts’ tweets) through
identifying hashtags (“#”) from tweets posted by our trapped spam accounts; in
Step 2, for each hashtag, Hashtag Sampler searches the recent M tweets5 that con-
tain hashtags, through exactly querying the hashtag from Twitter Search. Then, we
consider an account to be a potential spammers’ target, if they send tweets containing
that particular hashtag. Accordingly, through extracting the senders of those tweets,
Hashtag Sampler searches out all the potential targets; in Step 3, for each potential
spammers’ target, we could obtain its followers through using Twitter API. After
extracting all targets’ followers, we denote those followers with high occurrences as
suspicious hashtag followers. These hashtag followers essentially follow many other
5For each query term, Twitter limits to return 1,500 tweets as a maximal. Thus, in our experiment,
we set M = 1, 500
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accounts, who post that spammers’ hashtag. Finally, Hashtag Sampler outputs those
accounts as spam accounts, if they are sampled as suspicious hashtag followers with
the usage of multiple di↵erent hashtags, i.e., they are considered as suspicious hash-
tag followers with a high occurrence by using di↵erent hashtags.
Figure 5.9: Illustration of Hashtag Sampler.
5.3.3 Friend Sampler
5.3.3.1 Basic Intuition
Spammers tend to select famous accounts’ followers as their targets. In fact, those
Twitter accounts (especially famous accounts) followed by a user could also reveal this
user’s taste, which could be utilized by spammers to find their potential spamming
targets. According to this intuition, Friend Sampler is designed to preferentially
sample likely spam accounts through checking those accounts that excessively follow
multiple famous accounts’ followers, i.e., examining common followers of the followers
of some famous accounts.
5.3.3.2 Detailed Strategy
As illustrated in Figure 5.10, Friend Sampler first randomly selects M verified
(famous) accounts from those 400 verified accounts used in Section 5.2. Then, for
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each account, Friend Sampler collects its N followers (if available), which could
be considered as spammers’ potential targets. Then, we further examine extracted
followers of those potential targets, and save them in a dataset with their numbers of
occurrences, denoted as suspicious account set.(For example, if an account follows two
potential targets, its number of occurrences is 2.) Finally, Friend Sampler outputs
Nfd accounts in the suspicious account set as spammers with the top numbers of
occurrences.
Figure 5.10: Illustration of Friends Sampler.
5.4 Evaluation of Samplers
In this section, we mainly describe our evaluation methodologies and evaluation
results for two samplers in selectively sampling likely spam accounts.
5.4.1 Ground Truth and Evaluation Metrics
5.4.1.1 Ground Truth
To evaluate the e↵ectiveness of two samplers, we require a ground truth for those
accounts collected by our samplers. However, as a common challenge for all OSN
data analysis work, it is di cult to obtain perfect ground truth for a large-scale
dataset.
It is straightforward that an account can be considered as spam if it is sus-
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pended by Twitter. However, only considering suspend accounts as spam accounts
will miss many other spam accounts, which have not been identified/suspended by
Twitter. Thus, for the rest unsuspended accounts output by our samplers, we rely
on a state-of-the-art machine-learning classifier to further examine whether they are
spam accounts. This classifier is implemented based on Random Forest and uses the
same feature set designed in [65]. Then, the classifier is trained by using 2,000 sus-
pended accounts and 20,000 normal accounts (none of them post malicious URLs).
The accuracy and false positive rate of this classifier is 99.2% and 0.97% respectively
based on the training datasets through 10-fold cross validation tests. Note that we
use the machine-learning technique to help to estimate the ground truth rather than
to detect spam accounts. Also, we acknowledge that any machine learning classi-
fier may not be absolutely accurate (especially it may induce some false positives).
However in our evaluation, we are mainly interested in getting the estimation of
the accuracy, instead of absolute values. Furthermore, such a strategy is a common
practice for similar studies on accuracy estimation of large scale unlabeled datasets
[124].
5.4.1.2 Evaluation Metrics
To measure the e↵ectiveness of sampling strategies with the goal of collecting
more likely spam accounts, two metrics are typically considered. The number of
collected spam accounts, denoted in our work as “Hit Count (Nhit)”; and the ratio of
Hit Count to the total number of sampled accounts (Nsample), denoted as “Hit Ratio
(Hr)”. Thus, a higher value of Hit Count and Hit Ratio indicates that we can catch
more spam accounts and more accurately, respectively. Motivated by the limitations
of traditional ways of collecting spam accounts as described in Section 5.3, our two
samplers are designed as lightweight, guided strategies to e ciently and e↵ectively
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prioritize the sampling of more likely spam accounts instead of(otherwise) analyzing
all accounts in the huge Twittersphere. Thus, our two samplers are not designed
to find/uncover all types of spam accounts, and thus should not be considered as
spammer detectors. Accordingly, we use those two evaluation metrics (Nhit, Hr)
instead of false positives/negatives in our evaluation. Particularly, many existing
studies [138, 55] similarly use these two metrics to measure the e↵ectiveness by
outputting the number of hits in a top list.
With such notions, if we denote the number of suspended accounts asNsus and the
number of spam accounts output by the machine-learning classifier as Nmal, we could
calculate Hit Count and Hit Ratio as follows6: Nhit = Nsus+Nmal; Hr = Nhit/Nsample.
5.4.2 Implementation
To implement Hashtag Sampler, we use 3,246 unique hashtags/keywords posted
by 278 identified spammers. For each hashtag, Hashtag Sampler outputs SF = 500
(if available) suspicious hashtag followers. By using each spam account’s hashtags,
Hashtag Sampler samples M = 500 suspicious hashtag followers (if available) with
the top occurrences as spammers. To implement Hashtag Sampler, we randomly
select M = 40 verified (famous) accounts (10 accounts for each of four topics).
For each verified account, we examine its N = 5, 000 followers, which are retrieved
by sending one “get-follower” request to Twitter. Then, for each follower, Friend
Sampler continues to examine its followers, and samples Nfd = 1, 000 top ranked
accounts as spam accounts. Using these implementation parameters, we run our two
samplers for four days to sample more likely spam accounts. After one month, we
further examine whether those sampled accounts are suspended by Twitter.
6Since we could not obtain ground truth for those protected and nonexistent accounts output by
our samplers, we do not count such accounts in Nsample.
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5.4.3 E↵ectiveness of Hashtag Sampler
As seen in Table 5.2, Hashtag Sampler outputs 8,983 unique accounts to be likely
spam accounts. Among them, 262 accounts have been suspended, and 4,665 others
are output as spam accounts by the classifier. Thus, the hit count is 4,927 and the
hit ratio is 0.5489, which implies that Hashtag Sampler could correctly collect one
spam account by sampling less than two accounts.
Item Nsus Nmal Nhit Nsample Hr
Value 262 4,665 4,927 8,983 0.5489
Table 5.2: The e↵ectiveness of Hashtag Sampler.
Also, we further examine hit count and hit ratio by using each spammer’s hash-
tags. As seen in Figure 5.11(a), over 40% spam accounts’ hashtags can be used to
collect over 100 spam accounts by sampling 500 accounts. This observation shows
that Hashtag Sampler can e↵ectively collect spam accounts by focusing on spam-
mers’ tastes. Also, we find that around 30% spammers’ hashtags can not be used to
correctly collect spam accounts. The reason is mainly because Twitter Search does
not index every tweet, due to its resource constraints. According to our observation,
we could crawl very few (or even no) tweets by using those spammers’ hashtags.
As seen in Figure 5.11(b), Hashtag Sampler could obtain reasonable hit ratios
by using around 60% spammers’ hashtags, which are higher than 0.3 (sampling 3
accounts will correctly collect 1 spam account).
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Figure 5.11: Collection results of Hashtag Sampler by using individual spammers’
hashtags.
5.4.4 E↵ectiveness of Friend Sampler
As seen in Table 5.3, Friend Sampler outputs 21,686 unique accounts to be likely
spammers. Among these accounts, 4,000 have been suspended, and 9,781 others are
output as spam accounts by the classifier. Thus, the hit count is 13,781 and hit ratio
is 0.6355. According to our evaluation, over 50% famous accounts used by Friend
Sampler could achieve a hit ratio higher than 0.5.
Item Nsus Nmal Nhit Nsample Hr
Value 4,000 9,781 13,781 21,686 0.6355
Table 5.3: The e↵ectiveness of Friend Sampler.
5.4.5 Diversity and Complementarity
Next, we analyze the diversity and complementarity of using these two samplers.
Essentially, between these two algorithms, we examine the number of spam accounts
correctly sampled only by one algorithm, which can not be found by using the other
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one. If this number of each algorithm is high, it implies that these two samplers
are very complementary. Thus they could be combined together to find more spam
accounts. Specifically, to measure the diversity, we design a metric, named “Exclusive
Ratio (Er)”, which is the ratio of the number of spam accounts that are exclusively
sampled by one sampler (not sampled by the other one) to the total number of spam
accounts sampled by this sampler.
As seen in Table 5.4, We can find that both two samplers can obtain relatively
high exclusive ratios (over 77%). The ratio for Friend Sampler is even higher than
90%. This observation shows that these two samplers are indeed complementary.
And thus, they can be used together to collect more (likely) spam accounts.
Algorithm Hashtag Sampler Friend Sampler
Exclusive Ratio 77.69% 90.57%
Table 5.4: Exclusive ratios between two samplers.
Particularly, as shown in Table 5.5, according to our collected dataset, the com-
bination usage of these two algorithms could correctly collect 17,416 spam accounts.
Item Nsus Nmal Nhit Nsample Hr
Value 4,249 13,936 18,185 29,239 0.6219
Table 5.5: Result of combining two algorithms.
Among them, 3,480 accounts have been suspended by Twitter, and 13,936 other
accounts are classified as spam accounts by our classifier. Thus, the hit ratio of
combining these two algorithms is 0.6023. Compared with the dataset used for the
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purpose of building an e↵ective machine learning classifier [12], which contains 355
manually identified spam accounts from 8,207 randomly crawled accounts (i.e., a hit
ratio of only 0.04), this value of hit ratio is considerably high in terms of e↵ectively
crawling likely spam accounts.
5.4.6 Comparison with Existing Strategies
As the research motivation described in Section 5.3, we next compare the e -
ciency and e↵ectiveness of using our two samplers with existing strategies to collect
spam accounts.
5.4.6.1 Our Samplers VS Collecting Suspended Accounts
To compare the strategy to collect spam accounts by collecting suspended ac-
counts from a pre-crawled dataset, we calculate the number of suspended accounts
from those 1.2 million accounts. Whether an account is suspended can be automat-
ically known by issuing a query to Twitter. Accordingly, we get 14,226 suspended
accounts from those 1.2 million accounts, and achieve a hit ratio at 1.19%, which is
the number of suspended accounts to the total number of crawled accounts. How-
ever, our two samplers have a much higher hit ratio of 14.53% in terms of suspended
accounts only (more than 10 times higher). In terms of the speed, it only takes about
four days for our samplers to collect 4,249 suspended accounts, while to collect 14,226
suspended accounts, it takes around 7 months to crawl the dataset (not to mention
the long time lag to wait for Twitter to suspend the accounts). The advantage of
our samplers in terms of e↵ectiveness and e ciency is clear.
5.4.6.2 Our Samplers VS Social Honeypots
We next compare our samplers with two existing social honeypot studies. As
shown in Table 5.6, the honeypots used in [65] collected 500 spam accounts in one
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month; the honeypots used in [102] collected 11,699 spam accounts in 11 months.
Strategy [65] [102] Samplers
Time 1 month 11 months 4 days
# of Spammers 500 11,699 18,185
Table 5.6: Comparison with existing social honeypots.
Since di↵erent studies use di↵erent numbers of social honeypots, and collect spam
accounts at di↵erent time periods with di↵erent definitions of the spam account, we
do not intend to conclude which honeypots are better. However, we could easily see
that compared with the strategy of using (passive) social honeypots, our samplers
can actively collect likely spam accounts much more e ciently.
5.5 Limitation
We acknowledge our manually identified spam accounts may contain some bias,
and our machine-learning classifier may not be absolutely accurate. However, it is
challenging to obtain a perfect ground truth, and our strategies have been widely
used in this line of studies [123, 27, 65, 124]. In addition, even though some values
may vary according to di↵erent datasets, we believe that our major findings and
insights are still valid independent of the datasets.
It is possible that our advanced honeypots may also attract a few benign accounts’
contacts. However, this highly depends on the goal of honeypots – trapping more
spam accounts or obtaining spam accounts only, for which we believe the former is
more important. According to our data collection results, our advanced honeypots
could trap significantly more spam accounts.
We note that our samplers are not designed to collect/cover all (types of) spam-
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mers in Twittersphere. In addition, we note that the number of collected spam
accounts by our samplers is restricted by the number of inputs, e.g., hashtags and
famous accounts. Our result is also limited by Twitter Search API: one request could
only obtain the recent 1,500 search results, and not even to mention not all tweets
are indexed by Twitter Search. Thus, if our samplers are implemented by Twitter
(without many restrictions), they could find more spam accounts.
5.6 Summary
While spam accounts become more evasive and evolve to launch target attacks,
in this chapter, we performed a deep measurement study on how some Twitter spam-
mers choose their spamming targets, by building social honeypots with diverse social
behavioral patterns. We provided principled guidelines for building more e↵ective
(attractive) social honeypots, based on the intuitions that the accounts tend to at-
tract more spammers’ contact, if they post tweets related with specific topics, or
post tweets containing special keywords such as Trending topics, or follow famous
accounts related with specific areas. We designed two light-weight and e↵ective
samplers to guide the sampling of more likely Twitter spam accounts by reverse
engineering spammers’ tastes of finding their spamming targets. We reported an
experimental evaluation of our two samplers by actively crawling online data from
Twitter, and showed that our two samplers can be e↵ectively and complementarily
used to actively find spam accounts.
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6. UNDERSTANDING ANDROID MALWARE ECOSYSTEM
Similar to the analysis of the cyber criminal ecosystem on OSN platform, to
better understand how Android malware authors spread malicious Android apps, this
chapter presents an in-depth analysis of the market-level and network-level behaviors
of the underground Android malware ecosystem.
We empirically perform the first comprehensive measurement study on analyzing
the market-level and network-level behaviors of the Android malware ecosystem. We
have crawled and analyzed over 82,000 Android apps1 and 28,000 Android market ac-
counts2 from multiple representative markets (including both o cial GooglePlay [48]
and third-party ones such as SlideMe [100] from USA, Anzhi [70] from China, and
Tapp [104] from Russia). After further analysis, we obtain a dataset of over 9,700
malicious Android apps, and another dataset of over 3,500 malicious market accounts
that distribute at least one malicious app to the market. To facilitate the analysis of
the network-level behaviors, we extract networking attempts made by Android apps,
through running them in a customized Android runtime environment and developing
a UI fuzzing tool to add random UI events. In total, we obtain over 239,000 unique
URLs leading to over 25,000 unique remote servers.
In the phase of analyzing the market-level behaviors, we investigate whether
there are any special characteristics of those market accounts that distribute mal-
ware. We investigate whether specific metrics, such as the location of the market
and the popularity of the app, are e↵ective indications to the quality of Android
apps. In particular, we investigate whether malicious accounts have specific tempo-
ral behavioral patterns in submitting malware samples. In the phase of analyzing
1Each app is uniquely counted by its value of MD5.
2Each market account is uniquely counted by the author name registered in the Android market.
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the network-level behaviors, we investigate whether there are any special networks
mainly utilized by Android malware authors to host their remote servers and whether
there are any large communities among Android malware.
We propose a lightweight algorithm to infer malicious apps based on our analysis
of the market-level and network-level behaviors of Android malware ecosystem. Our
inference algorithm is positioned as a complementary, lightweight strategy to quickly
find those more suspicious apps.
We make the following contributions:
• We present an in-depth look at the market-level and network-level behaviors
of the Android malware ecosystem, based on a detailed analysis of over 9,700
malicious apps, collected from a large corpus of over 82,000 Android apps from
multiple markets.
• Through analyzing themarket-level behaviors, we find that: (1) Neither the
location of the market nor the popularity of the apps has a strong correlation
with the quality of the apps; (2) The public Android anti-virus blacklist is too
slow at identifying new Android malware, allowing around 90% of malicious
apps submitted to the markets before they are seen by the blacklist; (3) The
same malware authors tend to submit multiple malicious apps, and within a
short time period. This represents an interesting spatial-temporal behavioral
pattern.
• Through analyzing the network-level behaviors, we find that: (1) There is
a strong provider locality property in the Android malware’s remote servers
hosting infrastructure; Android malware authors tend to use cloud vendors to
host remote servers to communicate with their malware samples; (2) Existing
IP/domain blacklists are not e↵ective to be used to find Android malware;
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(3) A few malware communities (sharing common authors or remote servers)
contribute to a large portion of Android malware.
• We design a novel algorithm (AMIA) to infer more malicious apps by exploiting
their community relationships. AMIA is designed by exploiting the properties
of the community relationships among Android malware, which requires nei-
ther the disassembling of Android apps nor the deep domain knowledge of the
Android system. By using a small seed set of known malicious apps, AMIA
can e↵ectively find another extra 20 times of malicious apps, while maintaining
a considerable accuracy higher than 94%.
In Section 6.1, we introduce the problem background and the overview of our
analysis. In Section 6.2, we present our data collection methodology. We detail the
procedure of our analysis of market-level behaviors in Section 6.3 and network-level
behaviors in Section 6.4. In Section 6.5, we describe the design and evaluation results
of our inference algorithm to sample more likely malicious Android apps. We discuss
our limitation in Section 6.6.
6.1 Background and Overview
In this section, we first introduce the major actions taken by Android malware
authors to spread their malware to achieve malicious goals, and then describe the
overview of our analysis.
6.1.1 Background
Before the time when a victim accesses the Android market to install a malicious
Android app on his smartphone, an Android malware author typically need to take
a sequence of actions to underpin a successful download. We present the flow of
actions taken by Android malware authors to spread their malware in Figure 6.1.
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The flow begins with Android malware authors developing Android malware ( 1 ).
To achieve malicious goals such as compromising victims’ privacy and remotely high-
jacking victims’ phones, malware authors typically need to build remote servers ( 2 )
to communicate with (or control) their malware samples. Next, malware authors re-
quire to register Android market accounts ( 3 ) to launch malware on specific Android
markets ( 4 ). The registration of the market accounts typically requires developers
to use valid email accounts or even paying registration fee (e.g., in GooglePlay). Af-
ter successfully attracting victims’ attention and obtaining their trust, the malware
will be downloaded and further installed on victims’ smartphones ( 5 , 6 ). Once
the victims’ phones are infected, the malware typically communicate with the re-
mote servers, to send out private/system information ( 7 ), or even to further receive
instructions to communicate with other remote servers ( 8 ). Once victims’ phones
are fully controlled by the malware, any variety of other malware can be installed.
Finally, malware authors obtain profits by selling victims’ sensitive data or stealthily
charging victims’ mobile bills ( 9 ).
Throughout this process, we can clearly see that after developing malware, An-
droid malware authors typically require two types of behaviors to lure their victims
and obtain profits from the victims: utilizing Android markets to spread malware
and building remote servers to communicate with malware. Thus, our research goal
is to provide the first empirical analysis of the characteristics of the market-level and
network-level behaviors of the Android malware ecosystem, and provide new defense
insights against Android malware.
6.1.2 Analysis Overview
To achieve our research goals, as illustrated in Figure 6.2, our analysis procedure
contains three major steps: collecting data, empirically analyzing market-level and
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Figure 6.1: The flow of actions taken by Android malware authors to spread Android
malware.
network-level behaviors, and generating defense insights.
In the data collection step, besides crawling Android apps, our crawler also col-
lects those apps’ corresponding market information (e.g., author, downloading num-
ber, and submission time) from the o cial Android market (GooglePlay) and three
representative third-party Android markets (SlideMe, Anzhi, and Tapp). Then, we
identify Android malware from our crawled dataset, and extract the remote servers
(IP addresses and domains) visited by crawled Android apps.
In the phase of analyzing the market-level behaviors, we first uncover whether the
apps that are hosted in American markets or highly downloaded are more trustable;
we next measure the e↵ectiveness of using the Android malware blacklist to stop
malware authors submitting their malware samples to the markets; we also examine
which app categories Android malware tend to masquerade themselves to belong
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to; we finally uncover the behavioral characteristics of those malicious accounts that
submit malware to the markets.
In the phase of analyzing the network-level behaviors, we mainly analyze the
IP address spaces, special networks, and cloud hosting services used by Android
malware; we also examine the e↵ectiveness of using existing IP/domain blacklists to
find Android malware; we finally extract and measure Android malware communities.
Finally, spurred by the above analysis, we design a new algorithm to infer more
malicious Android apps.
Figure 6.2: The analysis overview.
6.2 Data Collection
6.2.1 Crawling Android Apps
We crawled Android apps from four representative Android markets: the o -
cial Android market (GooglePlay) announced in 2008 and three third-party Android
markets (SlideMe from USA created in 2008, Anzhi from China created in 2010, and
Tapp from Russia created in 2012). The crawling process for GooglePlay was har-
vested during a two-months period, from August 23rd, 2012 through October 23rd,
2012. The crawling process for those third-party markets was mainly achieved from
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June 3rd, 2012 to June 15th, 2012. During the crawling process, besides download-
ing Android apps, our crawler also recorded those apps’ market information (e.g.,
author, submission time, downloading number, and app category). Our crawler
downloaded all free apps that were available in the third-party markets at the time
when the crawler was launched. Due to the crawling rate limit and the large amount
of apps in GooglePlay, our dataset of o cial apps were randomly sampled from all
33 app categories in GooglePlay. As summarized in Table 6.1, in total, we collected
82,966 free Android apps, where around 22% of the apps (18,751) were collected
from GooglePlay, and the remaining 78% (65,232) were harvested from the third-
party markets.
GooglePlay SlideMe Anzhi Tapp
Location U.S.A U.S.A China Russia
Creation Time 2008 2008 2010 2012
Number of Unique Apps 18,751 15,109 38,458 11,822
Total (Unique)
18,751 (22%) 65,232 (78%)
82,966
Table 6.1: Summary of crawling Android apps.
6.2.2 Identifying Android Malware
Next, we identified malicious apps from our Android app corpus by searching
their values of MD5 to VirusTotal [114], which is a free anti-virus blacklist service
providing the scanning reports from over 40 di↵erent anti-virus products. For each
app, if it has been seen by VirusTotal, we obtained its full scanning report, which
includes the first and the last time the app was seen, as well as the results from
each individual virus scan. We consider an app to be malicious, if it is labeled as
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malware by at lease one anti-virus product. It is also worth noting that we searched
our crawled apps’ reports from VirusTotal on Oct. 11th, 2013, over one year after we
finished crawling those apps, in order to give enough time for those commercial anti-
virus tools to have updated signatures and achieve more accurate scanning results
of those apps.
As seen in Table 6.2, we finally obtained 9,712 unique malicious apps, where
around 16% of them (1,593) were collected from GooglePlay, and around 84% (8,229)
were harvested from three third-party markets. We term this dataset of malicious
apps as MalApps. Apart from the dataset of 9,956 adware (AdwareApps), we term
the dataset of the rest 63,298 apps as RestApps. Note that since a few antivirus
tools consider those non-malicious apps that use certain advertisement libraries as
adware, to better guarantee the accuracy of our measurement results, we distinguish
the adware from those truly malicious apps.
GooglePlay SlideMe Anzhi Tapp
MalApps 1,593 1,946 4,840 1,450
Total(Unique)
1,593 (16%) 8,229 (84%)
9,712
AdwareApps 1,037 1,247 6,764 994
Total(Unique)
1,037 (12%) 8,977 (88%)
9,956
RestApps 16,121 11,916 26,854 9,378
Total(Unique)
16,121 (29%) 38,726(71%)
63,298
Table 6.2: Summary of collecting Android malware.
Similar to other measurement studies, our analyzed dataset may contain some
bias or noise. For example, there could be sampling bias in our crawling. To reduce
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possible data sampling bias, we have crawled several representative large Android
app markets (instead of one) in di cult countries, and we crawled all the apps that
are hosted in the third-party markets and randomly sample apps from all 33 app
categories in GooglePlay. It is also true that even we use VirusTotal, a state-of-the-
art anti-virus service that combines the scanning reports from over 40 commercial
Anti-Virus products, it is still possible that a small number of apps in MalApps
might be actually benign, and RestApps might still contain a few malicious apps.
Essentially, it is extremely challenging to obtain an ideal, unbiased dataset with
perfect ground truth for a large-scale dataset of Android apps. We believe that even
though the exact values of some metrics reported in our work may vary a little bit
when using di↵erent sample datasets or ground truths, our major conclusions and
insights obtained in our analysis will likely still hold.
6.3 Analyzing Market-level Behaviors
Di↵erent from desktop malware authors, who typically have to build their own
platforms/websites to spread malware, Android malware authors can spread mal-
ware more e↵ectively by utilizing popular Android markets. However, no existing
studies have been done to deeply analyze how malware authors utilize those Android
markets. In this section, we first describe our results of collecting market accounts,
and then provide our detailed analysis of the market-level behaviors in a question-
and-answer fashion.
6.3.1 Collecting Market Accounts
To facilitate the analysis of the market-level behaviors, we collected market ac-
counts (uniquely identified by the author name) from those three representative
markets. Next, we extracted malicious accounts that at least submitted one mali-
cious app. As seen in Table 6.3, we collected 28,496 market accounts, where 35%
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of the accounts (10,064) were collected from GooglePlay, and the remaining 65%
(18,432) were harvested from three third-party markets; 3,517 of those 28,496 mar-
ket accounts are identified as malicious, where 25% of the accounts (883) were from
GooglePlay, and the remaining 75% (2,634) were from three third-party markets.
GooglePlay SlideMe Anzhi Tapp
# of Accounts 10,064 3,896 9,665 4,871
Total (Unique)
10,064 (35%) 18,432 (65%)
28,496
# of Malicoius Accounts 883 432 1,493 709
Total(Unique)
883 (25%) 2,634 (75%)
3,517
Table 6.3: Summary of collecting market accounts.
6.3.2 Detailed Analysis
Since the o cial market (GooglePlay) is located in America, many users prefer
to choose apps from GooglePlay or other American markets. Accordingly, our first
market-level analysis is to examine the relationship between the app quality and the
app market.
6.3.2.1 App Quality VS App Market
Question 1: Are the apps from American markets more trustable? Our Empirical
Answer: No. The quality of the American third-party market is not better than that
of the Chinese one, where malicious apps have been reported to be widely hosted
in. Also, although the quality of the o cial market is a little better than those
third-party markets as we expect, it still has much room to improve.
To answer this question, for each market, we calculate its percentage of malicious
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apps in the total apps crawled from the market, termed as Market Malicious Ratio.
Accordingly, the lower ratio one market has, the better quality it is. As seen in Table
6.4, the ratio of GooglePlay, which is around 8.5%, is lower than that of all three
third-party markets, which are 12.87%, 12.58%, and 12.27%, respectively.
GooglePlay SlideMe Anzhi Tapp
Location U.S.A U.S.A China Russian
Market Malicious Ratio 8.50% 12.87% 12.58% 12.27%
Table 6.4: The comparsion of market quality.
This observation is mainly because the o cial market has more strict security
rules (e.g., Google Bouncer [71]) to better guarantee the quality of the apps than
those third-party markets, as we expect. However, the di↵erence of the ratio between
GooglePlay and those third-party markets is not that significant. This observation
implies that there is still a large space for both the o cial market and third-party
markets to improve their quality.
In addition, the ratio for the American third-party market (SlideMe) is even
slightly higher than that of the Chinese one (Anzhi). Although the quality of the
Chinese market is not that good due to the fact that Chinese customers can not
access GooglePlay and have to rely on third-party markets to download Android
apps, which motivates many malware authors to spread Android malware in Chinese
markets, the quality of the American third-party market is not necessarily better.
This observation implies that apps that are hosted in the American markets are not
necessarily more trustable.
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6.3.2.2 E↵ectiveness of Android Antivirus Blacklist
As an important security aspect, besides analyzing the detection rate of the
blacklists [68, 141], existing studies have also analyzed the detection timelag of the
blacklists in di↵erent security scenarios (e.g., social network spam study [51] and X86
malware study [30]). Similar to these studies, we next examine the detection timelag
in the Android malware scenario.
Question 2: Is it e↵ective to use the Android anti-virus blacklist to filter Android
malware, before they are submitted to Android markets? Our Empirical Answer: No.
The public Android anti-virus blacklist is too slow at stopping malware authors from
submitting Android malware to the market.
To answer this question, we use one of the most well-known (representative) An-
droid anti-virus blacklists (VirusTotal) as the case study. VirusTotal automatically
retrieves the scanning reports (alerts) for Android apps from over commercial 40
anti-virus products. In the report, it will show the malware categories of the mal-
ware sample labeled by each anti-virus product, as well as the dates when the sample
is seen for the first time and the last time. Accordingly, using historical data from
VirusTotal, we can measure the blacklist lag period, which is the time period delay
between one malicious app’s submission to the market (submission date) and its first
appearance on VirusTotal (the firstly-seen date). (Note that when one malware sam-
ple is firstly seen by VirusTotal, it may not be successfully identified as malicious by
those anti-virus products. Thus, our measured blacklist lag period is only the lower
bound of the actual detection lag period)
For cases where malicious apps seen by the VirusTotal prior to appearing on
the markets, we say that the blacklist of VirusTotal leads the markets. Conversely,
VirusTotal lags the markets if malicious apps are submitted to the markets before
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becoming examined by VirusTotal. Lead and lag times can indicate the e ciency
of using the VirusTotal blacklist to stop malware authors submitting their malware
samples to the markets.
We begin measuring blacklist delay by gathering the timestamps for each Android
malicious app that is submitted to the market and that is firstly seen by VirusTotal.
For each malware sample submitted by multiple accounts (or in multiple markets,
or at di↵erent timestamps), we consider each submission as a unique, independent
event. Due to the fact that GooglePlay does not provide the exact time when the
app is firstly uploaded, we test this experiment based on the malware crawled from
those three third-party markets.
Figure 6.3(a) shows the lead and lag periods for Android malware, where we see
that around 90% of collected malware samples appear on markets prior to being seen
by VirusTotal. More specifically, over 99% malware samples from Anzhi and 93%
from SlideMe appear on markets prior to being being seen by VirusTotal. Although
the Russian market (Tapp) is founded much later and much less active than Anzhi
and SlideMe, around 40% of malware samples from it can not be identified by the
blacklist before their appear on the market. In addition, the average lag period is over
167 days, which is much longer than that (from 2 to 27 days) for detecting desktop
malware by using existing anti-virus products as stated in one recent study[30]. A
more extensive presentation of blacklist lag days can be seen in Figure 6.3(b), showing
the volume of malware samples per lead and lag day. Through this observation, we
find that the Android anti-virus blacklist in fact lags behind Android malware’s
appearance on the markets.
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Figure 6.3: Lag period between the submission date and the firstly-seen date.
Rank GooglePlay SlideMe
1 Personalization 357 (22.41%) Game 788 (40.51%)
2 Entertainment 249 (15.63%) Wallpapers 271 (13.93%)
3 Arcade and Action 97 (6.09%) Entertainment 265 (13.62%)
Total 703 (44.13%) 1,324 (68.07%)
Rank Anzhi Tapp
1 Entertainment 2830 (58.47%) Game 713 (49.17%)
2 Lifestyle 508 (10.50%) Wallpapers 362 (24.97%)
3 Wallpapers 398 (8.23%) Entertainment 149 (10.28%)
Total 3,736 (77.19%) 1,224 (84.41%)
Table 6.5: The categories of apps tend to be malicious.
6.3.2.3 Common Behaviors Among Malicious Accounts
Question 3: Are there any common behavioral characteristics among malicious
market accounts? Our Empirical Answer: Yes. There is a spatial and temporal
locality property in terms of malware authors’ submissions of their malware samples.
Malicious authors tend to repeatedly use the same market accounts to post multiple
malicious apps, and within a short time period.
To answer this question, for each of 3,517 malicious market accounts, we first
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Figure 6.4: The distribution of account malicious ratios, and the time intevals be-
tween two consequent malware submissions from the same malicious account.
calculate its account malicious ratio, which is the percentage of malware samples in
all of its submitted apps. As seen in Figure 6.4(a), around 50% of malicious accounts
from third-party markets and around 70% of malicious accounts from GooglePlay
have a malicious ratio higher than 0.5 (i.e., at least one malicious app in two submis-
sions). This observation indicates that malware authors tend to repeatedly use the
same malicious accounts to submit malicious apps. Also, we can find that malicious
accounts in GooglePlay typically have a higher ration than those malicious accounts
in the third-party markets. That might because GooglePlay requires higher cost for
registering market accounts (e.g., valid Google accounts and registration fee). Thus,
it will bring a much higher cost for malware authors to create a large number of
GooglePlay accounts to spread malware.
We also examine the time interval (in days) between two consequent submissions
of malicious apps for the same malicious accounts. As seen in Figure 6.4(b), over 60%
of time intervals are zero (i.e., those two consequent submissions happened in the
same day), and around 80% of time intervals are less than 5 days. This observation
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indicates that malware authors tend to submit multiple malware samples within a
short time period, an interesting spatial and temporal locality property. Utilizing
this property, we could find more malicious apps by checking those apps whose author
names are the same with known malicious ones’, especially when they are submitted
within a short time period.
6.3.2.4 App Quality VS App Popularity
Without a deep knowledge about Android app security, many users prefer to
trust those popular apps with high downloading numbers. Question 4: Are those
apps with higher downloading numbers more safer? Empirical Answer: No. An
app’s downloading number has not necessarily a strong correlation with its quality.
Many malicious apps have also been downloaded for a great number of times. To
answer this question, we need to calculate our crawled apps’ downloading numbers.
In particular, unlike third-party markets, which provide the accurate value of each
app’s downloading number, GooglePlay only provides the interval of the downloading
number (e.g., 5,000-10,000). Also, once the downloading number is higher than
250,000, GooglePlay only shows the interval as “> 250, 000”. Thus, we use an
approximate way to count the downloading number for the apps in GooglePlay.
More specifically, if the number is smaller than 250,000, we use the median value of
the interval; otherwise, we directly use 250,000. Then, we compare the downloading
numbers between the dataset of MalApps and RestApps for third-party markets and
GooglePlay, respectively.
As seen in Figure 6.5, in both third-party markets and GooglePlay, we can find
that the distributions of the downloading number between MalApps and RestApps
are similar. Specifically, in the third-party markets, we can find that the percent-
age of the apps in MalApps that have been downloaded more than 10,000 times is
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around 12%, which is even slightly larger than that (10%) in RestApps. Also, we can
find that around 20% of apps in MalApps have been downloaded more than 5,000
times, whereas around 80% of apps in RestApps have been downloaded less than
5,000 times. Similarly, in GooglePlay, around 45% of apps in MalApps have been
downloaded more than 150,000 times, whereas around 50% of apps in RestApps
have been downloaded less than 150,000 times. Thus, this observation indicates that
many popular apps with high downloading numbers are still malicious, i.e., an app’s
popularity is not an e↵ective indication to its quality.
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Figure 6.5: The comparison of the downloading numbers for MalApps and RestApps
in the third-party markets and GooglePlay.
6.3.2.5 Common App Categories Among Malicious Apps
Question 5: Are there any specific app categories that Android malware authors
tend to masquerade their malware samples to belong to? Our Empirical Answer: Yes.
Malware authors tend to register their malware samples into a few specific categories
(e.g., Game, Entertainment, and Wallpapers).
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To answer this question, in each market, we rank its app categories according
to the number of malware samples belonged to them. Table 6.5 lists the top three
categories for each market.
From this table, we can find that the majority of the malicious apps belong to
a few categories (e.g., Game, Entertainment, Wallpapers.). More specifically, the
categories of Entertainment and Game ranks in the top three in all these three
markets. (Note that in GooglePlay, the apps belonged to“Arcade and Action” are
mainly action games, which are typically categorized as “Game” in the third-party
markets; in the market of Anzhi, game apps are registered with the category of
Entertainment instead of “Game”.) In addition, in all three third-party markets,
top three categories are used by more than over 60% of malware samples. Even
in GooglePlay, which categorizes apps in a more fine-grained way (i.e., apps are
registered into multiple more fine-grained categories), the top three categories covers
more than 40% of malware samples.
This observation indicates that some categories are highly used by malware au-
thors. This phenomenon might because malicious apps may obtain more users’ at-
tention, when they are registered to belong to those hot categories such as “Enter-
tainment” and “Game”. The apps belong to those hot categories typically have a
large downloading number. In addition, since the programming logic of those benign
Wallpaper apps is typically simple, compared with developing completely new ma-
licious apps, it is easier for malware authors to develop malicious apps by inserting
malicious payloads into those benign Wallpaper apps.
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6.4 Analyzing Network-level Behaviors
6.4.1 Extracting Remote Servers
To facilitate the analysis of the network-level behaviors, we need to extract remote
servers (domain names and IP addresses) communicated by Android malware, i.e.,
we need to extract the URLs, domain names and IP addresses that are visited by
Android malware.
A naive approach is to extract those URLs that are hard-coded in the apps by
using existing Android app static analysis tools (e.g., [45]). However, this approach
is not e↵ective, due to the fact that many malicious Android apps use diverse tech-
niques to hide visited URLs instead of hard-coding them as constant strings to evade
detection. Such techniques range from string encoding, string encryption, string ob-
fuscation, splitting string into segments, to saving URL string segments into XML
files used in the apps. Thus, this strategy can not be used to e↵ectively extract
remote servers.
To avoid such a limitation, we extract remote servers by running apps in a cus-
tomized Android runtime environment (Android phone emulator). Before analyzing
each app, the emulator will start from a clean snapshot that is saved at the starting
point to avoid possible e↵ects (e.g., the changes of SD card) generated by other apps.
To trigger an app to execute more networking connections, we also design an Android
app UI fuzzing tool to simulate real users’ usage of the app by adding random UI
events (e.g., click buttons, stretch the views, and type characters).
While running each app, our environment will record its networking attempts
by using Android TCPDump[46]. Unlike traditional TCPDump, Android TCPDump
will only save the networking packets made by the emulator instead of the host. In
addition, we also record networking attempts saved in the emulator’s runtime log file
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by using Android Logcat[46]. Android Logcat will both record some sensitive net-
working attempts (e.g., the links of the advertisements for other Android apps), and
those failed networking attempts due to some networking exceptions (e.g., Once the
remote server is no longer alive, Logcat will record those failed networking attempts
to the remote server with the exception of “java.net.UnknownHostException”.) that
are not captured in the Android TCPDump. Finally, a parser is developed to au-
tomatically extract those networking attempts. To facilitate the following analysis,
for each URL, the parser will also extract its domain name; for each IP address, the
parser will reverse lookup its domain name, if available.
As seen in Table3 6.6, we finally collect 239,582 unique URLs leading to 25,099
unique servers4 (including 19,342 unique domain names and 5,755 unique IP ad-
dresses). More specifically, by running 9,712 malicious apps in the dataset of MalApps,
we collect a dataset of 34,176 unique URLs and 5,142 remote servers (including 3,980
unique domain names and 1,162 IP unique addresses), named as MalServers.
Type URLs Domains IPs Servers
MalServers 34,176 3,980 1,162 5,142
AdwareServer 35,267 3,112 1,057 4,169
RestServers 176,949 16,580 5,125 21,707
Total 239,582 19,342 5,755 25,099
Table 6.6: The summary of extracting remote servers.
3The datasets of MalServers, AdwareServers and RestServers in the table represent the servers
extracted from the apps in the dataset of MalApps, AdwareApps and RestApps, respectively.
4Each remote server is counted by one of its valid domain names, if aviable. Otherwise, the server
is counted by its IP address.
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6.4.2 Filtering Benign Servers
Since our goal is to analyze the network-level behaviors of Android malware au-
thors by analyzing the characteristics of the remote servers uniquely used by malware,
a data filtering step is required to filter benign servers that are also visited by Android
malware. In another word, we need to filter benign servers saved in the dataset of
MalServers in Table 6.6). We first filter top 10,000 Alexa [2] domain names. Then,
we use two conservative strategies to further filter benign servers: (1) filtering all
the servers visited by the apps in the RestApps, and (2) filtering top frequently used
servers by the apps in the RestApps.
More specifically, in the former strategy, we generated a filtered dataset named
as FAMalServers by filtering all the servers in RestServers from MalServers. In
this way, FAMalServers contains 2,288 unique servers. Note that due to the pos-
sibility that a small portion of apps in RestApps might still be malicious (i.e., the
false negatives of those AV products), some servers in RestServers might still be
uniquely visited by Android malware. Accordingly, this strategy may filter more
remote servers that are uniquely visited by Android malware. However, this strict
strategy could guarantee nearly all of the servers left in FAMalServers are unique
for malware, especially when the dataset of RestServers is su ciently large.
As a supplement, in the latter strategy, instead of filtering all servers in RestServers,
we only filter those servers that are highly visited by the apps in RestApps. More
specifically, we first rank the servers in RestServers according to the number of
unique apps in RestApps that visit them. Then, we empirically filter the top
N = 1, 000 servers5 from MalServers and generate another filtered dataset named
5According to our empirical observation, N = 1, 000 is a proper value for filtering known benign
servers while keeping unknown servers. However, this value could still be tuned with the tradeo↵
between filtering more truly benign servers and keeping more servers uniquely used by malware.
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FTMalServers, which contains 4,379 servers. To facilitate the later comparison, we
name the dataset of the rest of 20,707 servers as FTRestServers by filtering those
top 1,000 servers from RestServers, as seen in Table 6.7.
Dataset FAMalServers FTMalServers FTRestServers
# of Servers (Unique) 2,288 4,379 20,707
Table 6.7: The number of servers in each filtered dataset.
Due to the lack of the perfect ground truth, we clearly acknowledge that even
these two filtered datasets (FAMalServers and FTMalServers) may still contain some
benign servers, and miss some malware servers. However, note that these two strate-
gies are essentially complementary and we mainly use these two filtered datasets to
compare the network-level behaviors between malicious apps and other apps. If our
conclusions could hold under the usage of both two datasets, we believe that the
same conclusions will also likely hold under the usage of another real dataset, even
though the actual values of specific metrics may vary a little bit.
6.4.3 Detailed Analysis
Similar to the analysis of the market-level behaviors, we next perform our detailed
analysis of the network-level analysis in a question-and-answer fashion.
To determine which IP address and network spaces are mainly used by malware
authors to create their remote servers, our first network-level analysis focuses on
examining the network addresses visited by Android malware.
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6.4.3.1 Usage of Network Space
Question 1: Is the distribution of remote servers’ IP address space visited by
Android malware di↵erent from those visited by other apps? And are there any
special networks that are mainly utilized by Android malware authors? Our Empirical
Answer: Yes. We find that a few concentrated portion of IP address spaces are highly
visited by malware samples rather than other apps.
We compare the ASes visited by malicious apps and other apps. More specif-
ically, for each remote server, we extract the AS it belongs to. Then, in each
dataset, we rank the ASes according to the number of unique apps that visit them.
We extract the IP addresses of the remote servers in each of the four datasets
(RestServers, MalServers, FTMalServers and FAMalServers). In each of the four
datasets, for each individual IP network prefix (i.e., each /8 subnet from 0.0.0.0/8
to 255.0.0.0/8), we calculate the number of the unique apps (Nsubnet) that visit
the subnet. Then, for each subnet, we calculate the ratio of Nsubnet to the total
number of the malware samples in the dataset, termed as Subnet Malicious Ratio.
Accordingly, a higher ratio for a subnet implies that the subnet is visited by more
malicious apps.
As seen in Figure 6.6, although most IP address ranges that are used by a signif-
icant amount of malware also used by a lot of other apps, a few subnets are signifi-
cantly used by more malware than other apps. For example, in terms of the subnets of
23.0.0.0/8 and 54.0.0.0/8, the ratios of all three malware datasets (MalServers,
FTMalServers and FAMalServers) are much higher than that of RestAppServers.
This characteristic implies that malware authors may tend to utilize a few special
subnets to host remote servers to communicate with their malware. To further ana-
lyze the usage of ASes and domains for malware, we also compare the top ten ASes
for RestServers, MalServers, and FAMalServers as seen in Table 6.8, and show
the top ten domain names for FTMalServers and FAMalServers as seen in Table
6.9.
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Figure 6.6: The comparision of the distribution of the usage of IP address between
malicious apps and other apps.
Table 6.8 shows the top ten most frequently visited ASes in the datasets of
RestServers and MalServers. From this table, we can find that in RestServers,
only one of the top ten ASes belongs to the cloud vendor and it ranks the sixth.
However, in MalServers, four of the top ten ASes belong to cloud vendors.
Next, we show the top ten most used domain names by malware samples in the
datasets of FTMalServers and FAMalServers. As seen in Table 6.9 and 6.10, we can
find that in the dataset of FTMalServers, seven of the top ten most used domain
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RestServers MalServers
Rank AS Number AS Name AS Number AS Name
1 AS15169 Google AS9308 Abitcool
2 AS4134 Chinanet AS4134 Chinanet
3 AS9308 Abitcool AS15169 Google
4 AS4808 China169 Beijing AS17964 Beijing Dian-Xin-Tong (Cloud)
5 AS24400 Shanghai Mobile AS23724 IDC, China (Cloud)
6 AS14618 Amazon (Cloud) AS14618 Amazon (Cloud)
7 AS22577 Google AS24400 Shanghai Mobile
8 AS4837 China169 Backbone AS17431 Beijing TONEK
9 AS17431 Beijing TONEK AS3549 Global Crossing
10 AS20645 PurePeak Limited AS33494 IHNetworks(Cloud)
Table 6.8: The top ten ASes for RestApps.
names belong to the cloud vendors; one domain name is mainly used as C&C Servers
to receive victims’ private information; the other two domain names are used for the
abusive mobile advertisement. Also, in the dataset of FTMalServers, all of the top
ten domain names belong to the cloud vendors.
FTMalServers
Rank Domain Names Usage
1 ad.leadboltapps.net Abusive Advertisement
2 d36hc9ptsltjmz.cloudfront.net Cloud
3 m.airpush.com Abusive Advertisement
4 ec2-54-225-174-248.compute-1.amazonaws.com Cloud
5 client.139vps.com C&C Server
6 ec2-23-21-95-12.compute-1.amazonaws.com Cloud
7 ec2-54-225-131-82.compute-1.amazonaws.com Cloud
8 ec2-54-235-138-219.compute-1.amazonaws.com Cloud
9 ec2-204-236-218-179.compute-1.amazonaws.com Cloud
10 ec2-54-243-171-43.compute-1.amazonaws.com Cloud
Table 6.9: The top ten most frequently used in FTMalServers.
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FAMalServers
Rank Domain Names Usage
1 ec2-54-225-174-248.compute-1.amazonaws.com Cloud
2 aec2-204-236-218-179.compute-1.amazonaws.com Cloud
3 ec2-54-243-171-43.compute-1.amazonaws.com Cloud
4 ec2-23-21-67-42.compute-1.amazonaws.com Cloud
5 ec2-174-129-232-156.compute-1.amazonaws.com Cloud
6 208.43.117.142-static.reverse.softlayer.com Cloud
7 ec2-23-21-51-117.compute-1.amazonaws.com Cloud
8 ec2-23-21-251-51.compute-1.amazonaws.com Cloud
9 ec2-54-243-36-7.compute-1.amazonaws.com Cloud
10 ec2-50-112-100-234.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com Cloud
Table 6.10: The top ten most frequently used in FAMalServers.
Also, in the dataset of FAMalServers, the IP addresses of three cloud hosts (the
first, third and ninth) belong to the subnet of 54.0.0.0/8; the IP addresses of three
cloud hosts (the fourth, seventh and eighth) belong to the subnet of 23.0.0.0/8. This
observation also explains why these two subnets are highly used by Android malware
as discussed in the previous question.
From the above analysis, we can find that Android malware authors tend to host
their remote servers in the cloud vendors. Motivated by this observation, we further
analyze the common characteristics among malware samples, which communicate
with those servers hosted in the cloud vendors.
6.4.3.2 Usage of Cloud Vendors
Question 2: Are there any common charaterisitcs of Android malware samples,
which communicate with the servers hotsed in the cloud vendors? Empirical Answer:
Yes. Malicious Android apps, which communicate with the same cloud server/subnet,
are very likely to belong to the same malware families.
To answer this question, we use the popular cloud vendor (AmazonEC2) as the
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case study. We first extract AmazonEC2 servers6, termed as MalEC2Servers, visited
by malicious apps. Then, for each MalEC2Server, we extract its MalEC2Families,
which are the malware families of the malware samples that visit MalEC2Server7.
We first analyze the variation of the malware families in the MalEC2Servers.
More specifically, we first extract 92 di↵erent MalEC2Servers that have more than
two MalEC2Families. Figure 6.7(a) shows the distribution of the number of unique
apps in those 92 MalEC2Servers. From this figure, we can find that around 58% of
those MalEC2Servers are visited by more than 10 di↵erent malicious apps (i.e., these
MalEC2Serverstend to be visited by multiple malicious apps.).
Then, for each MalEC2Familiy in each MalEC2Server, we calculate its value of
FamilyCoverage, which is the percentage (coverage) of the malware samples belonged
to the MalEC2Family in all malware samples that visit that MalEC2Server. Next, in
each MalEC2Server, we rank its MalEC2Families according to their values of Fam-
ilyCoverage. Figure 6.7(b) shows the distribution of the FamilyCoverage of the top
MalEC2Family, and the sum of the top two MalEC2Families’ values of FamilyCover-
age, among those 92 MalEC2Servers. From this figure, we can find that in over 90%
of MalEC2Servers, the top MalEC2Family’s FamilyCoverage is higher than 0.5 (i.e.,
in over 90% of MalEC2Servers, more than half malware samples belong to the same
family.). While considering the sum of the top two families, the coverage is increased
to 0.85 (i.e., in over 90% of MalEC2Servers, the top two families coverages over 85%
of malware samples.) Also, we can see that in over 50% of MalEC2Servers, the sum
of the top two families is 1.0 (i.e., in over half of MalEC2Servers, there are only two
di↵erent families.). These observations imply that the malware samples that visit
the same AmazonEC2 server tend to belong to the same family.
6These servers are identified by their domain names, which start with “ec2” and end with “ama-
zonaws.com”
7This is achieved by analzying each malware sample’s scanning report received from VirusTotal.
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Figure 6.7: The distributions of the number of malicious apps, and the famliy cov-
erages among MalEC2Servers.
Next, we group MalEC2Servers into 12 di↵erent /8 subnets according to their
IP addresses. We name these subnets as MalEC2Subnets, and further examine the
variation of malware families in these subnets. Figure 6.8(a) shows the number of
unique malware samples in each MalEC2Subnet. Similar to the above experiment,
for each MalEC2Family in each MalEC2Subnet, we calculate its value of Family-
Coverage, which is the percentage (coverage) of the malware samples belonged to
the MalEC2Family in all malware samples that visit the severs belonged to that
MalEC2Subnet.
Figure 6.8(b) shows the FamilyCoverage of the top family and the sum of the
top two values of FamilyCoverage for all MalEC2Subnets. From this figure, we can
find that the FamilyCoverage of the top family in all MalEC2Subnets are higher
than 0.5 (i.e., for each MalEC2Subnet, over 50% malware samples that visit that
MalEC2Subnet belong to the same family.) Also, this value increases to 0.8, while
considering the top two families (i.e., for each MalEC2Subnet, over 80% malware
samples that visit that MalEC2Subnet belong to two families.) This observation
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implies that malware samples that visit the same MalEC2Subnet are very likely to
belong to the same malware family.
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Figure 6.8: The distributions of the number of malicious apps, and the famliy cov-
erages among MalEC2Subnets.
From the above experiments, we can find that malware samples that visit the
same cloud server/subnet are very likely to belong to the same malware family. This
server vendor locality property (i.e., malware authors tend to rent servers from the
same cloud vendor) is interesting. This shows that with the popularity of cloud
hosting services, malware authors begin to use cloud machines as remote servers.
That is mainly because comparing with deploying personal servers, it will cost less
time/money to use a cloud vendor, and the anonymity is also better preserved. From
defense point of view, once we find specific cloud servers that are used by malware
authors to communicate with their malware samples, we may likely to find more such
servers in the same cloud hosting network that belong to the same malware authors.
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6.4.3.3 E↵ectiveness of IP/Domain Blacklists
Since malware samples tend to use specific IP addresses and networks, we raise
the following question. Question: Is that e↵ective to use existing IP (or domain
name) blacklists to find Android malware? Empirical Answer: Not very e↵ective.
Even after the malware samples in our dataset are submitted to the market for a
long time (more than one year), existing IP (or domain name) blacklists can still
only find a small portion of them.
In this experiment, we extract the servers in MalServers that are labeled as
malicious by using the following four popular domain name and IP blacklists: Virus-
Total [114] (VT), WhatIsMyIPAddress [122] (IPB), Malware Domain List [73] (MDL)
and Malware Domain Blocklist [33] (MDB). More specifically, VirusTotal can also be
used to check malicious IP addresses and domain names. WhatIsMyIPAddress is
a powerful IP blacklist, which integrates results from 78 di↵erent blacklist servers.
Both Malware Domain List and Malware Domain Blocklist are blacklists for identi-
fying malicious domains. Table 6.11 shows the number of identified unique remote
servers and the number of a↵ected apps (malicious apps) by using each blacklist.
BlackList VT IPB MDL MDB
Remote Servers 213 510 5 4
Total 659
A↵ected Apps 735 2,718 22 7
Total 3,210
Table 6.11: The number of identified remote servers and a↵ected malicious apps.
From this table, we can find that both MDL and MDB can only find a very small
number (less than 25) of malicious apps from the dataset of 9,712 malicious apps.
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Also, even though our malicious apps are collected with the usage of VirusTotal, the
IP/domain name blacklist from VirusTotal can only be used to find 735 (around 7%)
malicious apps. Even combining those four popular blacklists, we can identify only
3,210 (around 33%) malicious apps, not even considering the long time lag of these
IP/domain blacklists. This observation implies that although existing IP/domain
blacklists can be used to facilitate finding malicious apps, this strategy is neither
e cient nor e↵ective to catch a high coverage of the malware.
6.4.3.4 Malware Community
Due to the observation that malware samples frequently share the same authors
and remote servers, we next analyze whether the submissions of the malicious apps
are more likely to be organized activities or isolated actions. Question 4: Are there
any Android malware communities? Our Empirical Answer: Yes. A few large mal-
ware communities contribute to a great amount of malicious apps.
In this experiment, we cluster malicious apps into communities according to their
community relationships. More specifically, we consider there is a community rela-
tionship between two malicious apps, if they share the same author name or at least
one malicious server. The intuition behind this is that if two apps share the same
author name (market account), they essentially belong to the same author, thus be-
long to same organization (community). If two apps share the same remote servers,
they are also very likely to belong to the same organization, who use those remote
servers to achieve their malicious goals.
To model such community relationships among malicious apps, we build a com-
munity relationship graph G = (V,E). In this graph, each node (vi) is represented
as a two-tuple (app, author name), in which the author name is the concatenation
of the account name and the market name. There is an edge eij between node vi
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and vj, if these two nodes share the same app (i.e., the same value of MD5) or the
same author name, or at least one malicious server in the dataset of FTMalServers.
Accordingly, our relationship graph contains 9,850 nodes and 621,166 edges, as visu-
alized in Figure 6.9.
Figure 6.9: The visulazation of the community graph for malicious Android apps.
From this figure, we can clearly find that the majority (80.67%) of the nodes
are connected with other nodes. Also, there are a few large subgraphs that are well
connected. This observation implies that there are some large malware communities.
We next examine the percentage of the malware samples covered by those large
communities in all malware samples. More specifically, we consider each connected
subgraph as one community, and thus obtain 847 communities. We next rank those
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Figure 6.10: The distribution of the cumulative community coverage under di↵erent
ranks.
communities based on their size. For each community, we calculate its coverage (ci),
which is the percentage of its malware samples in all malware samples. Then, sum-
ming up the coverages from the top community to the nth community, we calculate
the cumulative coverage as Cn =
Pn
i=1 ci. Figure 6.10 shows the distribution of the
cumulative coverage with the value of n.
From this figure, we can find that the top 10 communities covers over 35% of
all malware samples, and the top 100 communities covers covers over 55% of all
malware samples. This observation implies that a few communities contribute to a
large number of malware samples.
We next make an in-depth analysis of the top three communities. More specif-
ically, we term one app’s duration as the time period (in days) between the app’s
submission time and the date when we crawled it; we term one apps’ infection rate
as the ratio of its downloading numbers to its duration. Then, we measure those
five communities’ size, average downloading number, average duration, and average
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infection rate (see Table 6.12).
Rank Size Downloading Number Duration Infection Rate
1 1,895 7,551 117 180
2 1,031 453 152 3.75
3 85 569 99 5.77
Table 6.12: In-depth analysis of the top three communities.
From this table, we can see that the malware samples in all these three commu-
nities have been downloaded many times, and last for a long time. More specifically,
the average downloading number for the top community is even higher than 7,500;
the average duration of all the communities are longer than three months. On each
day, the malware samples in all these three communities are downloaded more than
3 times, especially this number increases to 180 in terms of the top community.
We further analyze the inner community properties of these three communities.
In the top community, the most frequently used server is “217.65.36.4”, shared by
527 malicious apps. Once directly visiting this server by using its IP address, it
shows a “404” error. However, this server is one C&C server, located in Israel, used
for communicating malware samples belonged to the family of Plankton.P. Once
victims install this type of malware, the malware will download actual malicious
payloads from the C&C server instead of directly executing malicious behaviors.
Thus, this type of malware is more stealthy and di cult to detect than other types
of malware. That might be one of the reasons why this community of malware could
allure a great number of downloads. In this community, we also find one malicious
GooglePlay account, named “Antonio Tonev”, shared by 30 malicious apps. In fact,
this developer has been reported as an notorious malware author to submit multiple
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malicious apps in GooglePlay [82].
In both the second and third communities, those apps are connected due to the
abusive usage of the Android market by one malicious market account. In the second
community, one malicious account named “hongxiutianxiang” submitted 1,024 mali-
cious apps to the market of Anzhi. This malicious account mainly inserted malicious
payloads into benign WallPaper apps and E-book apps. In the third community, one
malicious account named “phoneliving” submitted 85 malicious apps to the market of
SlideMe. These malicious apps are developed mainly by inserting malicious payloads
(including malware downloaders and abusive advertisements) into game apps.
From the above observation, we can find that some malicious apps have strong
community relationships. This implies that if we can find a few malicious apps in
particular malware communities, we could find more malicious apps belonged to the
same communities.
6.5 Combating Malicious Apps
We next discuss a defensive technique that can be used to e ciently catch more
malicious apps, as well as to further verify the correctness of the defense insights
obtained from the previous analysis.
Considering that there are a large number of submissions to Android markets, not
all Android markets have su cient time/resource/capability to make a deep security
analysis of their apps. In fact, due to those practical restrictions, most of current
third-party Android markets do not apply any vetting process to examine the quality
of their apps. Thus, a lightweight inference algorithm, to guide quickly identifying
more suspicious apps instead of analyzing all apps given limited resources or time, is
indeed needed, especially for those third-party markets. In this section, we propose
a lightweight algorithm (AMIA) to infer malicious apps based on our analysis of
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the market-level and network-level behaviors of Android malware ecosystem. Note
that our inference algorithm is positioned as a complementary, lightweight strategy
to quickly find those more suspicious apps. The limitation of our approach will be
discussed in Section 6.5.3. In practice, we envision AMIA could be combined with
existing detection approaches (e.g., the permission and API used by the apps) for
more complete protection of the Android market.
6.5.1 Design of Inference Algorithm
In brief, our inference algorithm (AMIA) propagates malicious scores from a
seed set of known malicious apps to other apps according to the closeness of their
community relationships. If an app accumulates a su cient malicious score, it is
more likely to be a malicious app.
The intuition is based on the two observations found in our previous analysis
of the market-level and network-level behaviors: (1) Malware authors tend to use
the same market accounts to spread multiple malware samples, and within a short
time period. Thus, an app sharing the same author names (market accounts) with
known malicious apps are more suspicious, especially when their submission times are
close; (2) A few Android malware communities contribute a large portion of Android
malware. Thus, by propagating malicious scores from the seed malware samples,
we can find out more unknown malware samples with close community relationships
with those seeds.
With the above intuitions, we then describe the design of AMIA in details. To
infer malicious apps from a set of U unknown apps8 by starting from a known seed set
ofM malicious apps, similar to the way of obtaining malware communities, we build
a Malicious Relevance Graph by using these (M + U) apps, denoted as G = (V,E).
8In our preliminary experiment, we use all collected malicious apps from GooglePlay, SlideMe and
Anzhi.
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In this graph, each node (vi) is represented as a two-tuple (app, author name). There
is an edge eij between node vi and vj, if these two nodes has the same app (i.e., the
same value of MD5) or the same author name, or their apps share at least one remote
server9.
Then, to model the closeness of their community relationships, we assign a weight
wij 2 E for each edge eij 2 E. As shown in Table 6.13, if two nodes share the same
value of MD5 or author name, the weight of the edge will be added 1.0, respectively.
If two nodes share n remote servers, then the weight will be added based on the
Gaussian Error Function [126] f(n) = 12(1 + erf(
n µ
  )), which can normalize the
weight into the interval of [0, 1]. If the time interval between two nodes’ submission
times is   days, then a value of g( ) = 1.0/(1.0 +  ) will be added to the weight10.
Feature MD5 Author Remote Servers Submission Time
Weight 1.0 1.0 f(n) g( )
Table 6.13: Weights used to build the malicious relevance graph.
Then, for each node whose app is malicious, we assign a non-zero malicious score
and propagate this score to other nodes according to the weights of the edges between
them by using the PageRank algorithm [128]. When the score vector converges after
several propagation steps, we infer the apps in those nodes with high malicious scores
as malicious apps.
9In our preliminary evaluation, we filter out the top 1,000 frequently visited servers by those (M+U)
apps.
10The weight functions used in our empirical exmpriment could be further tuned to achieve better
performance based on di↵erent types of datasets.
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6.5.2 Evaluation
Since the goal of our propagation-based algorithm is not to cover all malware
samples in the market, an evaluation metric like false negative rate is probably not
appropriate in our scenario. Instead, to evaluate the e↵ectiveness of our inference
algorithm, we consider both the number of correctly inferred malicious apps, termed
as “Hit Number”, and the ratio of Hit Number to the total number of inferred apps,
termed as “Hit Rate”. Thus, a higher Hit Number indicates the algorithm can
catch more malicious apps; and a higher Hit Rate indicates the algorithm can infer
malicious apps more accurately.
These two metrics have been similarly used in several existing inference-based
algorithms (e.g., [138, 137]), where Hit Rate is more reasonable to be used to measure
the accuracy than the false positive rate. Next, we provide our evaluation results by
varying di↵erent selection sizes (i.e., the number of apps inferred in the top list), and
di↵erent seed sizes.
6.5.2.1 Varying Selection Size
As seen in Figure 6.11(a), while increasing the selection size, more malicious
apps could be identified by AMIA. More specifically, starting from 200 seeds and
selecting 5,000 apps from the corpus of over 82,000 apps, our inference algorithm
could correctly find out 3,070 malicious apps. This implies that our lightweight
algorithm can be e↵ectively used to infer more malicious apps. Also, as seen in
Figure 6.11(b), the Hit Rate decreases with the increase of the selection size. That is
mainly because the apps with higher malicious scores are more likely to be malicious.
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6.5.2.2 Varying Seed Size
As in seen in Figure 6.11(a) and (b), the more seeds we use, the higher Hit
Number and Hit Rate we can achieve by selecting the same size of apps. This
is because when we use more malicious seeds, we have more knowledge about the
community relationships among malicious apps. Thus, the performance of AMIA
could be further improved, when we have more known seed malicious apps. Also, as
shown in Figure 6.11(a), starting from 50 known malware samples, AIMA can find
over 2,000 malicious apps, many of which do not share the same family(type) with
those seeds. This implies although as a complementary and lightweight strategy to
quickly find those more suspicious apps, AMIA is not designed to find all malware
in the markets, it can still be used to find new types of malware.
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Figure 6.11: The hit number and hit rate based on VirusTotal.
6.5.2.3 Further Analysis
We further manually analyze those inferred apps that are not labeled as malicious
by VirusTotal blacklist. More specifically, while K = 1, 000, we manually scan the
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APK files of those apps, with the usage of multiple most recent Android Anti-Virus
tools11. By using three di↵erent sets of seeds (size=50, 100, 200), 266, 217 and 179
inferred apps that are not identified by VirusTotal blacklist are reported as malicious
by other Android anti-virus tools, respectively. This observation also implies that the
Hit Number and Hit Rate showed in Figure 6.11 are only the lower bound achieved
by our inference algorithm. While K = 1, 000, by adding the numbers of malicious
apps identified by VirusTotal (VT) and reported by other Android anti-virus tools,
the actual Hit Number (Actual) can be seen in Table 6.14.
Seed Size 50 100 200
VT Actual VT Actual VT Actual
Hit Number 677 943 732 949 771 950
Table 6.14: The actual hit number by using three di↵erent sets of seeds.
From this table, we can see that our inference algorithm is also a good complement
to existing Android malware blacklist service, (i.e., it can quickly find out more
malicious apps missed by the blacklist). Also, by using three di↵erent sets of seeds,
AMIA can all correctly infer more than 940 malicious apps, while selecting 1,000
apps (i.e., the Hit Rate is higher than 0.94).
6.5.3 Possible Evasions
Malware authors could try to evade our inference algorithms by only submitting
a very small number (e.g., only one) of malicious sample per account. However, this
strategy will significantly limit the e↵ectiveness of distributing malware. Thus, they
may try to create a large number of market accounts and use each account to submit
11This is very time-consuming and tedious work. Thus, it is not practical to use this strategy to
identify malware from a large-scale (e.g., over 70,000) corpus of apps in our data collection phase.
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one malicious app. However, in many Android markets, it will bring a significant
cost to register a great amount of market accounts. For example, in GooglePlay,
registering each market account requires one valid Google account and paying 25
dollars registration fee. Also, as long as the malware authors use the same groups of
remote servers to communicate with their malware samples, they may still be caught
due to their shared remote servers.
Malware authors may try to increase the false positives of our inference algorithms
by submitting benign apps on the same day when they submit their malware samples.
However, we can use a more strict strategy to filter those benign apps, due to the
fact that those benign apps do not communicate with those remote servers used by
malware.
6.6 Limitation
We note that the number of remote servers extracted by running malware samples
in an emulated Android platform environment is restricted by the coverage of the
execution paths (i.e, whether the apps meet specific conditions to execute the paths
to communicate with remote servers.), a common limitation for all dynamic analysis
based approaches. More specifically, it is challenging to trigger the apps to execute all
networking connections, even with the usage of the current static/dynamic analysis
tools. In our current work, to increase the coverage, we have implemented a UI
fuzzing tool to simulate real users’ usage of the apps, and inserted hundreds of UI
events.
6.7 Summary
Similar to the measurement of the malicious OSN accounts’ ecosystem, in this
chapter, we described an in-depth empirical analysis of the market-level and network-
level behaviors of the Android malware ecosystem. We observed find that neither
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existing Android malware blacklists nor IP/domain blacklists are e↵ective to stop
malware authors from submitting malicious apps to Android markets. We also ob-
served that malware authors tend to submit multiple malware samples within a short
time period, and discovered a few communities that are in charge of a large portion
of Android malware. We further proposed an e↵ective algorithm to infer more ma-
licious apps by starting from a seed set of known malicious ones and exploiting the
properties of their community relationships. This approach is promising because it
requires the disassembling of Android apps nor the deep domain knowledge of the
Android system.
132
7. AUTOMATED MINING MALICIOUS BEHAVIORS IN ANDROID
APPLICATIONS
Besides providing an inference-based algorithm to find more malicious Android
apps, this chapter further presents a more complete detection scheme by dissem-
bling Android apps and deeply analyzing the programming procedure used in known
Android malware.
We introduce DroidMiner, a new approach to salably detect and characterize
Android malware through robust and automated learning of fine-grained program-
ming logic and patterns in known malware. Specifically, DroidMiner extends tradi-
tional static analysis techniques to map the functionalities of an Android app into a
two-tiered behavior graph. This two-tiered behavior graph is specialized for model-
ing the complex, multi-entity interactions that are typical for Android applications.
Within this behavior graph, DroidMiner automatically identifies modalities, i.e., pro-
gramming logic segments in the graph that correspond to known suspicious behavior.
The set of identified modalities is then used to define a modality vector. DroidMiner
then uses common modality vectors to o↵er a more robust classification scheme, in
which variant applications can be grouped together based on their shared patterns
of suspicious logic.
We present and implement a prototype of DroidMiner for discovering and auto-
matically extracting malware modalities. While our e↵orts are primarily focused on
identifying and then characterizing malware behavior, aspects of our methodology
are also directly applicable to automated characterization of a broad class of Android
application behaviors, including the detection of shared security vulnerabilities [22].
We evaluate DroidMiner using 2,466 malicious apps, identified from a corpus of over
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67,000 third-party market Android apps, plus an additional set of over 10,000 o cial
market Android apps from GooglePlay [48]. Specifically, we measure the utility of
DroidMiner modalities with respect to three specific use cases: (i) malware detection,
(ii) malware family classification, and (iii) malware behavioral characterization. Our
results validate that DroidMiner modalities are useful for classification and capable
of isolating a wide range of suspicious behavioral traits embedded within parasitic
Android applications. Furthermore, the composite of these traits enables a unique
means by which Android malware can be identified with a high degree of accuracy.
We make the following contributions:
• A description of our new two-tiered behavioral graph model for characteriz-
ing Android application behavior, and labeling its logical paths within known
malicious apps as malicious modalities.
• The design and implementation of DroidMiner, a novel system for automated
extraction of Android app modalities, and using machine learning strategies to
classify a given app under the modality pattern of a known malware family.
• An in-depth evaluation of DroidMiner with respect to its run-time performance
and e cacy in malware detection, family classification, and behavioral charac-
terization.
7.1 Motivation and System Goals
Program analysis techniques (e.g., data flow analysis and control flow analysis)
have been widely used to analyze and detect traditional malware. Kolbitsch et
al. proposed to detect host-based malware by extracting malware’s behavior graph
through analyzing the function-call flow [60]. Fredrikson et al. proposed to utilize
control flow to extract discriminating specifications to identify a class of malware
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[41]. Christodorescu et al. proposed to mine specific malicious behavioral patterns
(such as decryption loops) from tracking the data flow and control flow of malware
[26, 25].
7.1.1 Case Study
We motivate our system design by introducing the inner working of a real-
world malicious Android application. This malware sample (MD5: c05c25b769919f
d7f1b12b4800e374b5) belongs to the family of ADRD (a.k.a HongTouTou). It at-
tempts to perform the following malicious behaviors in the background after the
phone is booted: stealing users’ personal sensitive information (e.g., IMEI and IMSI)
and sending them to remote servers, sending and deleting SMS messages, download-
ing unsolicited apps, and issuing HTTP search requests to increase websites’ search
rankings on the search engine.
Figure 7.1: Capabilities embedded in malware from the ADRD family.
As illustrated in Figure 7.1, HongTouTou registers a receiver (named “MyBoolSer-
vice”) to receive the boot intent BOOT COMPLETED message. Once the phone is
booted, the receiver will send out an alarm every two minutes and trigger another
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receiver (named “MyAlarmReceiver”) by using three API calls: AlarmManager(),
getServiceSystem(), and getBroadcast(). Then, MyAlarmReceiver starts a back-
ground service (named “MyService”) by calling startService() in its lifecycle call
onReceive(). Once the service is triggered through onCreate() or onStart()1, it
will read the device ID (getDeviceId()) and subscriber ID (getSubscriberId())
in the phone, and register an object handler to access the short message database
content://sms/)). Before sending out sensitive information and communicating
with the C&C server, the service obtains network information (e.g., network types
such as “CMWAP”, “UNIWAP” and “wifi”) by invoking two Framework API calls:
ConnectivityManager() and getActiveNetworkInfo(), and reading the content
provider content://telephony/carriers/preferapn. It then encrypts personal in-
formation by using Cipher.getInstance(), Cipher.init() and Cipher.doFinal(),
and exfiltrates encrypted data through SMS by using SmsManager.getDefault()
and sendTextMessage(), and issuing HTTP requests. Meanwhile, the service mon-
itors the changes to the SMS Inbox database by calling onChange() and deleting
particular messages using delete(). Finally, it also attempts to download unso-
licited APK files (e.g., “myupdate.apk”), to receive C&C commands and data, and
to visit search engines by issuing HTTP requests.
The above description motivates an important design premise that when malware
authors design malicious apps to achieve specific malicious behaviors, they typically
require the use of sets of framework API calls and specific resources (e.g., content
providers). More specifically, although attackers may attempt to launch malicious
behaviors in a more surreptitious way, they would still have to use those framework
APIs or access those important resources.
1If the service is triggered as the first time, it will call onCreate and onStart; otherwise, it will only
call onStart.
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7.1.2 Goals and Assumptions
The goal of DroidMiner is to automatically, e↵ectively and e ciently mine An-
droid apps and interrogate them for potentially malicious behaviors. Given an un-
known Android app, DroidMiner should be able to determine whether or not it is
malicious. Going beyond just providing a yes or no answer, our system should be
able to provide further evidence as to why the app is considered as malicious by
including a concise description of identified malicious behaviors. This kind of infor-
mation is typically considered the hallmark of a good malware detection system. For
example, DroidMiner can inform us that a given app is malicious, and that it con-
tains behaviors such as sending SMS messages and blocking certain incoming SMS
messages. With such information, an informed analyst could further infer that this
is probably a money-stealing app that uses SMS to register for a premium service,
spends money, and then suppresses the end-user notification.
The input into our system is an Android application developed with the Android
SDK. Currently, we do not analyze native Android applications implemented using
the Android Native Develop Kit (Android NDK). According to our observations, an
overwhelming majority of Android applications today are developed using the An-
droid SDK. Furthermore, the vast majority of malicious behaviors in Android apps
are achieved by using Android SDK rather than Android NDK. Even for those ma-
licious apps that use the NDK to achieve some malicious behaviors, they typically
also use certain Android Framework APIs to obtain some auxiliary information. For
example, “rooting” malware (e.g., samples in the family of DroidKungFu), which uti-
lizes native code to achieve privilege escalation, still needs to use specific Framework
APIs to obtain auxiliary information (e.g., the version of the operating system) to
successfully root the phone. Hence, the presence of such APIs in the Dalvik bytecode
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Figure 7.2: DroidMiner System Architecture
could still provide hints for detecting such malware. Extending our system to include
complete analysis of native code in Android applications is future work and outside
the scope of this dissertation.
7.2 System Design
DroidMiner contains two phases: Mining and Identification. As illustrated in
Figure 7.2, in the mining phase, DroidMiner takes both benign and malicious Android
apps as input data and automatically mines malicious behavior patterns or models,
which we call modalities. In the identification phase, our system takes an unknown
app as input, extracts a Modality Vector (MV) based on our trained modalities, and
outputs whether or not it it is malicious, and which family it belongs to. In addition
to a simple yes/no answer, our system can also characterize the behaviors of the app
given the Modality Vector representation.
An important component in our system is the Behavior Graph Generator, which
takes an app as input and outputs a behavior graph representation. As the anal-
ysis of a real-world malicious app shown in Figure 7.1, although Android malware
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authors have significant flexibility in constructing malicious code, they must obey
certain specific rules, pre-defined by the Android platform, to realize malware func-
tionality (e.g., using particular Android framework APIs and accessing particular
content providers). These framework APIs and sensitive content providers capture
the interactions of Android apps with Android framework software or phone hard-
ware, which could be used to model Android apps’ behaviors. With this intuition,
DroidMiner builds a behavior graph based on the analysis of Android framework
APIs and content providers used in apps’ bytecode.
In the Mining phase, DroidMiner will attempt to automatically learn the ma-
licious behaviors/patterns from a training set of malicious applications. The basic
intuition is that malicious apps in the same family will typically share similar func-
tionalities and behaviors. DroidMiner will examine the similarities from the behavior
graphs of these malicious apps and automatically extract common subsets of suspi-
cious behavior specifications, which we call modalities. From an intrusion detection
perspective, these modalities are essentially micro detection models that character-
ize various suspicious behaviors found in malicious apps. We provide more detailed
descriptions in Section 7.2.2.
In the Identification phase, DroidMiner will transform an unknown malicious
application into its behavior graph representation (using Behavior Graph Extrac-
tor) and extract a Modality Vector (based on all trained modalities), described in
Section 7.2.3. Then, DroidMiner can apply machine-learning techniques to detect
whether or not the app is malicious. DroidMiner also has a data-mining module that
implements Association Rule Mining to automatically learn the behavior character-
ization of a given Modality Vector, described in Section 7.2.4.
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7.2.1 Behavior Graph and Modality
7.2.1.1 Behavior Graph
DroidMiner detects malware by analyzing the program logic of sensitive Android
and Java framework API functions and sensitive Android resources. To represent
such logic, we use a two-tiered graphical model. As shown in Figure 7.3, at upper
tier, the behaviors (functionalities) of each Android app could be viewed as the in-
teraction among four types of components (Activities, Services, Broadcast Receivers,
and Content Observers). We represent this tier using a Component Dependency
Graph (CDG). At the lower tier, each component has its own semantic functionali-
ties and a relatively independent behavior logic during its lifetime. Here, we represent
this independent logic using Component Behavior Graphs (CBG).
Figure 7.3: Two-tier behavior graph.
The Component Dependency Graph (CDG) (upper tier of Figure 7.3) rep-
resents the interaction relationships among all components in an app. In particular,
each node in the CDG is a component (Activity, Service, or Broadcast Receiver).
(Note that multiple nodes could belong to the same type of component.) There is
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an edge from one node vi to another node vj, if the component vi could activate
the start of component vj’s lifecycle. For example, in terms of the malware sample
illustrated in Figure 7.1, since MyAlarmReceiver could activate MyService by using
startService(), its CDG has an edge from a broadcast receiver node MyAlarmRe-
ceiver to a service node MyService.
The Component Behavior Graphs (CBG) (lower tier of Figure 7.3) rep-
resents each component’s lifetime 2 behavior logic (functionalities), i.e., each CBG
represents the control-flow logic of those permission-related Android and Java API
functions, and actions performed on particular resources of each component. Specif-
ically, as illustrated in Figure 7.3, a CBG contains four types of node:
• A root note (vroot), denoting the component itself (e.g., one Activity or one
Service).
• Lifecycle functions (Vlcf ), used to achieve the runtime logic of specific type of
component (e.g., onCreate() in an activity, onReceive() in a receiver, and
onStart() in a service).
• Permission-related API functions (Vpf ), representing those permission-related
(Android SDK or Java SDK) API functions (e.g., Java API Runtime.execute()
or Android API sendTextMessage()). For simplicity, in the rest of this chap-
ter, we refer both lifecycle functions and API functions as framework API
functions.
• Sensitive resource (Vres), i.e., sensitive data (files or databases) that are ac-
cessed by the component. In this dissertation, we consider resources as con-
tent providers (e.g., content://sms/inbox/), which could be extended to any
2Lifetime, as defined by the Android, is time between the moment when the Android OS considers
a component to be constructed and the moment when the Android OS considers the component
to be destroyed.
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other type of sensitive data. The usage of framework API functions and sen-
sitive resources in an app essentially captures the interactions of an app with
the Android platform hardware and sensitive data. Hence, the control-flow
logic of framework API functions and the actions performed on those sensitive
resources reflect an application’s range of capabilities.
The edges in CBG represent the control-flow logic of framework API functions
and sensitive resources. In terms of framework API functions, we consider that there
is a direct edge from function node vi to vj in the CBG, if (1) when vi and vj are
in the same control-flow block, vj is executed just after vi with no other functions
executed between them; or (2) when vi and vj are in two continuous control-flow
blocks Bi and Bj respectively (i.e., Bj follows Bi), vi is the last function node in Bi
and vj is the first node in Bj. Then, we call vj “is a successor of” vi. For example,
in terms of the malware sample illustrated in Figure 7.1, there is an edge from
smsManager.getDefault() to sendTextMessage(). In terms of sensitive resources,
since our work mainly focuses on analyzing the control-flow of sensitive functions
rather than the data flow of sensitive data, we simply consider that there is an edge
from the root to the resource vr, if the component uses that sensitive resource3.
7.2.1.2 Modality
We use the term, modalities to refer to malicious behavior patterns that are
mined from behavior graphs of Android malware. More specifically, each modality is
an ordered sequence of framework API functions (function modality) or a set of sen-
sitive resources (resource modality) in commonly shared in malicious apps’ behavior
graphs4, which could be used to implement suspicious activities (e.g., sending SMS
3We could also choose to build an edge from a framework API function (that uses that resource)
to the resource, which relies on the data flow analysis.
4Although modalities described in this dissertation are localized within a CBG, our work could be
extended to include cross CBG modalities with the usage of CDG.
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messages to premium-rate numbers or stealing sensitive information). As an exam-
ple, the malware sample illustrated in Figure 7.1 relies on a function modality with
an ordered sequence of two framework functions (onChange()! ContentResolver-
.delete()), and a resource modality (content://sms/inbox/) to partially achieve
the malicious behavior of deleting messages in the SMS inbox.
7.2.2 Mining Modalities
Our desire to conduct e cient mining of modalities from large malware corpora
calls for an automated approach to mining malicious patterns. We now describe
the details of our modality mining process, which involves the following three steps:
Behavior Graph Generation, Sensitive Node Extraction, and Modality Generation.
7.2.2.1 Behavior Graph Generation
The generation of the behavior graph of an app contains two phases: generating
CDG and generating CBG. The generation of CDG is relatively straightforward. The
nodes in an app’s CDG are acquired by analyzing activities, receivers, and services
registered in its manifest file (“AndroidManifest.xml”). As a special case, Droid-
Miner extracts runtime the Broadcast Receiver by analyzing instances of Context
.registerReceiver() instead of parsing the manifest file. Much like [139], Droid-
Miner acquires the edges of an app’s CDG by analyzing the usage of intents in each
component. For example, an intent used in startActivity(Intent) can activate an
activity; an intent used in startService(Intent) can start a background service.
Since Android is component driven, and each component has its own lifetime ex-
ecution logic, the extraction of control-flow logic of framework API functions (rather
than the control-flow logic of methods in traditional program analysis) described in
the model of our CBG is more complex, which involves the following three steps: Gen-
erate Method Call Graph, Generate Control-Flow Graph, and Replace User-Defined
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(a) MCG (b) CFG
(c) Transformed CFG (d) CBG with API functions
Figure 7.4: Illustration of generating a CBG with framework API functions.
Methods:
• Step 1: Generate Method Call Graph. For each component, our system
generates a method call graph (MCG) containing two types of nodes: Android
lifecycle functions and user-defined methods. Since each type of component has
fixed lifecycle functions (e.g., onCreate() in an Activity), DroidMiner extracts
lifecycle functions by analyzing method names in the component according to
the type. Those user-defined methods could be identified by using a static
analysis tool. As illustrated in Figure 7.4(a), there is a directed edge from
method M0 to M1, which implies M0 calls M1.
• Step 2: Generate Control-Flow Graph. To extract the programming
logical usage of framework API calls, DroidMiner first extract each method’s
control-flow graph (CFG) via identifying branch-jump instructions in the method’s
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bytecode (e.g., if-nez or packed-switch). Each node is a block of Dalvik
bytecode without any jump-branch instructions. For example, M0 with five
blocks is illustrated in Figure 7.4(b). There is a directed edge from block B0
to B1, if B1 is a successor block of B0. Then, each block is represented as or-
dered sequence of framework API functions and user-defined methods, which
are extracted from the Dalvik bytecode with function call instructions (e.g.,
invoke-direct). We label a block as “null”, if it does not contain any func-
tion call instructions . For example, in the method M0, if (1) B0 contains two
API functions and user-defined method M1, with the execution order of f01,
M1 and f02; (2) B1 and B3 do not contain any function calls; (3)B2 contains
method M2 and one API function f21; (4) B3 contains one API function f41,
then the control-flow graph of M0 could be formed as Figure 7.4(c).
• Step 3: Replace User-Defined Methods. As illustrated in Figure 7.4(c),
since each leaf in the method-call graph does not call any other user-defined
method, the leaf either contains a subgraph of framework API functions or
is “null”. Then, our approach replaces its position in its parents’ control-flow
graphs with that subgraph. This process is recursively performed, until all user-
defined methods are replaced with framework API functions. For example, if
(1) M1 contains three framework API functions (fm1, fm3, and fm4) and one
“null” node after replacing its children methods M3 and M4 as illustrated in
the middle of Figure 7.4(d), and M2 does not contain any function nodes, then
after replacing its children methods M5 and M6, the graph will be transformed
to Figure 7.4(d). Finally, the CBG will be generated by removing those leaves
that are “null”. After the above three steps, each app’s CBG could be generated
that represents the control flow of its framework API calls.
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7.2.2.2 Sensitive Node Extraction
A modality is essentially an ordered sequence of framework API functions and a
set of sensitive resources that are commonly observed in malicious apps behavioral
graphs. We denote those framework API functions and sensitive resources as sensitive
nodes (the former are called sensitive function nodes, while the latter are called
sensitive resource nodes).
We use two strategies to automatically extract sensitive nodes. The first strategy
is based on the observation that malware samples belonging to the same family
tend to share similar malicious logic. Such an observation has been validated by a
recent study, which reports that Android malware in the same family tends to hide
in multiple categories of fake versions of popular apps. Based on this intuition, we
group known malware samples according to their families. (Note that the process of
deriving the family label for known malware is only used in the mining phase and
depends on the way of collecting malware. DroidMiner automatically acquires the
malware’s family label by parsing antivirus reports. More details are provided in
Section 7.3.2).
Then, for each malware family, we extract function nodes and resource nodes
that are commonly shared by at least ✓% members in this family 5.
Our second strategy is based on the observation that malware samples hosted on
third-party market websites tend to be parasitic, i.e., they masquerade as popular
benign apps by injecting malicious payloads into original benign apps. Based on
this intuition, we automatically extract sensitive nodes by calculating the ( ), i.e.,
additional bytecode between the known malicious app and o cial Android apps
sharing similar application names. The o cial apps are acquired by automatically
5In our preliminary experiments, we set the threshold as 30%.
146
searching for known malicious app names in GooglePlay. (We skip this process for
known malware whose names are not registered in GooglePlay.)
In practice, our two strategies can be complementary. To detect malicious apps,
our approach relies on the control-flow logic of these sensitive nodes. Also, the
e↵ect of those false positive sensitive nodes could be further decreased when we add
benign apps in training the detection model to decrease the weight of those benign
patterns. In terms of the false negatives induced by the second strategy, although
not all apps from the GooglePlay are benign, this market is still the only o cial one
with the best reputation for Android apps. Also, if the known malware family set
contains su cient malware samples, those missed patterns through the comparison
with o cial apps could still be found by using the first strategy.
7.2.2.3 Modality Generation
As defined in Section 7.2.1, we now detail how we automatically generate function
modalities and resource modalities.
Intuitively, our system generates function modalities by mining an ordered se-
quence (path) of sensitive function nodes from known malware samples’ behavior
graphs, as illustrated in Figure 7.2. In particular, for each path of each known mal-
ware’s CBG, we denote a subpath of it as a sensitive path, if it starts from one
sensitive function node and ends with another sensitive function node. Then, after
removing those non-sensitive nodes sitting in the middle of the sensitive path, we
generate function modalities from the transformed sensitive path by extracting all
of its subsequences. Generating function modalities involves the following two steps:
Extract Sensitive Path and Extract All Subsequences.
• Step 1: Extract Sensitive Path. For each pair of sensitive nodes Si and
Sj, we extract sensitive paths Pij of framework API functions from all known
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malware samples’ CBGs, if Pij starts from Si and ends with Sj. In particular,
for each path in the malware’s CBG, we generate modalities from the longest
sensitive path, which will cover the results extracted from those shorter sensi-
tive paths. As an illustrative example in Figure 7.4(d), if f01, fm4 and f02 are
sensitive nodes, the longest sensitive path could be illustrated as Figure 7.5(a).
Then, we could generate a transformed path of function nodes, through remov-
ing non-sensitive nodes in the middle. In the previous example, a transformed
sensitive path f01 ! fm4 ! f02 can be extracted by removing two non-sensitive
nodes fm1 and “null” in the middle.
• Step 2: Extract All Subsequences. We generate function modalities by
extracting all order-preserving6 subsequences of the transformed path of sensi-
tive function nodes. Accordingly, we could mine four function modalities from
the previous example (see Figure 7.5(b)). Since DroidMiner utilizes all sub-
sequences to generate the modalities instead of using the original single long
sequence/path, DroidMiner is resilient to many evasion attempts by malware,
e.g., insertion of loop framework API calls in the middle that serve no purpose
other than adding noise. Hence, our modalities are a more robust representa-
tion of specific malware programming logic than using simple call sequences or
frequencies.
7.2.3 Identification of Modalities
After mining modalities, the second phase of DroidMiner involves the identifica-
tion of modalities in unknown apps (i.e., determine which modalities are contained
in unknown apps). As illustrated in Figure 7.2, for each unknown app, DroidMiner
6This implies that the order of two function nodes in the subsequece remains the same as in the
original path.
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f01 fm1 null fm4 f02
(a) Extract Sensitive Path
f01 fm4 f01 f02
(1) Modality 1 (2) Modality 2
fm4 f02 fm4 f02f01
(3) Modality 3 (4) Modality 4
(b) Extract All Subsequences
Figure 7.5: An illustration of function modality generation.
identifies its modalities by extracting its behavior graph and generating a Modality
Vector, specifying the presence of mined modalities.
More specifically, for each unknown app, DroidMiner generates its behavior graph
and extracts sensitive paths from the graph. Then, DroidMiner obtains all potential
sub-paths by generalizing those sensitive paths. For each sub-path, if it is a modality
(belonging to the mined modality set), we consider this app to contain this modality.
This process of modality extraction is highly e cient due to the limited number of
sensitive nodes present in each app.
In this way, onceM di↵erent modalities are mined from known malware samples,
each app could be transformed into a boolean vector (X1, X2, . . . , XM), denoted as a
“Modality Vector”: Xi = 1, if the app contains the modality Mi; otherwise, Xi = 0.
In this way, an app’s Modality Vector could represent its spectrum of potentially
malicious behaviors.
7.2.4 Modality Use Cases
We introduce how to use an Android app’s Modality Vector to address the fol-
lowing three use-case scenarios: Malware Detection, Malware Family Classification,
and Malicious Behavior Characterization.
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7.2.4.1 Malware Detection
The first use case involves simply determining whether or not an Android app is
malicious. In fact, it is challenging to make a confirmative decision. For example,
although some sensitive behaviors (e.g., sending network packets or SMS messages
to remote identities) are commonly seen in malware, without a deep analysis about
such behaviors (e.g., the analysis of the reputation of those remote identities), we
cannot blindly declare all apps with such behaviors to be malware. However, as
seen in Table 7.6, Android malware typically needs to use multiple sensitive func-
tions (or modalities) to achieve its objectives: e.g., (i) sending SMS AND blocking
notifications or (ii) rooting the phone AND installing new apps.
According to this observation, DroidMiner considers an app to be malicious only
if the cumulative malware indication from all of its modalities exceeds a su cient
threshold. That is, the single usage of one modality in a benign app will not cause
it to be labeled as malware. We use machine learning techniques (described in
Section 7.3) to learn the indication of each modality used in the cumulative scoring
process. More specifically, we consider each of mined modalities as one detection
feature in the machine-learning model. Thus, the number of detection features is
equal to the dimensionality of the Modality Vector. By feeding modality vectors
extracted from known malware and benign apps into the applied machine-learning
classifier, the indication of those modalities that are highly correlated with malicious
apps are up-weighted in judging an app to be malicious; those modalities that are
also commonly used in benign apps are down-weighted.
DroidMiner could also be designed to detect malware using pre-defined (strict)
detection rules, like policy-based detection systems, which may lead to a lower false
positive rate. However, such a policy-based design requires considerable domain
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knowledge and comprehensive manual investigations of malware samples, which can
limit overall scalability and thus is more suitable to be applied to detect specific
attacks. Our goal of designing a fully automated approach motivated us to use the
learning-based approach instead of policy-based ones.
7.2.4.2 Malware Family Classification
Another use case is automatically determining which malware family an malicious
app that is determined to belong to. This problem is also important for understand-
ing and analyzing malware families. In fact, many antivirus vendors still rely on
common code extraction techniques, which typically manually extract signatures af-
ter gathering a large collection of malware samples belonging to the same malware
family.
Di↵erent malware samples in the same family tend to share similar malicious
behaviors, which could essentially be depicted by Modality Vectors. Thus, the de-
gree of similarity between the Modality Vectors of two malware samples provides an
indication of whether these two samples belong to the same family. Hence, with the
knowledge of Modality Vectors mined from malware samples belonging to existing
malware families, we could build a malware family classifier for unknown malicious
apps by using machine learning techniques.
7.2.4.3 Malicious Behavior Characterization
The final use case involves characterizing the specific malicious functionality that
is embedded within a candidate app. To solve this problem, we essentially need to
know which modalities could be used to achieve specific malicious behaviors. Then,
if an app contains those modalities, we could claim with high confidence that the
app is malicious.
To realize this goal, we use a well-known data mining technique, called “Associ-
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ation Rule Mining”. The problem of association rule mining is defined as follows:
Let A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} be a set of binary attributes. Let B = {B1, B2, . . . , Bm}
be a set of items, where Bi = {ai1, ai2, . . . , ain}. A rule is defined as an implication
of the form X ) Y , where X, Y ✓ A and X \ Y =  . The attribute sets X and
Y are called antecedent and consequent of the rule, respectively. It represents the
scenario that if the attributes in X are true, then the attributes in Y are also true.
The support supp(X) of an attribute set X is defined as the proportion of items in
the item set whose attributes in X are all true. The confidence of a rule is defined as
conf(X ) Y ) = supp(XSY )/supp(X), which could be interpreted as an estimate
of the probability P (Y |X).
We abstract this as an Association Rule Mining problem, i.e., we need to mine
relationships (association rules) from modalities to malicious behaviors. More specif-
ically, DroidMiner derives association rules by analyzing the relationship between the
modality usage in existing known malware families and their corresponding malicious
behaviors. e.g., Zsone has two known malicious behaviors: (i) sending SMS and (ii)
blocking SMS. Hence, we attempt to associate modalities generated from this family
to these two behaviors.
Our assumption is that in most cases malware samples belonging to particular
malware families tend to express similar malicious behaviors. (While our ground
truth may not be perfect, we believe that this assumption will be valid for most
cases.) More specifically, given a set of modalities M = {M1,M2, . . . ,Mn} and a
set of malware samples S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sn} with their malware family names, for
each malware sample Si, we extract its Modality Vector SMi = {Mi1,Mi2, . . . ,Mip}.
Given a set of malicious behaviors B = {B1, B2, . . . , Bq}, we generate a behavior
vector for Si, Bi = {Bi1, Bi2, . . . , Biq}, whereBik = 1, if Si’s family contains malicious
behavior Bk; otherwise Bik = 0. Accordingly, as illustrated in Table 7.1, we build
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a behavior matrix BMn⇥(p+q) by setting: (1) BMi,j = (Si,Mj) denotes whether ith
malware sample in the malware set contains jth modality in the modality set, where
1  i  n and 1  j  p; (2) BMi,p+k = Bik, where 1  i  n and 1  k  q.
M1 M2 ... Mp B1 ... Bq
S1 0 1 ... 1 0 ... 1
S2 1 0 ... 0 1 ... 0
S3 0 1 ... 0 0 ... 1
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Sn 0 0 ... 1 1 ... 1
Table 7.1: An example of behavior matrix.
Thus, the problem of identifying which modalities could be used to achieve the
malicious behavior Bk could be transformed to the following problem:
Finding a set of modalities, Mk = {Mi|Mi 2M, 1  i  m},
s.t., C(Mk) = conf(Mk ) Bp+k) = supp(Mk
S
Bp+k)/supp(Mk)   Tconf , where
Tconf is a pre-defined threshold.
Then, we consider the set of modalitiesMk that could be used to achieve malicious
behavior Bk with a confidence score of C(Mk). Accordingly, we mine association rules
from modalities to malicious behaviors with high confidence scores and su cient
support scores, and apply them to candidate malicious apps to characterize their
malicious behaviors.
7.3 Evaluation
We present our evaluation results by implementing a prototype of DroidMiner
and applying it to apps collected from existing third-party Android markets and
from the o cial Android market (GooglePlay).
7.3.1 Prototype Implementation
We implement a prototype of DroidMiner on top of a popular static analysis tool
(Androguard [45]). In our experience, comparing with other public Android app
decompilers (e.g., Dex2Jar [47] or Smali [50]), Androguard produces more accurate
decompilation results, especially in terms of handling exceptions. The prototype
decompiles an Android app into Dalvik bytecode, further builds its behavior graph
and mines its modalities based on the bytecode.
The method call graph in an app is built by analyzing the caller-callee relation-
ships of all methods used in the app. For each method, DroidMiner extracts its callee
methods by analyzing the invoke-kind instructions (e.g., invoke-virtual and invoke-
direct) used in the method. Since Android is an event-driven system, the entrance of
an app could be UI event methods (e.g., onClick) instead of lifetime cycle methods.
However, such UI event methods could only be executed after the corresponding
UI event listeners are registered (e,g., setOnClickListener). Thus, to make the
program logic more complete, DroidMiner adds an edge from UI events listeners to
corresponding UI event methods, although there is no such caller-callee relationship
in the bytecode. We use a similar strategy to address registered event handlers by
linking the handle method (e.g., handleMessage) to its corresponding construction
method (e.g., Landroid/os/Handler.init). We also modify Androguard to generate
the control-flow graph in each method by analyzing branch jump instructions (e.g.,
if-eq).
As an illustrative example, Figure 7.6 shows part of Dalvik code for the method
Myservice.onCreate() used in the malware sample described in Section 7.1.1. From
Line 1, DroidMiner will build an edge from Myservice.onCreat() to Myservice.
getSystemService() in its method call graph. Frome Line 9, which contains a
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1 invoke-virtual v8, v3, Lcom/xxx/yyy/MyService;->getSystemService(Ljava/lang/String;)
2 move-result-object v2
3 check-cast v2, Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager;
4 invoke-virtual v2, Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager;->getDeviceId()
5 move-result-object v3
6 iput-object v3, v8, Lcom/xxx/yyy/MyService;->imei Ljava/lang/String;
7 invoke-virtual v2, Landroid/telephony/TelephonyManager;->getSubscriberId()
8 iget-object v3, v8, Lcom/xxx/yyy/MyService;->smsObserver Lcom/xxx/yyy/SMSObserver;
9 if-nez v3, +1e
10 new-instance v3, Lcom/xxx/yyy/SMSObserver;
11 new-instance v4, Landroid/os/Handler;
12 invoke-direct v4, Landroid/os/Handler;-><init>()V
13 invoke-direct v3, v4, v8, Lcom/xxx/yyy/SMSObserver;-><init>
14 iput-object v3, v8, Lcom/xxx/yyy/MyService;->smsObserver Lcom/xxx/yyy/SMSObserver;
15 invoke-virtual v8, Lcom/xxx/yyy/MyService;->getContentResolver()
16 move-result-object v3
17 const-string v4, ’content://sms/’
18 invoke-static v4, Landroid/net/Uri;->parse(Ljava/lang/String;)Landroid/net/Uri;
Figure 7.6: The Dalvik bytecode of the method Myservice.onCreat() used in a
real-world malware with capabilities of reading device ID and accessing SMS.
branch-jump instruction (if-nez), DroidMiner will generate a new code block, while
generating the control-flow logic. Two sensitive framework API functions will be
recorded from Line 4 and Line 7, and one sensitive resource (content provider) will
be recorded from Line 17. Thus each application’s modalities could be mined through
examination of its usage of framework API functions and content providers.
7.3.2 Data Collection
We crawled four representative marketplaces, including GooglePlay, and three
alternative Android marketplaces (SlideMe [100], AppDH [5], and Anzhi [70]). The
collection from the alternative Android markets occurred during a 13-day period,
from June 3 through June 15, 2012. The GooglePlay collection was harvested during
a two-months period, from August 23 through October 23. Our resulting app corpus
is described in Table 7.2. In total, we collected 67,822 free apps, where 17% of the
apps (11,529) were collected from GooglePlay, and the remaining 83% (56,268) were
harvested from the alternative markets.
Next, we attempt to isolate the set of malicious apps from our corpus by submit-
ting the set of apps from the alternative markets to “VirusTotal.com”, which is a free
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O cial Market SlideMe AppDH Anzhi
Location U.S.A U.S.A China China
Number of Apps 11,529 15,129 2,349 38,790
Total Apps
11,529 (17%) 56,268 (83%)
67,797
Table 7.2: The summary of collecting Android apps.
antivirus (AV) service that scans each uploaded Android app using over 40 di↵erent
AV products [114]. For each app, if it has been scanned earlier by an AV tool, we can
obtain the full VirusTotal report, which includes the first and last time the app was
seen, as well as the results from the individual AV scans. For example, BitDefender
has a report for a malicious application (MD5: 7acb7c624d7a19ad4fa92cacfddd9257)
as Droid.Trojan.KungFu.C. In this way, we obtained 1,247 malicious apps identi-
fied by at least one AV product. For each malicious app, we extract its associated
malware family name, and when AV reports disagree, we derive a consensus label
using the label that dominates the responses from the AV tools. In addition, we ob-
tain another set of malware samples from Genome Project [140, 141]. This dataset
contains the family label for each malware sample. After excluding those already
appeared in our crawled malware set, there are 1,219 di↵erent malware apps. Thus,
in total, our malware dataset consists of 2,466 (1,247+1,219) unique malicious apps
that belong to 68 di↵erent malware families.
In addition to the malware dataset, we also construct a benign dataset using
popular apps collected from GooglePlay. To further clean this dataset, we submit
our candidate set of 11,529 free GooglePlay apps to VirusTotal, of which 1,126 apps
were labeled as malicious by one AV product. We discarded those apps and con-
structed our benign dataset using the remaining 10,403 free GooglePlay Android
apps. Clearly, the benign app dataset may still contain some malicious apps, but
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this set has at least been vetted by the GooglePlay anti-malware analysis and by
more than 40 AV products from VirusTotal. The problem of producing a perfect
benign app corpus remains a hard challenge, and we note that a similar approach to
construct a benign app dataset has been used in prior related work [84].
7.3.3 Evaluation Result
Below, we summarize our system evaluation results for malware detection, mal-
ware family classification, behavior characterization, and e ciency.
7.3.3.1 Malware Detection
As introduced in Section 7.2.4, we utilize machine learning techniques to conduct
malicious app detection. To better evaluate the e↵ectiveness of DroidMiner, we uti-
lize four widely used machine learning (ML) classifiers: NaiveBayes, Support Vector
Machine (SVM), DecisionTree and Random Forest. NaiveBayes is a probabilistic-
based classifier. It is fast, easy to understand, and has been widely used in spam
detection studies. Since this classifier relies on the assumption that each individual
feature is distributed independently of other features, its main disadvantage is that
it could not learn interactions between features. Accordingly, it is not very powerful
when the feature set is complex and the training set is big with high variance. SVM
is a kernel-function-based classifier, very popular for text classification problems. It
could achieve a relatively high accuracy regarding over-fitting, especially when the
number of the feature dimensions is very high. However, its performance is sensitive
to the choice of the kernel functions and parameters.
Decision Tree and Random Forest are two rule-based classifiers. They are non-
parametric and could easily handle feature interactions. Thus, they could achieve
high performance, even when the data is not linearly separable. Random Forest
considers the problem of over-fitting, which could perform better than Decision Tree.
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Classifier NaiveBayes SVM
Method Permission[84] DroidMiner Permission[84] DroidMiner
DR 75.1% 82.2% 78.8% 86.7%
FP Rate 7.2% 4.4% 3.5% 1.1%
Classifier Decision Tree Random Forest
Method Permission[84] DroidMiner Permission[84] DroidMiner
DR 85.7% 92.4% 87.0% 95.3%
FP Rate 2.2% 1.0% 2.0% 0.4%
Table 7.3: E↵ectiveness of malware detection (DR denotes detection rate, FP denotes
false positive).
Specifically, Random Forest is fast, scalable and often the winner for many problems
in classification. Also, Random Forest does not require developers to excessively tune
parameters as SVM does.
For each classifier, we conduct a series of experiments using a ten-fold cross vali-
dation to compute three performance metrics: False Positive Rate, Detection Rate,
and Accuracy. Specifically, we divide both malicious and benign datasets randomly
into 10 groups, respectively. In each of the 10 rounds, we choose the combination
of one group of benign apps and malicious apps as the testing dataset, and the re-
maining 9 groups as the training dataset. We further compare the performance of
DroidMiner with another classifier (used in [84]), which uses registered permissions
as major detection features, based on our collected dataset.7 Although [84] is mainly
designed to rank apps’ risks based on apps’ registered permissions and categories,
it also reports the true positive rate and false positive rate by choosing a particular
risk value as indicative of malicious apps.
Table 7.3 shows the results of using permission versus DroidMiner based on dif-
7We are unable to provide a direct corpus comparative evaluation with other detection systems
discussed in related work [142, 21], because they are not publicly available and it is generally
di cult to completely reproduce similar systems and parameter selections.
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ferent classifiers. We see that for all four classifiers, the usage of modalities as the
input feature set (DroidMiner) produces a higher detection rate and lower false pos-
itive rate than the approach of using permission features [84]. In particular, using
Random Forest DroidMiner achieved a detection rate of 95.3%, roughly 10% higher
than the that of using permission. Furthermore, DroidMiner produced a lower false
positive rate of (0.4%), or around 1/5th of the compared approach. Also, Droid-
Miner could maintain the detection rate higher than 86% for all four classifiers. In
addition, we can see that Decision Tree, Random Forest and SVM could achieve
better performance than NaiveBayes by using both permissions and modalities as
inputs, mainly because the features (both permissions and modalities) are not to-
tally linear separable. In terms of permission, particular permissions with semantic
coordination are often granted together (e.g., SEND SMS and RECEIVE SMS). In terms
of modalities, a shorter (more general) modality may be a part of a longer (more
specific) modality. Also, since Random Forest could solve over-fitting without the
need of tuning parameters, its performance could beat Decision Tree and SVM.
We next compare the average training time used for each classifier with Droid-
Miner. As seen in Table 7.4, we find that the training time used for all four classi-
fiers could be maintained lower than 150 seconds. Particularly, although NaiveBayes
could not achieve an accuracy as high as other classifiers, it is the fastest one (taking
only 0.15 seconds) to train the model, which validates what have we discussed about
this classifier. We see that Random Forest is both fast (taking only 8.15 seconds)
and accurate.
Classifier NaiveBayes SVM Decision Tree Random Forest
Time (s) 0.15 141.21 76.08 8.15
Table 7.4: Training time (in seconds).
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Further, to understand false positives/negatives, we randomly choose 20 false
negatives and 15 false positives generated in the case of Random Forest for further
investigation that were induced in the first two rounds of our ten-fold cross vali-
dation experiment. Through manually analyzing these apps, we find four possible
reasons that induce those false negatives: (i) Adware: we find DroidMiner missed
identifying 11 instances of adware (seven belong to Leadbolt and four belong to Air-
push), due to the diverse implementation of those adware examples. (ii) Native
code: Since DroidMiner relies on the static analysis on the Dalvik code, it generated
four false negatives that utilize native code to achieve malicious goals (e.g., root-
ing the phone). (iii) Dynamic payload: we also find four malware instances that
will dynamically launch malicious payloads by either downloading from the remote
servers (e.g., Plankton) or modifying local files ( AnserverBot). Since such malware
initially does not contain (or activate) malicious payloads, DroidMiner could not de-
tect them through statically analyzing Dalvik code. (iv) False label: we also found
1 false negative, which is labeled as malware belonging to the family of Pjapps by
Sophos in our data collection phase. However, our manual analysis does not find any
malicious payload from the app that could be seen in other apps belonging to this
family. Then, we re-submited this app to VirusTotal again and found that Sophos
has changed its description on this app and identified it as benign.
Similarly, we find that our false positives could be classified into four categories:
(i) Eight apps from GooglePlay are identified as malicious because they could send
out sensitive information. In particular, four apps (three Game apps and one Shop-
ping app) sent out phone information (e.g., IMSI) or account information8; three
apps sent out Geo-location information; the other app could send out the contact
8That could be because some Game or Shopping apps tend to use such information as the unique
identifier to distinguish registered accounts.
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information. (ii) Three apps could achieve sensitive functionalities as malware. Two
of them could automatically monitor and send out the phone state, and even unlock
the phone without using the password. The other one, named as “Task Manger”,
could kill the background process, start/restart an app, clean web browsing history,
and so on. (iii) One app is essentially adware, which belongs to both Leadbolt and
Airpush. (iv) Three other benign apps are falsely identified as malware.
7.3.3.2 Family Classification
The purpose of this experiment is to measure the accuracy of using Modality
Vectors to correctly assign apps that are classified as malicious to their correct cor-
responding malware family. To conduct the malware family classification, we use
samples from 12 families, each of which has more than 50 samples. The number of
samples of each family is shown in Table 7.5.
Ind Family Num Ind Family Num
1 GingerMaster 166 7 KMin 52
2 GoldDream 57 8 BaseBridge 122
3 Airpush 568 9 Geinimi 69
4 AnserverBot 187 10 DroidKungFu3 327
5 DroidKungFu 70 11 DroidKungFu4 104
6 Leadbolt 52 12 Plankton 194
Table 7.5: Malware samples used for classification.
For each family, we use half of the samples as training dataset, and the other half
as the testing dataset. In this case, the classification accuracy represents the ratio of
the number of correctly classified samples to the total number of samples in the test
dataset. Here, we use Random Forest for classifying both the training and testing
datasets. The classifier produces a relatively high classification accuracy of 92.07%.
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Figure 7.7 shows the confusion matrix produced from our classification of the
dataset into the malware family label set. The value of the cell (i, j) in the matrix
shows the number of samples in family i, which are classified as being family j.
Thus, the central diagonal in the matrix shows the number of correctly predicted
samples per malware family. The darker the cell color is, the higher the classification
accuracy is. With the exception of Leadbolt (index is 6), most of the other families
achieve an accuracy higher than 90%. Leadbolt is an adware family, and thus its
implementation may be influenced by the campaign it is serving, and thus producing
a behavior that has a wide variability, leading its samples to appear to match a wider
range of potential families.
Figure 7.7: The confusion matrix of malware classification for multiple malware
families.
This experiment suggests that Modality Vectors also have a potential applicability
to assist in the classification of malware family labels.
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7.3.3.3 Behavior Characterization
As described in Section 7.2.4, to characterize malicious apps’ behaviors, we first
construct a behavior matrix based on malicious behaviors observed within an ex-
isting training set of known malware applications. To decrease sampling bias, we
produce our training dataset using malware samples from 29 di↵erent malware fam-
ilies, each contributing a minimum of 5 members. Next, for each selected family, we
manually extract a malicious behavior description for this family using documenta-
tion describing the malware family from sites that contain malware analysis reports,
such as threat reports from various AV companies (e.g., Symantec.com). There are
many detailed public sources of information regarding malicious behavior description
for many existing Android malware families [103]. For this experiment, we focus on
the following six malicious behaviors commonly observed within many malware fam-
ilies: stealing phone information (GetPho), Sending SMS (SdSMS), blocking SMS
(BkSMS), communicating with a C&C (C&C), escalating root privilege (Root) and
accessing geographical information (GetGeo). Table 7.6 summarizes malicious be-
haviors observed within those 29 malware families.
Using an Association Rule Mining system, DroidMiner automatically learned 439
behavior association rules. In Table 7.7, we summarize the number of association
rules mined for each malicious behavior. Applying these learned rules to test new
malware samples (not in the training set) with ground truth information, we find
that DroidMiner could generate correct behavior characterizations.
7.3.3.4 E ciency
We now consider the performance overhead of DroidMiner in identifying modal-
ities. As described in Section 7.2.3, modality identification involves three steps: 1)
decompilation, 2) behavior graph generation and 3) modality vector generation. Ta-
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Family GetPho SdSMS BkSMS C&C Root GetGeo
ADRD
p p p p
AnserverBot
p p
Asroot
p
BaseBridge
p p p
BeanBot
p p p p
Bgserv
p p p p
DroidDream
p p
DDLight
p
DroidKungFu1
p p p
DroidKungFu2
p p p
DroidKungFu3
p p p
DroidKungFu4
p
DroidKungFu5
p p p
FakePlayer
p
Geinimi
p p p
GingerMaster
p p
GoldDream
p
Gone60
p p
GPSSMSSpy
p
jSMSHider
p p p
KMin
p p
Pjapps
p p
Plankton
p
RogueSPPush
p
SmsSend
p
SndApps
p p
YZHC
p p p
zHash
p
Zsone
p p
Table 7.6: Malicious behaviors in di↵erent families.
ble 7.8 shows the mean and median value of time spent on each step and the overall
time required to identify modalities for all collected apps.
Table 7.8 illustrates that DroidMiner expended an average of 19.8 seconds and a
median of 5.4 seconds to identify modalities in an app. We further find that the vast
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GetPho SdSMS BkSMS C&C Root GetGeo
157 144 11 71 37 19
Table 7.7: Number of association rules mined for common malicious behaviors.
majority of this time is spent on behavior graph generation.
Step Decompile Behavior Graph Modality Vector Overall
Mean 3.87 15.19 1.10 19.83
Median 1.65 3.08 0.56 5.35
Table 7.8: Processing time for identifying modalities.
For a more fine-grained performance analysis of this step, Figure 7.8(a) shows the
cumulative distribution of time used to generate behavior graphs for our collected
apps. For approximately 80% of the apps, our system generates their behavior graphs
within 10 seconds. As seen in Figure 7.8(c) and 7.8(d), the values of time spent
generating behavior graphs typically rise with the increased number of control-flow
blocks and programmer-defined methods found in the app. This occurs because the
behavior graphs of apps are extracted through analyzing the control-flow logic of API
functions with the consideration of their located control-flow blocks and programmer-
defined methods. Thus, the numbers of control-flow blocks and programmer-defined
methods will a↵ect the time used to generate the graphs. However, as shown in
Figure 7.8(b), the time spent in generating behavior graphs does not increase due to
increase in the app size. That is, a bigger app size does not necessarily contain more
complex control-flow logic.
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Figure 7.8: Processing time for generating behavior graphs.
7.4 Discussion and Limitation
7.4.1 DroidMiner Against Zero-day Attacks
Emerging malware generally falls into two classes: fundamentally new strain
with entirely novel code bases, and malware that improves (evolves) from an exist-
ing code base. The latter form arguably represents the dominant case. We believe
DroidMiner is well designed to adapt to evolutionary change in existing code bases,
and thus useful in detecting most emerging variant strains. As long as new malware
launches malicious behaviors through utilizing modalities observed in known mal-
ware families, DroidMiner should detect it. For entirely novel malware strains, an
166
additional strength of DroidMinder is that unlike traditional systems that require
human expertise, DroidMiner’s features (modalities) can be automatically learned
and updated by feeding new malware samples.
7.4.2 DroidMiner Against Common Evasion Techniques
As there is an arms race between attackers and defenders, Android malware
may evolve to be more evasive. As observed by DroidChameleon [91], common
malware transformation techniques (e.g., repackaging, changing field names, and
changing control-flow logics) could evade many existing commercial anti-malware
tools. However, DroidMiner is resilient to these common malware evasion techniques
studied in [91]. Specifically, DroidMiner does not rely on specific signing signatures
or class/method/field names to detect malware. The simple program transformation
(resigning, repackaging, changing names) will not a↵ect the detection model used
in DroidMiner. Another type of evasion technique is to insert noisy code or to
change specific control-flow logic. However, DroidMiner is designed to extract all
subsequences of suspicious control-flow logic commonly seen in malware. As long
as the malware follows a known programming paradigm to achieve malicious goals
(e.g., intercepting short text messages after receiving them, and obtaining the phone
number before sending it), DroidMiner could still capture such suspicious logic and
ignore noise API injections.
7.4.3 Limitations
Like any learning-based approach, DroidMiner requires an accurate training dataset
to mine its malicious behaviors into modalities. The e↵ectiveness of our approach
depends on the quality of the given training data, e.g., labeled malicious Android
apps and their families. Fortunately, it was easy for us to obtain such data (thanks
to prior research e↵orts from academia and industry). In fact, one may also rec-
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ognize DroidMiner’s automatic learning approach as a feature rather than a strict
liability. Whereas most existing approaches require significant manual labor to gen-
erate signature, specifications, and models for detection, DroidMiner o↵ers far more
automated model generation.
Our current behavior graphs and modalities primarily model the control flow in-
formation corresponding to malware behavior, i.e., we may miss some important data
flow information that could help build better behavior models. Also, the obfuscation
of the control-flow logic and the constant-string for content providers in the malicious
apps’ bytecode may decrease the detection rate of our approach. Attackers could
also split the constant-string for content providers (e.g., “content://sms/inbox/”)
into segments and recombine them later to avoid the identification of the usage of
sensitive content providers.
DroidMiner currently employs static analysis, which is a reasonable choice given
that current Android apps are relatively easy to reverse engineer statically, unlike
notorious malware programs commonly seen in PC-based malware. We acknowledge
that dynamic analysis provides an advantage in accurately studying runtime behav-
iors, and in the future we plan to extend DroidMiner to utilize a combination of static
and dynamic analyses. Like other Java static analysis studies, DroidMiner may fail
to identify certain usages of instances/methods, which are encrypted or made by
using Java Reflection and native code. This serves as another motivation for us to
incorporate dynamic analysis in our future work.
7.5 Summary
Android malware detection is a relatively new and very challenging research area.
In this chapter, we introduced a new Android malware detection system, named
DroidMiner. Our detection approach is designed based on the intuition that An-
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droid malware authors must obey certain specific rules, pre-defined by the Android
platform, to realize malware functionality (e.g., using particular Android framework
APIs and accessing particular content providers). DroidMiner automatically mines
malicious parasitic code segments from a corpus of malicious mobile apps to detect
Android malware, while preserving the control flow logic. We reported an experi-
mental evaluation of DroidMiner on many real-world Android apps and showed that
it has very promising detection accuracy with a very low false positive rate.
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8. LESSONS LEARNED AND A FUTURE MALICIOUS ACTIVITY
DETECTION SYSTEM
8.1 Lessons Learned
As we have highlighted earlier regarding the lack of the understanding of the new
types of the malicious activities in the OSN and smartphone platforms, an in-depth
analysis of the way in which the malicious activities are launched and propagated is
indeed needed. From and the success of our findings, and proposed defensive insights,
we have learned the following important lessons:
• An in-depth understanding of the malicious activities can facilitate the gen-
eration of the e↵ective defensive insights. By understanding the di↵erences
between malicious activities and benign activities, we can design e↵ective de-
tection features to distinguish malicious activities from benign ones. By under-
standing the strategies and steps used by cyber-criminals to launch malicious
activities, we can both design e↵ective defensive rules to catch those launching
actions, and reverse engineer those strategies to find other malicious activities.
By understanding how the malicious activities are propagated, wen can design
approaches to find more other malicious activities from a small seed set of
identified malicious activities.
• The graph propagation-based algorithms can be e↵ectively used to sample ma-
licious activities in both OSN and smartphone platforms by starting from a
small seed set of known malicious activities. In both the OSN and smartphone
platforms, if the cyber-criminals want to achieve significant attacking a↵ect
(or su cient profit), they typically require to launch multiple malicious ac-
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tivities. Meanwhile, these malicious activities launched by the same group of
cyber-criminals typically inevitably have some intrinsic connections/relation-
ships/similarities. Accordingly, these malicious activities and the connections
among them can be modeled into a relationship graph. Then, once we use a
few identified malicious activities as seeds, and propagate a score from them to
the rest of activities in the graph, those activities accumulate su cient scores
(i.e., have strong connections with existing known malicious activities) are more
likely to be malicious. Based on this observation, we can design lightweight
and e↵ective inference algorithms to find unknown malicious activities from
known ones.
• A more complete and e↵ective Android malware detection solution should rely
on more fine-grained detection features that represent the programming proce-
dure. Although several existing Android malware detection systems are devel-
oped, their detection performance is highly limited due to the features used in
those detection systems. These features are selected either too corse-grained
that are not e↵ective enough to distinguish malicious apps from benign ones.
Or, they can not be used to represent well the programming procedure of the
Android apps. Thus, such detection systems tend to generate many false neg-
atives. As we have shown, compared with the corse-grained features, those
fine-grained detection features that represent the programming procedure, can
be used to e↵ectively distinguish malicious apps from benign ones (i.e., achieve
a high detection rate and a low false positive rate).
8.2 A Future Malicious Activity Detection System
Figure 8.1 shows the architecture of an example design of a future malicious
activity detection system that incorporates the complementary techniques we have
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discussed.
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Figure 8.1: Example combination of multiple techniques in a future malicious activity
detection system on OSN and smartphone platforms.
The new system is divided into two main parts: analysis components and detec-
tion components. The analysis components contains three major categories: analysis
of individual malicious behavior, analysis of malicious ecosystem, and analysis of at-
tack targets. Each of the four detection components (Machine learning classifier,
inference sampler, honeypot and reverse engineering strategy) are motivated by the
defensive insights obtained from the analysis results.
While obtaining a seed set of known malicious activities on OSN or smartphone
platform, the analysis of the di↵erences between the malicious behaviors and benign
behaviors in each individual identify (OSN account, smartphone market account, and
smartphone malware) are very useful (and typically the first step) to design detection
approaches. The malicious behaviors in each individual identify can include the
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submission of the malicious content (OSN spam messages and malicious smartphone
apps), the submission frequency, and etc. Once accumulating su cient amount and
types of known malicious activities, we can design e↵ective detection features by
comparing the di↵erences between malicious and benign behaviors, and further build
e↵ective machine learning classifiers to detect malicious activities.
Besides focusing on analyzing isolated behaviors, the analysis of the malicious
ecosystem can help better understand more deep insights on how attackers launch
and spread the malicious activities on the communication platforms. In order to
attract more victims, attackers typically need to launch multiple malicious activities
(OSN spam and smartphone malware). Also, due to practical restrictions, attack-
ers typically also have to repeatedly use the same malicious accounts to submit their
malicious content, or repeatedly use similar strategies (e.g., injecting malicious URLs
into OSN messages, and using sensitive Android framework APIs to implement An-
droid malware) to launch and spread malicious activities. Thus, there are obvious
behavior correlation relationships among malicious identities (e.g., similar malicious
content patterns, similar account behaviors, and similar temporary patterns). These
correlations can be further used to find malicious communities, which are very impor-
tant to understand the influence and the categories of the malicious activities. Also,
the analysis of the ecosystem can further motivate the design of community-based
detection features, to build more e↵ective machine learning classifier. In addition,
by building the relation graph among the malicious activities, we can design e↵ec-
tive graph-based inference samplers to find more other unknown malicious activities.
Since this approach is essentially a prioritized sampler, it is very suitable for the
large-scale of dataset, which typically requires great amount of resource and time.
Also, unlike the machine learning classifier, which requires su cient amount of train-
ing data, this type of approach can be e↵ectively applied to find unknown malicious
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activities, while starting from a very small seed set of known malicious ones.
By analyzing the attack targets, we can further understand how attackers choose
their targets, and even uncover the evolvement of the attacks by keeping monitoring
the communication between attackers and their victims. Once knowing the strategies
used by attackers to choose their attack targets (specific types of OSN/smartphone
market accounts, or versions of smartphones), we can design more e↵ective honeypots
to attract attackers, and e↵ective detection approaches by reverse engineering those
strategies. In addition, since the malicious activities can become more evasive, this
type of analysis is very important to understand the evolvement of the malicious
behaviors, and further help design more robust detection features.
To conclude, we can develop a relatively comprehensive and practical solution by
combining multiple complementary detection techniques to achieve a multi-perspective
view, as shown in this section.
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9. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
9.1 Conclusion
Malicious OSN accounts and malicious Android apps are considered as the most
dangerous malicious activities to the security on OSN and smartphone platforms.
Millions of benign users have su↵ered a lot from those new types of malicious ac-
tivities, and they can further be utilized by cyber-criminals to spread attacks and
fraudulent actives on these two types of communication platforms. Thus, we urgently
need to better understand the ecosystem of malicious OSN accounts and malicious
Android apps, and further to design e↵ective solutions to mitigate and defend against
them.
In this dissertation, we have proposed an in-depth analysis of the ecosystem
of malicious activities in the two emerging communication platforms, and further
presented e↵ective defensive insights against those malicious activities. Our anal-
ysis mainly focuses on three facets of the ecosystem (attack infrastructure, attack
target, and relationships among attack identities). We also presented three infer-
ence algorithms for sampling more likely malicious activities (two are made for the
OSN platform, and one is made for the smartphone platform), and detection system
(DroidMiner). We have discussed our analysis and defensive insights in details, and
summarized the lessons we have learned.
Our analysis of the malicious activities and defensive insights have the following
three major characteristics:
First, our analysis covers multiple perspectives of the ecosystem of the malicious
activities. Our analysis of the spammers’ social networks uses the knowledge of graph
theory to understand the social relationships among social spammers, and further
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to reveal the reason why spammers have mixed well in the current real-world OSN
platforms. By deploying social honeypots with multiple fine-grained social behav-
iors, our analysis of the spammers’ spamming targets reveals that many spammers
tend to build unsolicited social relationships with those accounts that expose specific
interests. Based on these findings, we provide guidelines for deploying more e↵ective
social honeypots. Our analysis of the ecosystem of the Android malware first reveals
the fact that a few indications that are commonly used to select Android apps with
high quality are not that trustable. Then, the analysis further shows the characteris-
tics of the networking infrastructure that are tend to be utilized by Android malware
authors. It further reveals the characteristics of the community relationships among
multiple Android apps that share the same developer or similar remote communica-
tion servers. All the analysis of these perspectives facilitate us to better understand
these new types of malicious activities. Such analysis further spurs new defensive
insights against those malicious activities.
Second, our solutions are practical for the large-scale datasets. One common
challenge of detecting malicious activities in these two types of platforms is the huge
volume of the objects that are uploaded in the platforms. Also, these objects are
constantly updated by their providers. Thus, given the limited resource/time, it is
very challenging or even impossible to make in-depth checks on every object whether
it is malicious in a short time period. Thus, lightweight defensive algorithms, to guide
to more suspicious objects instead of scanning or analyzing all objects at the same
time, are indeed needed. By exploring social relationships and semantic coordinations
among spam OSN accounts, and reverse engineering spammers’ strategies of selecting
spam targets, we provide light-weight inference algorithms to sample more likely
spam OSN accounts. Similarly, by exploring the community relationships among
Android malware, we present light-weight inference algorithms to sample more likely
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malicious Android apps.
Finally, our proposed defensive sights are practical and capable to work in the
real world. Our defensive insights are evaluated on real-world dataset (real-world
Twitter accounts and Android apps). Experimental results are promising, showing
that our defensive insights can be used to e↵ectively capture those malicious activities
on real-world communication platforms.
9.2 Future Work
In the future, we plan to study the following directions:
• Larger dataset and more types of data. We plan to design and test more
crawling strategies and crawl more data, to decrease possible sampling bias.
We also plan to obtain more data from other OSN and smartphone platforms
(e.g., Facebook accounts and iOS malware), to reveal more insights of the
malicious activities.
• Dynamic view of the malicious activities. Besides analyzing the static view of
the malicious activities by crawling the dataset at a particular timestamp, we
plan to further analyze a more dynamic (evolvement) of the malicious activities
by monitoring the change of identified malicious activities for a longer time. By
doing this, we can further understand how the malicious activities evolved, and
further design more e↵ective detection approaches. We also plan to adaptively
change the strategies of our honeypots to more e↵ectively collect spammers.
• Analysis of more prospectives. We plan to provide more analysis of the simi-
larities and di↵erences of the malicious activities among more communication
platforms. We also plan to make a more in-depth analysis of the strategies
utilized by cyber-criminals to gain their profits.
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• More comprehensive detection approaches. We plan to cooperate our inference
algorithms with other detection features to build more comprehensive detection
models. Then, we can further evaluate the advantages of our proposed defensive
approaches, compared with other existing ones.
• Improvements of the DroidMiner. We plan to explore how to model malicious
code segments written in native code, which DroidMiner currently does not
handle well. We also plan to combine the dynamic analysis approaches with
DroidMiner to further improve the detection performance.
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